GREAT BRITAIN'S DEFENCES. (Daily Chronicle.)

North Otago Times, Volume XXXVII, Issue 8174, 4 May 1895, Page 4

GREAT BRITAIN'S DEFENCES. (Daily Chronicle.)

Wo talk with a certain easy cant of tho virtuo3 of arbitration. What steps aro wo taking in that direction ? None whatovor. European stateamou wait) for us as tho Power which is supposed to bo pro-orainenbly industrial and anti-warlike. Wo, in our turn, waib for European statesmen. In tho moanbinio Italy struggles with bankruptcy, induced purely by hor military and naval responsibilities. Russia and Germany aro crushed by militarism, Franco oxisb mainly for the sake of hor army, whilo as a naval Power she is in close and constanb competition with ourselves. Thab is tho spoctaclo of Christian Europo nearly ninoteon hundred years aftor tho birth of the Prince of Pence. As for our own position, ib ia perhaps more assailable in regard to tho Army than in relation to tho Navy. A strong Navy is no doubt with us a dofensive force. We covob no man's territory, aud our ironclads aud cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyors have, in tho eyes of sensible statesmen, no other objecb than tho pro tection of our trade and tho securing of our food supplies. In that view the idea of a strong Navy is a national policy. We should nob, however, require so strong a Navy if wo abandoned the Mediterranean, as some experts think we ought to do. But what are we to say of outlay on an army which feebly imitates tho Continental system without securing its oflicioncy and workmanlike quality? Our army costs us as much as the giant levies of Fiance or Germany, and whab do wo get for it 1 According to tho Times, wo could jusb succeed in pi icing a siuglo army corps in the field as against the thirty armycorps of France or Germany. Sir Frederick KitzWygram, a Conservative Member and a cavalry officer of distinction, declares thab the groat bulk of the cavalry regiments aro hopelessly inefticient — mere skeleton bodies, useless without a comploto plan of reorganisation. We doubb whether a single |soldier of any experience or listioctioo. would in tho main traverse theao statements. But why are thoy so freely made, and why is every important recommendation made by iho Ilartington Commission dis e^urded ? Thoro U ono answer to this question. Jt is bceaiHO Mr ampbell-Banncrman poimits an inoompctont and obstructive aid gentloman to remain ab tho hoad of tho UritishArmy for no othor reason than th it he is connected by blood with tho lloyal Family. Tho Duko of Cambiidge is, as overybody knows, nob a soldier at all in the modern senso of ho word, Lord Wolsoley or Lord Roberts or Sir Evelyn Wood or Sir Kedvers Duller would not for a momenb regard him as competenb to lirect the operations of tho British Army provided we were engaged in a serious conflict with a military Power. The cosb of maintaining a largely inefficient force, is admittedly swollen by tho overloading of tho Army list with generals, and by tho way in which the Commander-in-Chief distributes his patronage. Wo do not know whether tho Queen considers that her personal interests aro served by tho way in which the royal command of tho Army is nominally maintained at tho expense of its efliciency. Ff so tho comments of Conservative journals and of Conservative military men in tho Houso of Commons ought to have opened their eyes bo the truth. As for the inwardness of tho entire military question, ib is doubtful whether we want an army, in tho European sense, aball. Ireland ought, if our statesmon would only consenb to proclaim a truce with Irish national - ism, to bfl relieved of its army tomorrow ; England, Wales, and Scob. land ought nob to require ono ab all. The lesson of the China. Japaneso war is surely that security from invasion depends on our command of the sea, and thab if that is lost land forces and land defences are of little avail. We agree that tho command ought not to be abandoned, and thab a sea-Powor may be prepared to make greab sacrifices in order to maintain it. But it is worth asking what proportion of the cost of the war forces of tho empire is due to retention in Egypt, and how much wo can save by a withdrawal which, according to Lord Charles Beresford and other authorities, we shall be compelled to effecb in tho time of war. In a word we are drifting, and perilously drifting.