A SHORT EXPLANATION OF MR. HARE'S SCHEME OF REPRESENTATION.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXIII, Issue 5372, 15 June 1878, Page 1 (Supplement)

A SHORT EXPLANATION OF MR. HARE'S SCHEME OF REPRESENTATION.

Essays and Lectures (Fawcett.)

In the discussions which from time to time have taken place on Mr. Hare’s scheme of representation, so much has been said on the one side of its sim plicity, on the other side of its complexity, that it is a matter of no surprise that a large amount of contusion pervades the public mind regarding the merits of the scheme. It is the object of this paper to describe, as briefly as possible, its principles and details, without disguising the difficulties which would surround its practical application. The end and object of Mr. Hare’s scheme is the_ direct equal and personal representation in Parliament of every elector. If this end were accomplished, Parliament would become the mirror of the nation, and in proportion to the extension of the suffrage, all opinions would have in Parliament a strength corresponding to their strength in the country. ' To attain this end it would be necessary that each voter should have an equal amount of electoral power. At present there is nothing to prevent an elector from having a score of. votes in different constituencies. _ Nonresidence not being a disqualification for the county franchise, a man mayhavoa vote for every county in the kingdom, if he can possess himself of the requisite property qualifications. To remedy this inequality Mr. Hare’s plan provides that eaoh.eleotor shall have but one vote ; and in order to enable the elector to obtain real representation, he would bo permitted to give this vote to any candidate, irrespective of the restrictions of local representation. For instance, a voter living in Hampshire could vote, if ho chose, for a candidate standing in Yorkshire, or in any other part of the kingdom. . Under this system, those who are willing to servo in Parliament might bo described as “All England” candidates, because they could poll votes in every constituency in the kingdom. If this plan of choaing members of Parliament wore adopted, those candidates would of course be elected who obtained the largest number of votes ; but in order to prevent inequality of electoral power through one candidate receiving an immensely large number of votes, Mr. Hare’s scheme provides that no candidate shall receive more votes than are sufficient to secure his return. For this purpose the following arrangement is proposed It ia obvious that if all electors were allowed to vote for any candidate, well known and popular men, such as Mr. Gladstone and Mr..,Bright, would receive a large proportion of the entire number of votes polled. Equality of electoral ' power, which is one of the , main objects of the scheme, would bo

destroyed if Mr. Gladstone received six times as many votes as any other candidate; tor his constituents. would then not be sufficiently represented in proportion to their numbers. It has therefore been proposed to find, by dividing the total number of votes polled by the number of vacancies to .be filled, the quota of votes necessary for the return of each member. If CSB members are to be elected, and the total number of votes recorded is 2,032,000, four thousand votes would bo the.,quota necessary for the return of a member. .Each elector would vote by a voting paper, which would be drawn up in the following form :

Name ol Voter Address Vote No Parish of Borough of The above-named elector hereby records his vote for the candidate named first in the subjoined list ; or, in the event of such candidate being already elected, or not obtaining the quota, the above-named elector votes for the second named candidate, and so on in their numerical order, viz.:— , . 1. Name of Candidate 2. Ditto of another 3. Ditto of another 4. Ditto of another (And so on, adding as many as the elector chooses.) The foregoing form, filled up with the names proposed by the voter, expresses in substance this ; —I desire to bo represented by the candidate whoso name I have placed No. 1. If he should obtain his quota of votes before mine comes to bo counted, or if he should fail to obtain a sufficient number, and therefore cannot be elected, I direct that my vote bo transferred to the candidate I have placed as No, 2, and under the same conditions to candidate No. 3, and so on.

The above comprises the whole of the so-called complexity of Mr. Hare’s system of representation. The main principles of the scheme might bo translated as follows :—l. All voters to be represented in Parliament. 2. Each member of Parliament to represent an equal number of voters. 3. Each elector to have one vote. 4. Electors to bo allowed to vote for any candidate. 5. Electors to be allowed to transfer their votes from one candidate to another, so that ho votes are thrown away for candidates already elected, or for those who have no chance of obtaining the quota. The most striking effects of such a deviation from the traditional method, of conducting elections, would first be seen in Parliament itself. The House of Commons would then no longer be filled with local magnates whose names are unknown outside theirownboroughs, and whoseonly recommendation to serve in Parliament consists in their employing a large number of workmen, and being able consequently to command a considerable number of votes. On the contrary, the House of Commons would bo filled by really representative men, who would bo sent to Parliament not solely on account of their wealth and local influence, but on account of their opinions. A common charge brought against this plan of proportional representation is that it would bring into the House of Commons nobody but the representatives of crotchets. In reply to this, it may be stated that it will be their own fault if the people without crotchets are unrepresented; if, indeed, they are so few as not to bo able to secure a quota of votes for their candidates, then the House of Commons will justly be composed of crotchety members ; it would not be representative if it were not.