ITALIAN DECISION

Manawatu Standard, Volume LX, Issue 164, 11 June 1940, Page 2

ITALIAN DECISION

ALLIED POSITION. THE PROS AND CONS. 11l view of the declaration of war on the Allies by Italy the following message sent by .radio by the London correspondent of the New York Times to his paper on May' 9 is of special interest : Developments have brought the Allied General Staff face'to face with this question: “What., will we do if Italy’ conies in on the German side?” Obvjously', if Italy can by any means he kept out, the Allies want to keep her out, the message continues. They are: not particularly anxious to expand the conflict any more than can he helped. On the other hand, they are not disposed to proceed indefinitely on the basis that Italy' must be kept nonbelligerent at all costs. Especially 7 ' they are . not disposed to proceed on such a basis if it involves giving up any part of their blockade as a concession. Finally 7, the Allies are not disposed to allow. Italy to make any disposition —including military 7 occupation— of the Balkans that she pleases. Some of the reasons why the Allies are not too greatly concerned over the possibility of Italian entry into the war can be discerned by looking at a map. In tlie first place, the Allies control both ends of the Mediterranean. FORCES IN NEAR EAST. Second, the British and French have large forces in the Near East, both in Egypt and in Tunisia. Between these two forces lies Libya, a part of the Italian Empire. An obvious conclusion is that the minute Italy entered the war the Allies would close their pincers and crush Libya. Third, it would also appear obvious that the entrance of Italy would mean immediate loss of her East African empire, won at so much cost. There would be no communication between Italy and East Africa if the Allies choose to cut the present line. Eourth, there is the fact that Italy depends so much on seaborne imports, on which the Allies could clamp down. : Finally, there is . the long coastal line of Italy, open to Allied naval action. The strength of the Allied fleet in the Mediterranean, of course, is not known. But it is perhaps significant that five new British-capital ships are now supposed to be undergoing trials. Nobody knows where they will be sent. But it would not appear they are needed in the North Sea. On the supply side, ,it would appear that Italy is in not too good shape. She has already gone to the mat with Britain over the question of shipments of German coal to her by sea. If she went to war, . those shipments would be blocked entirely 7. Probably Germany might send her enough coal by railroad to keep her going. How about oil ? How about iron ore ? TURKISH ACTION POSSIBLE. There is also the consideration that any move by Italy would probably bring Turkey—now as strongly nonbelligerent for the Allies as Italy has been so far for Germany:—off the fence. This might also result in similar action by Greece. In that case the Allies would have the eastern end of the Mediterranean completely sewn up and would also have access through the Dardanelles to the Black Sea.

These are the arguments that are being used to show that the Allies need not worry too much over the possibility of the Italians coming in. Nevertheless, there are many arguments on 'the other side, too. Italy’s participation would undoubtedly entail a serious diversion of Allied troops and ships from the Western theatre of war and hence from the main target, which is Germany. Any such diversion might or might not prove advantageous in the long run, but its immecVatc effect would undoubtedly be to enhance the Allies’ problems in the Balkans. Then, too, Italy’s entry would throw her powerful Army, Navy and Air Force against the Allies. Just how powerful is not known exactly, but estimates recently were that Italy would have 1,500,000 men under arms by this spring That number had probably been increased with the recent calling up of new classes. Some of these Italian divisions are highly mechanised, and, of course, Italy would have the jump. The Italian Navy is not over-strong in big ships. It has only four capital ships, of which two either are or were recently under repair. Italy has seven heavy. cruisers, fourteen light cruisers and sixty-one destroyers. But she has more than 100 good submarines and almost 150 fast torpedo boats', and perhaps over the short distances of the' Mediterranean these’ would prove of greater value than big warships. Finally. Italy has a large and wellenuipped Air Force, although the British say they are willing to try its mettle/ That Air. Force might prove most damaging to the Allied fleets, although very litt!° is known of its actual strength. The latest estimate gives it 2500 ’planes arid a personnel of 38 000. It should be remembered that any war involving the Allies and Italy would not necessarily mean that the former would be opposing Germany as such. It would give the Allies another front on which to fight without adding immediately to Germany’s military problems. ,