PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXIII, Issue 5372, 15 June 1878, Page 1 (Supplement)

PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.

(From the Copenhagen “ Nineteenth Century.”)

PRECIS TRANSLATED i'OR THE NEW ZEALAND TIMES, BY V. MONRAD. Second Part.

By the Electoral Law of 1855, Denmark proper was divided into several districts, with from one to seven representatives. Andre did not approve of this : “The qualification of the electors and the number of representatives having been decided upon, it becomes very plain and evident that a certain number of electors will be entitled to send one representative to Parliament, wherever the electors may reside.”

If the number of the electors who make use of their vote is divided by the number of the M.P.’s, the quotient will show how many electors are required to vote together in order to be unconditionally entitled to appoint a representative of their own. But if a sufficient number of candidates do not roach the quotient, what then 1 Then anything above half the quotient will be sufficient. But if vacancies still exist, then iJie whole of the voting papers are again taken into consideration. Andre’s does not approve of tills : “ The electors who have already put one candidate into the House are not entitled to have their list of candidates reconsidered. If the rest of the electors have scattered their votes so much that none of their candidates has received half the quotient, that is no reason for . lessening their influence by calling in the votes of electors who have already obtained all that they are entitled to.” Andre proposes that no attention should bo paid to “half the quotient,” even with the risk of having some members elected by a somewhat diminutive number of electors, and he boasts (1863) that Thomas Haro has, after a long consideration, come to the same result. The electoral system proposed by Andre would then be as follows :—The country is not divided into electoral districts, but it is left with the electors to organise themselves into different groups. Local interests would generally form the basis, but there would be no hard-and-fast lines. When an election is to take place, every elector will fill up his paper with one or more names. One name is sufficient, but more names must be added if the elector wishes to make sure of not wasting his vote on a candidate who has already been elected, as will presently be seen. The chairman of the Electoral Committee counts the papers and calculates the quotient. The papers are then deposited in an urn, mixed well, and drawn by the chan-man one at a time. The chairman reads out the first name on each of them, and the papers headed by the same name are placed together, and when any candidate has reached the quotient he is declared elected. The reading is continued as before, but if the name of any elected candidate is found at the head of a paper, it is scored out by the chairman, and the name which follows in the second place is read out and taken down. In this manner all the papers are drawn, and all the candidates who have reached the quotient are declared to be elected. If a sufficient number of candidates have not reached the quotient, the rest of the members will be taken from amongst those candidates who have received the greatest number of votes.

It may be urged against this system that ittransforms the eleotionintoalottery as far as those candidates are concerned whose names do not appear at the head qf the voting papers. If a good many representatives, for instance, are to be elected, and the quotient is 2000, 2000 electors may vote for A, supplementing their lists with B. and 0., whilst 2000 others may vote for A., C., and B. lie papers are carefully mixed in the nm, and A. will sooner or later reach the quotient, but it becomes a mere chance if either B. or C., or both, or none of them, are elected. In short, instead of certainty we have only chance, or at the best, probability; and yet nothing is more certain than if the quotient is 2000 then 4000 electors have an undeniable claim to get two representatives, and strictly speaking, they ought to have neither more nor less.

In the abstract the objection is indefeasible, and it would find practical application in a country where proportional representation had been recently introduced. The system presupposes an accurate knowledge of its workings, or, at all exents, a careful organisation. If all those who voted for A., C., and B. had only agreed to vote for A., 8., and 0., then the party would at all events have secured the election of B. The objection thus falls to the ground, but, and a very weighty “but” it is, on the condition that the individual liberty of the elector becomes very limited. Every party may, of course, fix upon whatever . list of candidatures it chooses, and may be sure of getting a number exactly corresponding to the numerical strength of the party elected from this list. It is furthermore optional with every elector to connect himself vrith whatever party he chooses, or to try and form a party of his own ; but having elected one he must closely follow the list of candidates adopted by the party, and that for a twofold reason. We have already seen that the vote of an elector may become entirely useless if a sufficient number of electors do not head their papers with the same name as ho does. It now appears that the same thing may happen even if nothingis the matter with the first name, should thisnamehavereached the quotient r, ■'fore the paper of our elector is drawn f roL n the um. Then again _ the papers will b e useless, unless a sufficient number of elect OTS have placed the same name as ■kt o 2 short, electors may, by combinin'*' a* a party, cause that party to become Jbettor represented; but the rtv and not the individual elector; will decide who fbeir candidates are to be; his chance of personally influencing his uartv will cve.n be less when the whole country ia one electoral district, and a party may sometimes have its head quarters far from the place where some of its supporters are residing. (It must, however, not be forgotten that under the old system he would have had no chance of joining the party, such as it is, however much he might desire to do so.) But the object of the whole system is that every elector shall in a free and independent manner be able to vote for the representative of his choice, whilst at the same time not one vote shall be entirely without influence on the result of the election, a circumstance which would very much lessen the political apathy of the intelligent and independent electors of the present day. We shall try to show in what way this object may bo attained. x T t is one circumstance only which makes h. ! ch especially makes it necessary that tj, ‘. wnes must follow each other strictly "the tama °rder. This circumstance is, i ii,, v <aiuetient is only found and made that tnt 1 day of thQ election> 1{ it ekerion to divide itself into 20 groups each electing its owa candidate; and each eMn .eieciius . only on to P.® I» -to *• I “oU.nt beforihaiiJ, il '■viU lb send aprinted note to every electoi, inquiring whether he intends to make use of his vote or not. If he replies in the affirmative, and does not vote, he must be punished by fines or by losing liis vote for the next election. When' the replies have been received by returning officers or electoral committees, then the number of representatives to be elected is divided into the number of electors who have undertaken to vote, and the quotient is known and published.

The electors thereupon form themselves into “electoral circles,” none of which must be more numerous than the quotient, and none smaller than, for instance, onetenth of the quotient. In order to bo recognised as an electoral circle, they must propose one candidate, and one candidate only, who in writing has declared himself willing to receive election. The electoral circle elects a committee,

| and elects as its domicile some place j where there is a magistrate, who . will have to act with the committee. When the Government has received the [ information from the committee, it prints i a list specifying the number of members , in each electoral circle, their domiciles, and the names of the candidates proposed by them. A copy of this list is sent to every voting elector, through the returning officer or registrar of electors within the county, and the elector must then, within throe days, return his voting paper, filled up and signed, to the committee of the electoral circle with which ho intends to vote; but ho is not allowed to join any of the electoral circles who have already reached the quotient. The use of, voting papers does not, like the personal vote, unfairly favorise the electors who are living in the neighborhood of a polling-place. In about six weeks from the beginning of the election, the papers will have been received at the domiciles of the several committees, and the counting up commences everywhere at the same time. On the voting paper the elector will have written, first the name of the candidate who has been proposed by the circle to whom ho has sent his paper, and subsequently the names of candidates from the list which has been published, in the order in which he desires to see them elected. The candidates which have been proposed by circles who have reached the quotient are declared to be elected, and all the voting papers from the circles who have not reached the quotient, as well as the supernumerary papers from circles that have exceeded it, are then brought to some central place where at first they are kept strictly separate. It may bo left to the elected candidate to decide which of the papers shall be looked upon as supernumerary as far as ho is concerned. It is better to let the candidate who has received such proofs of public confidence in supernumerary votes decide this, and thus, after a fashion, elect his own electors from amongst the many who have desired to see him elected: it is better, we say, to let the popular candidate have this influence than to leave it to the lottery of the urn. An English politician has proposed that no elector should be entitled to have more than one name on his paper, and that each candidate should be at liberty to bestow his supernumerary votes on some other candidate. Wo would prefer to retain the right of the electors to vote for as many candidates as there are members, with the addition that those who know, perhaps, only one eligible candidate, may, by confining themselves to his namo only, be supposed to vote according to a list previously published by him, for the case that he should receive any supernumerary votes. We have said that the papers were brought to some central place where at first they are kept strictly separate. First of all, the supernumerary papers are divided amongst the rest of the circles according to the names of the candidates which appear on them as No. 2; No. 1 having alreadybeendeclaredelected. Ifin this manner the candidate of any circle has received any supernumerary votes, these will again be divided amongst the other circles, according to the name which appears as No. 3 ; or if there be no name in the third place, then according to the list previously published by the candidate who received this supernumerary vote. The circle which is then found to be the least numerous is thereupon dissolved, the candidate whose name appears as No. 1 on their paper is rejected, and the papers are divided amongst the other circles, and thus the reduction is continued until the number of circles is equal to the number of representatives wanted. No vote will have been without influence on the result of the election. If the representative dies or resigns, all the Government will have to do is to let the electors of that circle which he represents elect another by simple majority. As all these electors may be supposed to hold about the same political views, there will in this case be no great danger in submitting to the rule of the majority. One very plausible obj eotion requires an answer. In spite of fines, etc., some of the electors who have declared their intention of voting will yet, by illness or other legal excuses, be prevented from doing so, but the consequence will only be that one of the circles does not reach the quotient. If it reaches half the quotient, the candidate may still be considered elected; if otherwise, no harm would be done if the representation was to be less numerous by one or two members than originally intended. If the country was geographically divided into electoral districts the case would be different. So far the ideas of A. 0. Larsen, in the “ Nineteenth Century.”