THE WAR.

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume VI, Issue 114, 16 May 1871, Page 2

THE WA R .

(.From tf/ie Saturday * Review, February 18). , The Emperor Napoleon has thought it necessary to remind Francelof his existence. He wishes to inform all whom it may concern that he was betrayed by* fortune, that he admired the resistance of the country, that he thinks the Government of National Defence ought to be punished, and that be is still the Eiect«6f France, and the only capable pers__" ready an{T willing to govern it. jpae absent are always in the wrong, __d the Emperpr might be wise in thinking that already he, on whose lips and words of wisdom all Europe so lately hung attentive, was in danger of being actually forgotten. The stream of events seemed rushing by and leaving him alone and unremembered on a shelf. He had to do a most difficult task; he had to acknowledge his failure, to account for it, and to let it -(^understood^ that he,still believed his En_pire is going' on. This was a very harff antTfcuzzling thing to do with grav^tjf and decency, and perhaps the Emperor has done it as successfully as most would have done H. He knows pretty well by this time how to write for the French taste. He dashes at once into the middle of things, and solemnly announces. that he was betrayed - by fortune. Every Frenchman? who gets into a bad scrape sets it down/that he has been betrayed by someh/iy, and an Emperor who has had Jtftie conduct of affairs entirely in his ojtfn'.jbands can at least rail against luckj^or his star, or some vague thing that has been too powerful even for hira.. .The -whole of the Emperor's history, from the declaration of war to _; 7\LX -: : VA.il .'iiKiu...' n\w>. ..• r,i< ci

Sedan, is ihus brushed a*vay from his memory and from that of his renders. He was betrayed by fortune; that is all* and the best and wisest of men may be betrayed by fortune. If France could but; entirely forget all that happened six months ago, the Emperor might really feel himself again. He provoked. a perfectly unnecessary war, he allowed himself to be first goaded on and then bullied and bandied about by a little clique of tenthrate military: men and U.lfcrainontanes; he who had been spending the money of France for years had no army, no commander, no in tendance, no stores ready. He showed himself incapable alike of I advancing to attack,, or of organising a defensive campaign. He suffered himself to be told by a knot of incapable women officials at Paris to lead his, best troops to the overwhelming disaster of Sedan. And then he gets over all this by simply stating that he was betrayed by fortune. For remainder of news syi-jburili page.

He was quite right; for if France remember^ anything he paighjr as . well address proclamations to the winds as to herj if she decides on remembering nothing, she may as well hide herself under the cover of the formula that her Emperor was betraye_ by fortune as under any other. The Emperor has' judgedrightly of the situation. So long as he had only to contrast his Government with . that, of the Government of National Defence he might hope that in her weariness and misery France, might wish to blot out a humiliating 'memory altogether, and get ber old Saviour of Society back again. But the "elections were quite another thing. An Assembly elected by the whole nation, and composed of men coming up from provinces desolated or menaced by the war he wantonly provoked, and from constituencies sacrificed by the hollow and corrupt "system he had for years imposed upon France, will have another reading of history than that it was fortune that betrayed the prisoner of Cassel. The constitution of such an Assembly, which will nominate a Government that will be immediately recognised by neutral Powers as entitled to speak for France, at once puts, the forgotten Emperor aside,, and reduces him to the rank of a Pretender. This is the Emperor's last speech, his last appeal. He could but protest ; and he has protested that if France would but pretend to know nothing of the causes of the national calamities of last August, he would come back and govern beautifully, and keep the churches clean. At present all that is not ignoble in France appears to prefer an Assembly, and ao order 1 of things which shall at least be new, and raise hopes of something better than the Empire.

Another celebrity also at this moment makes his bow to France and leaves her, finding that her ways are not his ways, and that she does not want him. Garibaldi has gone back to Caprera, and it must be acknowledged that the news ha_ everywhere been heard with relief aod satisfaction. It is comforting to know that the foolish old man has not been hart or killed, and that he has not ended a career once so brilliant in an enterprise so little creditable to him. He has not done, any good to France, and he has not got any thanks from France. The French did not at all like him and his wayward adventures. Those of his followers who really fought despised the raw French lads who shrank by their side from the horrors of war. We know the truth as to both parts of the brilliant picture which M. Gambetta drew of what would have been done in the East if M. Jules Favre had not mismanaged matters so dreadfully with regard to the armistice, j The Germans were saved by the culpable rashness of M. Favre, as M. Gambetta explained, for a most brilliant manoeuvre wss on the point of being executed which wotald 'Mve annihilated them. Bourbaki, j witb\hils 80,000 men, was, going to turn roundXsuddenly and face btk pursuers, while Garibaldi, with 50,000,^ \as going to take them in the rear and cut them to pieces. The extravagance of representing Bourkaki's starving rabble as likely to turn on their pursuers was obvious to the j readers of M. Gambetta' s fiery words ; but it was not easy to say what were tbe real facts about Garibaldi. The history of the last days of the military command of j Garibjaldi in France is now revealed. It is simpleNanough. He had got somewhere about half the force that M. Gambetta | assigned to him. When Manteufliel wanted to get by him to crush Bourbaki, j he sent a small force to attack Garibaldi at Dijon, and occupy his attention. Gari- j baldi obtained an easy success, .and had no more notion than a child that he was beiDg fooled into quietly throwing away the last chance of saving Bourbaki. He waited until the Germans came back after, drivingßourbaki's troops into Switzerland, and then he was told he ; must go away from Dijon, which he did. So ended the army of the Vosges, as his motley force was called, and his exploits as a general of France. It is not his fault that he showed himself incompetent to conduct the operations of regular war, for he bad already shown this in the Tyrol, and' the i French who accepted ' him as a 'gieneral knew that, except by chance, he could do I no good. But be came as an enthusiast to enthusiasts, and 'it was his enthusiasm i that was really acceptable. He cast the mantle of the Universal Republic over the naked and trembling shoulders of the; GoVernment of National 'Defence. It is I true that the bigoted intolerance which isj oue. of the marks of . the Universal Jse-j public, and which showed itself : 6n» the part of the Garibaldians in insulting the! religious feelings 1 of ;/ th6 '^ebpl^ jtheyj supposed themselves, to be simhg, caused! many inconveniences ,io. the, Ggv^rnment! liß^^lujjh'^ Garibaldi apte^., ; , %$ fy^adj at least one ..recommendation i ta.ua i iRe-i publican Government j he was -a./Re-j W\>)\s&® e^:M MW th $^ nl y 'BeptaWfcap| general to be found. The undoubted

courage of himself jind his men afford a j useful set-off to the equfHjs undoubted courage of the Pontifical Zouaves.T'X,Y^ as something to ' bave<_«ne ;; real,'<:jbl-t. of 'Republican enthusiasm in, the armies of a Republic. But tbe- day* for enthusiasm and spasmodic local efforts is- over, aiid that of business, and soberness, and national action, is begun ; and Graf rbaldi very properly retires from a scene and a sphere so alien to his habits and tastes. The Germans, with their wonted foresight and activity, are said to be making every preparation for resuming the war if peace cannot be made. Large bodies of troops have been sent southwards and eastwards, so as to, be able without losing a day to begin their march on Lyons. This is only what prudence bids them do, for nothing, yet has been conclSd^d snore than a short armistice, which, as at first arranged, would have expired to-morrow, and is now only to last until next Friday. But there is now apparently no chance of the war going on. There are no French armies left ; Chanzy has been to Paris to explain that his force cannot be relied, on, and Faidherbe, while in a general way informing his men that they must be ready to fight the enemy again if necessary, added a very significant hint that the next occasion when their martial valour would- be taxed would very probably be in fighting, not against Germans, but against Frenchmen. Whenageneral busg ot to explaining to his troops that their chief use will be to keep order at home, the enemy may make himself tolerably cpm.fortable about them. Tbe Assembly* i& proceeding to name a Government that will treat for peace. So confident are the Germans of peace that it is said the sick are to be moved out of the barracks in Germany to make way for the troops on their return. There is as great a longing for peace in the German, army almost as there would have been in the French . armies, if there . ha,il beeu any French army to speak of. As to the terms of peace, it becomes more and mb_;a clear that there are only two points 'reaVy at issue. Will the Germans insist on retaining Metz ? and will they insist on marching through Paris ? Therie two questions appear of almost equal importance, at any rate to the Parisians. Count Bismarck has said that he must and will have Metz, and the Germans appear at present inclined to insist on marching through Paris, partly to gratify the soldiery, but much more to make it evident to the Parisians that they have been conquered. There is no other nation and no other capital as to which such argument could be necessary. But Frenchmen aod Paris will always say that the Germans did not march through Paris because they dared not. The Parisians are quite capable of believing thafiLthfe real reason why King William and his^ra.n do not march through Paris is because they are afraid of tbe ridiculous little holes which the Parisians dug in the side paths of the Bois de Bologne. If the Germans care to make the Parisians realise that they have been beaten altogether, they must march through Paris. But whether it is worth while to produce this effect on the Parisians, while to forbear to do so would promote the revival of good feeling between tbe two nations' aa* nothing else could do, is another matter. If the Germans would forbear to march through Paris, and would agree that Metz shouldj be .dismantled,, not ceded to them, there] would be scarcely a difficulty about pea_e| that could not be settled ia an afternoon.; But it must be acknowledged that on both points the Germans have to judge for themselves and tcnook at the consequences very practically, and they c^trhof' go so fast as nevtrals, who have only -.remote interest i_ the decision, and who like to leap at.any solution which seems calculated to make things comfortable and let trade revive and. flourish.