ALLIED POLICY IN NORWAY

Manawatu Standard, Volume LX, Issue 135, 8 May 1940, Page 7

ALLIED POLICY IN NORWAY

COMMONS DEBATE OPENS . '• / > / PREMIER DEFENDS ACTION REASONS FOR WITHDRAWAL (United Press Association. —By Electric Telegraph—-Copyright.) (British Official Wireless.) Received May 8, 9.50 a.hi. LONDON, May 7. “I believe the failure of the Allied plan in * Southern Norway was due to two factors —first, our inability to secure aerodromes from which to operate our fighters and, secondly, the rapid arrival of German reinforcements. We always believed that if our troops could get ashore they would not suffer heavy casualties from the air, and in,fact that proved to be the case. \': ■ ■ : . “But the absence of fighters enabled the enemy to attack our communications and hinder our reinforcement, whilst his own land communications enabled him to bring up an ever-increas-ing superiority of strength.” In these words the Prime Minister (Mr Chamberlain) summarised his view of the circumstances in Southern Norway compelling 1 the Allied withdrawal, when delivering in the House of Commons the speech inaugurating the debate on the British policy in Norway. j 1 “It became clear that we could only maintain our forces in the Trondheim region by such a concentration of men, materials, and aircraft as .would have drawn off an altogether undue proportion of the total forces,” declared the Premier. “In the special circumstances, we decided to carry the campaign in Norway elsewhere with greater vigour and effect. Later, Mr Chamberlain said it was quite obvious that the Germans had made certain gains. It was equally clear that they had paid a heavy price for them. It was too early to say on which side the balance was finally inclined, because the campaign was not- yet finished. A large part of Norway was not in German hands, and the Government was still on Norwegitin soil. It would rally round itself tlio remcuiider. jof tliß Norwegian forces and carry on the figlit -against the invader in which Britain should be at their side. MR CHURCHILL’S ROLE. Asking for co-operation of all parties, the Premier announced that the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr Churchill) was now authorised by Cabinet to give guidance and dnection to the Chiefs-of-Staff Committee. Mr Churchill would have the responsibility for the supervision of the military operations day by day. This would ensure that every aspect, of military policy was examined, and that the decisions would be followed with speed and energy. After paying a tribute to the skill of the British naval and military forces in effecting the withdrawal from .Namsos in a single, short night without any loss in the operation, and describing the bombing of the convoy of transports the next day by fifty enemy bombers, resulting in the loss of only one British and one French destroyer, although the ships were dependent for their defence solely on anti-aircraft fire, Mr Chamebrlain said the news of the withdrawal from Southern Norway, had come as a profound shock to the public, but it was desirable not to exaggerate the extent of the importance of the check to the Allies. DETERMINATION STIFFENED. France had shown remarkable steadiness and, as in England, tlie only effect of the reverse had been to stiffen their determination. Turkey had remained unperturbed. Egypt had continued to strengthen her defences. In the Middle East the position had been, quietened by the reversion to norniaL ot - the Allied fleet distribution in the Mediterranean. Analysing the reasons why the Allies decided to try to take Trondheim, although knowing the serious difficulties and risks, the Premier mentioned the urgent and repeated appeals from the Norwegian Commander. It was made clear to the Allies that, unless they were ready to assist in the only way the Norwegians themselves felt effective—by an attack on Trondheim—the Norwegians were not likely to feel able to resist, and the whole country would have fallen at once into German hands.