LAW INTELLIGENCE.

New Zealand Colonist and Port Nicholson Advertiser, Volume I, Issue 64, 10 March 1843, Page 3

LAW INTELLIGENCE.

JIIDGMKNTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. GUYTON V. WADE. This is an action by the holder against the acceptor of a bill of exchange. The defendant pleaded, first, that plaintiff is agent for the drawer of the bill; secondly, a setoff against the drawer. On the trial, itwasadmicted, the plaintiff is agent for the drawer ; but no evidence was offered in support of the plea of set-off. The defendant, however, objected that the plaintiff had no sufficient authority to bring this action, and defendant should submit to a verdict against him subject to the decision of the Court on the objection so raised. In this state of things, then, it is virtually admitted that there is no defence on the merits. That the debt is justly liable upon this bill. The plaintiff, the holder of the bill, has at least a prima facie right to sue upon it. That the parties who endorsed the bill to him, could have done so, is admitted by defendant’s plea. No evidence has been adduced to defeat or narrow the original demand. The right of Ridgway & Co. to sue as agents of Foster, has not been denied ; but defendant says, that Ridgway & Co. could not transfer their right of action to the present plaintiff. It is said that Ridgway & Co. had nothing beyond a general authority. That they had no special authority to indorse to the plaintiff, and that without such authority, no such indorsement could be lawfully made. Various cases were cited, by which the principle is established, that every written authority given to an agent, is to be interpreted strictly, and not extended beyond what is clearly expressed, or w r hat is necessary for carrying the authority itself into effect. It is assumed that the powers of Ridgway & Co. were eonfined within the words of their letter to defendant, dated 18th July, 1842 :—“We are instructed to take proceedings immediately for the recnvery of the sum.” Now, I do not think the defendant entitled to make that assumption against the present plaintiff. Ridgway & Company were at that date holders of the bill. They stated all that was then necessary to state. Because they did not state more, am I to infer that the subsequent indorsement was an unlawful act ? The defendant might have so framed his plea, as to put the plaintiff to the strictest proof of hi 9 authority. Having omitted to do so, he now rests on the non-production of such proof, for the purpose of defeating the motion. I cannot justly allow the defendant to benefit by his own negligence. The defendant obtaining possession of the bill, will be protected against all demands in respect thereof. Judgment according to verdict. MERCER V. RBVANS. This is an action by payee against maker of a promissory note given for certain goods sold by plaintiff to defendant. The defendant admits part of the sum sought to be recovered, to be due, but as to the residue pleads that it is an overcharge, fraudulently made by the plaintiff in violation of the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant as to the price of the goods. In support of the defence, three witnesses were called, certain papers called invoices were handed to the three witnesses, who themselves went into very minnte and detailed statements, as to various items appearing on the face of those papers. Upon an objection being taken by plaintiff’s counsel, it appeared that defendant could offer no proof of those papers so as to connect them with the plaintiff, they were accordingly rejected. The jury found a verdict for defendant. The plaintiff moves for a new trial on several grounds, the main ground being the alleged probability that, the minds of the jurymen were influenced by the evidence thus improperly given. In general, I am but little disposed to disturb the finding of a jury. The power to ‘ do so is a wholesome, and, indeed, a necessary power, but one which ought to be exercised with great caution and prudence. In this case, whilst on the one hand 1 cannot say, that the jury might not have been justified in finding the present verdict upon the evidence of the two former witnesses standing alone ; yet, on the other hand, considering the nature of the matter improperly adduced as evidence, and the mode In which it was brought forward, I am far from feeling certain that it

did not weigh with the jury In forming their opinion. I think it just and reasonable to allow the question to be submitted to the consideration of another jury.—New trial granted. THE aUEEN V. RANGIHAIATA. This is a motion for a Bench Warrant against one of the Aboriginal natives, for the purpose of holding him to bail on a charge of felony. The issuing of this Warrant would be equivalent to decision of several important points. The two main questions involved are— First.—That of the statues, or legal position, and liabilities of certain portion, and that, a large portion of native population. Secondly.—That of the construction of the 4th section of the Police Magistrate’s Ordinance, Session 2, No. 4,—the former of.these points was touched upon by the Council, but the discussion was, from the nature of an ex parte application , less complete than was desirable. The latter was not adverted to, although, if ever the point shall come to be fully argued, the clause referred to, may possibly be found to preclude all applications like the present. Under these circumstances, seeing that the matter sought by this application, is one of right, but within the discretion of the Judge; and seeing, also, that the granting thereof would be a virtual decision of the points referred to, and that to upon a mere ex parte motion, without any full argument, or .even without any argument at all; Ido not think I should be exercising a sound discretion if I were to issue this warrant.* * The practice in issuing the bench warrants is, that where the parties-are not under recognizance, the prosecutor has a right, during the assizes or sessions, to this process against them, to bring them immediately into court to answer. —1 Chitty's Criminal Law , 342.

The following is the confession of Dr. Nugent, respecting the destruction of the mail bag on board the New York Packet, on her voyage from London to this Port:— During our passage, there was a white linen bag in which there were a variety of things, amongst other things, there were a bundle of papers called cockets, belonging to the Captain of the New York Packet. There were also newspapers and letters, directed to various parties; I cannot recollect to whom the various letters were directed, except to a Mr. Scott, of Auckland, and to Mr. Wilson, of Wanganui, containing the duplicate of the money order he entrusted me with. The whole of the letters and papers I put out of the porthole—the cockets I.kept for some time, meaning to put them in some place where he (Capt. Gregory) should discover them ; they were in a canvas bag for nearly two months —in the cuddy. On the morning we arrived here, when this bag was enquired for, I took the cockets out of the bag, tied them up tight, and threw them into the sea that evening. I opened all the letters sometime previous; but there were no remittances, either in money or bills, except for Mr. Wilson. George D. Nugent. Signed before me this 27th day of February, 1843. George White, Chief Police Magistrate.