MR. GLADSTONE ON AGGRESSION ON EGYPT.

New Zealand Times, Volume XXXII, Issue 5179, 27 October 1877, Page 2 (Supplement)

MR. GLADSTONE ON AGGRESSION ON EGYPT.

(From the Manchester Examiner.) Most of those who urge upon us the duty of making some fresh acquisition in the Mediterranean defend their suggestions on the ground of a prudent regard to our interests, and are more specific in their recommendations. They oscillate just a little between Candio and Egypt. One or the other they think essential to ua, if Russia is to be established in the Bosphorus, or even to secure a right-of-way for her war vessels from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. To make things quite safe, they think it would not be extravagant or unjustifiable for us to acquire both, though, if a choice must be come to, they would have us on the whole prefer Egypt. With Egypt once in our possession, with forts on the side of Syria, a garrison at Alexandria, an ironclad at Port Said, and the administration of the whole country in the hands of English officials, we need give ourselves no concern about Russia. We shall hold the road to India, we shall have asserted our superiority in the Mediterranean, we shall have calmly flung defiance at the other Powers, and may give ourselves up to. confidence and repose. This is the question which Mr. Gladstone takes up in the new number of the “ Nineteenth Century,” and we heartily recommend a perusal of his able paper to those who wish to familiarise themselves with the details of ft moat important discussion. , . . Wo believe that the proposal to take possession of Egypt may be successfully combated on the narrowest grounds of self-interest. On this point Mr. Gladstone's paper seems to us to bo conclusive. But we do not care to descend so low till we are driven to it, and we could offer good reasons for reluctance even then. We demur to the proposition that we have sufficiently proved the justice, the rectitude, or even the expediency of a measure when we have proved, even to demonstration, that it is necessary to our interests according to the interpretation we choose to give them, or the particular standard we set up. It seems to us that justice is, and ever must be, the truest expediency, and that the material interests of no country in the world can be promoted by acts of brigandage. We care for Egypt only because it affords a route to India some three weeks shorter than that by the Cape of Good Hope. We have done all that can possibly be done to keep the route open, when we have taken care that the Mediterranean and Red Sea entrances are not blocked up against us. This is the business of a fleet, and will bo settled for or against as In the last resort by our comparative naval strength. The Canal cannot possibly be used against us so long as we are superior to other Powers individually, or to any probable combination of them, at sea, and whan we cease to hold that position, on the theory which supposes that nations must always be employed in cutting each other's throats, we shall be in danger of losing a good deal besides the navigation of the Canal. In point of naval strength England is equal to any two Powers in the world ; whether she would be equal to three or four is a question we are not competent to discuss, but there is at least enough of doubt to point to the conclusion we wish to draw. If we mean to retain our Empire it will be wiser to cultivate the friendship than to provoke the enmity of other naval Powers, to act so that alliances will at any moment be within our reach, and especially to refrain from making implacable foes of France and Italy. In the new state of things which seems likely to emerge from the present war, those Powers, or one of them, may be glad to be assured of the cordial support of one who has so long been thair neighbor in those waters, but it wiU be an act almost of madness on our part if we pursue a policy which will send them both over to an enemy, and leave us without a single hearty friend in Europe.