RUSSIA'S POWER OF ATTACK ON THE PORTS OF INDIA AND AUSTRALIA.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXIII, Issue 5341, 10 May 1878, Page 3

RUSSIA'S POWER OF ATTACK ON THE PORTS OF INDIA AND AUSTRALIA.

The Pioneer. Mail, an ably-written paper published at Allahabad, writes as follows concerning the probabilities of Russian offensive operations against the seaboard cities and towns of India and Australia :

The steady progress of the Russians in Eastern Asia, and the gradual formation there of a large naval station, have gone on almost unnoticed, while alarmists have been occupied in detecting threatened attacks on India in every move of Russia on our northern frontier. Since the conquest of Siberia in the sixteenth century, Eussia appears to have fully understood the enormous advantages to be derived from the possession of the River Araoor and the country and ports about its mouth ; for this mighty river, formed by the junction of two other rivers in Siberia, is navigable by steamers from such junction to its mouth, a distance of nearly 2500 miles. Erom the year 1636 the Russians made constant excursions down the Amoor into Chinese territories, and in 1666 constructed a fort and advanced as far as the mouth of the river ; this fort was, however, captured by the Chinese in 1385, and although subsequently retaken by the Bussians, they were afterwards forced to abandon it. No further attempts to obtain these possessions appear to have been made for some years, but the Russians were steadily improving their position, and waiting a suitable opportunity to again advance. During the Russian war of 1851-56 two expeditions were sent down the river from Siberia without meeting with any opposition from the Chinese; and when the China war of 1858 began, the Russians at once seized the opportunity of getting some : recognised footing in these regions, and sue-, ceeded in obtaining the Treaty of Tientsin,: which defined the boundaries of Russia and China. The second China war of 1860 was another opportunity which they were not long in seizing ; and no sooner had Pekin been occupied by the allied English and Preach forces, than General Ignatief otained another treaty from China, by which Russia was recognised as in possession of all the regions north of the Amoor and east of the Usuri River, from Cape Siodro to the Sea of Japan. This was the point on which Russian enterprise and ambition had long been fixed, and the importance of such a position cannot be over-esti-mated. It includes safe, capacious harbors in a comparatively temperate latitude, where navigation is impeded for only three months in the year, and often not even for so long as that. It has easy communication with the interior and : Siberia, and the Island of Saghalien (the greater portion of which now belongs to Eussia), with its rich fields of good coal, lies close at hand. It offers at once a convenient outlet to the trade of Siberia 1 and' the neighboring regions, and forms a central stronghold from which to carry on future conquests. The possession of the territory we have described gives Russia a naval station in the East, and the only station, too, in all her immense territories, which is open to the sea; for her stations in the Baltic and Black Sea could easily be closed by a superior naval force at their narrow entrances. '

The territory acquired by the treaty of 1860 is! divided into two provinces separated by a range of mountains ; and though thinly populated, colonisation is proceeding with rapid strides in the face of, enormous difficulties ; whilst numerous settlements are being formed along the banks of the ' rivers Amoor , and Usuri. The scenery is said to resemble "that of England, with a dark and rich soil, and well-wooded country abounding in . game. English vegetables grow ! successfully, , and timber is already exported in large quantities. The capital is ; Vladivostookj or Dominion ,of the East, situated on an inlet c 110(1 the Golden Horn, which forms a large and safe harbor, perfectly sheltered by the surrounding hills. This place was connected with Europe by a telegraph cable in 1872, and contains a large naval depot, which Is strongly fortified. This stronghold has been carefully guarded from the eyes of the curious, and but little ; information is available in regard to its actual resources for defence, but it is said to be im- ‘ pregnable. Our Naval Commander-in-Oliief in i China lately visited the place, but; was not permitted to examine the fortifications. ; Correspondence on the subject appeared ;at the time in some of the English papers, ; According to an official Hussion report, 'dated 1875, it appears that on the Amoor the ■Russians possess a- fleet of 9 ships, mounting :33 guns, and 18 steam transports ; but as ‘these are intended for the defence of the river, i which, as before stated, is navigable; for 2500 Smiles, and forms the boundary between the S Chinese and Russian territories, it is probable .‘that these vessels are unable to go to sea. But, in retrard to isoagoing ships, the squadron at Viadivostock is by no means weak. Accurate ■information as to its strength cannot bo expected, but it consists of about 5 ootvettes, 2 sloops, 7 gunboats, and 5 troopships—or a total 'of 19 vessels. Of these, 13 are believed to be ready for service, whilst the others are probably [in reserve. We must also take account of the 'five or six ships reported lately in the Pacific. iTheir exact whereabouts is not known ; but it is probable that they.are somewhere in the neighborhood of Vivldivohtook. Por nll we know, thq Russians, fleet/may ba very; niuoli stronger, for it. is not often these vessels pass through the canal, as: their movements would then bnknown. . out,'as they generally flo, round Cape Horn, they are comparatively unnoticed. Let us now look at the naval force maintained by Great Britain in the East, and available: against these vessels. Taking the last official “Navy List”, as our guide, wo find that the British squadrons aro as follow ;

In China : 1 ironclad, 3 corvettes, 4 sloops, 16 small vessels ; total, 22. In the Pacific : 1 frigate, 2 corvettes, 4 sloops, 1 gun vessel; total, 8. In Australia : 2 corvettes, 2 sloops ; total, 4. In India : 1 frigate, 2 corvettes, 0 sloops, 5 gun vessels ; total, 12. Our total naval force in the east consists, therefore, of 46 vessels, irrespective of the two un-ready monitors at Bombay, and two monitors at Melbourne,or any otherlocalshipsthat might be employed for defensive purposes on an emergency. In regard to actual numbers, therefore, we are not so badly off. It is not, however, the size or fighting powers of the Russian ships we should have to fear, bat rather their peculiar construction for the duty they would have to perform, which would be the destruction of our merchant shipping, and the annoyance of ourundefended colonial possessions. Most of the larger Russian vessels before mentioned are built expressly for speed. Armed with only two or three heavy guns, Gatlings and torpedoes, these ships resemble much the Active and Volage class in our own navy—a .type introduced after the famous Alabama had shewn what a. large amount of damage’could be in; Aided on an enemy’s trade by a light-armed but swift cruiser. The great speed of these vessels under steam and sail, combined with their small consumption of fuel, renders them formidable antagonists in case of war ; and out of the 46 English meu-of-var we have mentioned only one (Shah) in the Pacific, could deal with them. In other "cases they could simply run away without fear of being caught. Under these conditions there is almost no limit to the amount of the damage a few of these Russian vessels could inflict on our shipping and colonial possessions. Here to-day and gone to-morrow, they would carefully avoid our slower cruisers, and, if caught at all, it would be by accident. They would not attack (fortified towns or court a meeting with our solitary ironclads, but would visit rather the wealthy ports in India and the colonies that ■ are unprotected, and from which a contribution could be levied or the place shelled. Then, again, there would be the rich harvest of merchant., ships that could be gathered before warning could be given for them to seek the. shelter of some fort or inan-of-wari

It must not, however, be thought that this danger has sprung up without notice ; the Admiralty are fully alive to the necessity of providing agaioat such vessels, and are now making great exertions to provide a fleet; of swift cruisers—four of such vessels are now in commissions five are fitting out in the dockyards at Home, whilst no less than seven are being built in various Government and private yards. When all these are ready we shall possess a fleet of sixteen vessels superior to anything of the sort .afloat. At the present moment, however, it must be confessed •that war with Russia would involve serious danger to our shipping and Eastern possessions, bo long as the squadron from the Amoor was at large.” '..