ANTI-COMINTERN PACT.

Manawatu Standard, Volume LVIII, Issue 44, 20 January 1938, Page 2

ANTI-COMINTERN PACT.

RIVAL CAMP TO LEAGUE. JAPANESE PRESS VIEW. Any lingering pretence that the “anti-Comintern” alliance of Germany, Italy and Japan has not much wider objectives is dismissed by current revelations in the Japanese Press, in articles advocating enthusiastically the development of an aggressive “rival camp” against League nations. A representative, though comparatively moderately written, article in the latest Oriental Economist, states the new objective in Power politics quite clearly. It makes an instructive background to the cabled anti-British outbursts from the Japanese Minister for the Interior (Admiral Suetsugu). The Oriental Economist in material portions of its editorial comment writes:

It is rather an unusual spectacle to sec this imposing array of Great Powers putting up a common front against/so indefinable an entity. Moreover, it has been freely criticised and questioned as to how this manner. of inter-governmental agreement is going to contribute toward checking and eliminating the danger from radical thought propaganda. In fact, for some time, the existence of such a treaty has virtually disappeared from the public memory. LEAGUE OF HAVE-NOTS. The anti-Commtern Pact, however, has taken on new significance by Italy’s adhesion. While the pact ostensibly aims at combating the activities of the Comintern as before, that was 60 only superficially even when it was still a" Japanese-German agreement. It is a matter of course that the Soviet was the only objective. But Italy’s participation gives the distinct impression that the Soviet Union has become but one of tho many objectives of the instrument, which has virtually lined up the so-called “Have Not” nations against the camp of “Have” countries. In plain terms, pitted against a diplomatic front represented by the League of Nations of a group of countries under the leadership of Great Britain, a rival camp has been organised by Japan. Germany and Italy. It is difficult to believe that either Japan and Germany or Japan, Germany and Italy combined, should find it sufficiently called for to make that serious gesture merely for fighting off the vague red propaganda menace. While the pact fails to note that in black and white, a common-sense interpretation at least will he that it implies a moral understanding for aligning thpsc “Have Not' nations for the common cause. This fact ■accounts for the satiated countries failing to be favourably disposed toward the conclusion of tho tripartite agreement. Because of tho fact that, as dictatorship happens to bo tfie ideology underlying the internal government of both Germany and Italy, some are inclined to interpret Japan’s joining hands with them in the present part as signifying Japan’s kinship in their form of government which, of course, is farthest from the truth. What determines the philosophy of a country’s government is the actual necessity of that country. To all intents and. purposes, tho three-Power agreement is a diplomatic arrangement, hut not of internal significance. Should it happen in future that Japan adonis a dictatorship, that would be to fill the internal demand for one and would have no relation whatsoever with the treaty with Germany and Italy. OPPOSING CAMPS. Apart from the consideration of the stability of the Japanese, German and Italian treaty as an alliance of nations of small resources, it appears to he ail undeniable fact, that the world is fast being divided into two opposing camps of nations: one of “Have Not” nations and the other of “Haves.” So, many observers are apprehensive that peace is now growingly menaced and tho world is again on the verge of another war of all nations. We. of course, do not deny that this might happen. Prevailing world conditions are such, however, that, although rather loosely bound together round tho League of Nations, under the cloak of the preservation of peace,

the satiated nations are, after all. engaged in defending their vested rights and interests, all the while the grievance of “Have Not” nations is becoming daily more acute. If tilings arc left to take their own course, even if the “Have Not” countries had refrained from forming themselves into an alliance, it may lie doubtful whether war can be avoided. The peace desired by the “Have” nations, of course, can be maintained if the “Have Not” nations submit tamely to the former. These “Have Not” nations are by no means destitute. Their national prowess is too powerful to submit to the command of the richer nations. Under such circumstances, the fact that Japan, Germany and Italy have organised into a camp cannot fail to bo a menace to the satiated countries. But then this development might even prove the turning point where a harmonious settlement of demands on both sides is effected. The peace of the world hangs as ever upon the attitude of the “Have” nations —whether they will actually meet the demands of the “Have Not’* nations, which the former in principle recognise as entirely reasonable.