When the Time Comes

Manawatu Times, Volume 69, Issue 52, 4 March 1944, Page 3

When the Time Comes

THE DUTCH WILL KNOW WHAT TO DO The counter-invasion of the Continent will not find the people of Holland dithering about, wondering where their individual duty may lie and where they might help best. A programme as detailed as any other part of important staff work has been laid down and is being broadcast in advance, bit by bit, to tlio Dutch homeland. And this is not done in one or two odd broadcasts, but in a series of important addresses, some by Queen Willielmina herself, others by members of the Netherlands Cabinet in London. The most recent of these talks was given by Prime Minister, Professor P. S. Gerbrandy, on December Bth. It reiterated some points J previously made and added others. The Basic Needs of the Situation It is obvious that a situation will have to be dealt with which will be in many ways unprecedented. Not only is counter-invasion in itself different from the more normal way of a battleline, but in this particular case two other facts must be allowed for from , tho beginning: (a) That many thousands of Holland- - ers arc no longer leading a legal existence, their whereabouts and Identity ' being hidden under the subterfugo that has become known as “diving-’ and; (b) That several hundred thousand of them have been deported from their homeland, who will raise a double prob- , lem—that they must be enabled to come back, and that their return in ' thousands must not be allowed to become the opportunity for “wrong- ’uns” to slip in. Emergency measures are tlreretore inevitable. Apart from these transient , factors, there are one or two of a basic

lature: The war years have opened leoplc’s minds to the need for certain ihanges from pre-war conditions. But lie existing Netherlands Government loes not propose to arrogate to itself ho privilege of directing these ihanges. Individual members of the Government and officials who have studied these problems of the future iold personal opinions regarding them. But the Cabinet as at present constituted docs not wish, to go further in lhe matter than to enable the Dutcn people to decide themselves what reforms they want. The Cabinet, therefore, wants to make it clear that its own role is, deliberately, a temporary one, meant simply to restore as quickly as possible the Dutch people’s traditional rights to operate legislative changes when they see fit. No attempt is made to announce permanent changes now, because no desire is harboured to prejudice any which the country may want to make. . One Difficulty of the Transition Stage To mention only one, though an important one, of the difficulties of the transition stage with which Professor Gcrbrandv dealt: When the factories and industries still remaining at work in Holland at present stop the war work which they are now forced to do for the enemy, there will be no ready means of switching them over immediately to other production. Wholesale disorganisation is bound to result. The same thing, on a nation-wide scale, will apply to many puplic services too numerous to cite in detail. Only emergency measures can cope with such a situa tion. It will be one in which each Icing living in Holland will be immediately, intimately and personally con■erued And every measure devised to keep the wheels of the indispensable services going must be one that will also fit into tho scheme of Allied strategical operations. It is inevitable, then, that a military regime must bo tho first stage of re-conquest. This military authority, already embodied m a Royal Decree signed by the Queen and counter-signed by an the Mmisetrs, constitutes the “special state of siege” referred to in previous broadcasts. But tho military authority, let it be remembered, will derive its power from the Government, and the Government will be present, or represented, in Holland when the military authority is there.. _ The Limitations of Military Power The powers themselves will be limited to what is required for the recovery and maintenance of internal and external security and for proper co-opera-tion with the Allies. Beside it, a purged civil administration will function The Government will remain responsible for the control and direction of the military authority. There will these representatives will discharge their authority in provinces, parts of pro. vinces and large municipalities. But these represetatives will discharge their duties not only in such a way as to leave as much free play as possible to local administrative authority, but they 1 will also support that authority with all the means and powers at their disposal. .. In a way the military authority will i>o the liaison between tho local administrations and the Government. Its members, now being trained and formed into organisations, will include civili ians and professional and reserve officers. All will have military rank, , given to them because they_ must work in conjunction with the Allied military machinery. . In view of the known opinions of the ’ Dutch population, it is assumed that . the duration of tho “special state of siege” thus carried on under military - authority will be short-lived. It will not be kept in being any longer than • jj le f or c3 of circumstances demands. e The complete restoration of government by the know'll institutions of the .. Dutch people will follow as quickly as possible. And it is obvious that tho 1 transition period will be all the shorter if the knowledge of what is wanted a from each citizen can be well spread -in advance.