Manawatu Evening Standard. TUESDAY, APRIL 28, 1925. THE MASTERY OF THE PACIFIC

Manawatu Standard, Volume XLV, Issue 123, 28 April 1925, Page 4

Manawatu Evening Standard. TUESDAY, APRIL 28, 1925. THE MASTERY OF THE PACIFIC

A certain' amount of uneasiness is discernible as the result of Japan’s naval activity. The existing relationships between the British Commonwealth of Nations and Japan are friondly enough, but warning signals have been displayed from time to time, which indicate a change in tho former friendly relationships between the British and tho Japanese peoples. There was, to begin with, the unexpected opposition shown by Japan to the Singapore base scheme which, as wo have pointed out on more than one occasion, was expressly excluded from the scope of the Washington Disarmament Agreement, in consideration of the pledge given by the British and American delegates-—the former in respect to Hong Kong and the latter in regard to the Philippines, that no further steps would bo taken to strengthen existing fortifications, or to enter upon new defences. It may be regarded, not merely as a coincidence, but as significant, that the Japanese objections 10 the British Government proceeding with the Singapore works were first raised after the British Labour Government took control of British affairs, and Mr Ramsay MacDonald, as its head, made what he termed his “moral gesture” in favour of peace, by intimating that the works would not be proceeded with pending the holding of a further Disarmament Conference. The feeling shown by the Japanese press and retain Japanese statesmen in regard to Singapore may be looked upon as tho first Danger Signal. The second was apparent when the Protocol was under discussion at the Geneva Conference, and the Japanese delegates sought to include matters of domestic concern such as immigration within such measures as should be adjudicated upon by the League of Nations. Japan’s insistence upon that point resulted in the rejection of the Protocol by Great Britain, in deference to the representations made by the Dominion Governments and, more particularly by the Australian, Canadiun and New Zealand Governments, all of which have reason to fear the influx of alien coloured races. The third Danger Signal is probably more serious. Jt appears in connection wjth the Japanese naval building programme, which recent cablegrams have informed ns includes the construction of eight first-class and three second-class cruisers, all to have a speed of 3fl knots, also ten powerful sea-going destroyers and an aircraft carrier. English and French writers agree that Japan’s light ship programme will give her supremacy in the Pacific within three years. Sir Herbert Hussell points out that the eleven cruisers, ten destroyers and the aircraft carrier to which we have referred, are included in this year’s building sanctions, and that, “since the Washington Agreement, Japan has shown extraordinary activity in the construction of all classes of warships outside the ridiculously limited prohibition.” The naval strength of the three leading naval Powers —Britain, America and Japan —agreed upon at Washington as the

5-5-3 standard, placed America and Britain on a level and constituted Japan as the third greatest naval Power in the world. But the limitations imposed by the Conference only had reference to capital ships of the Dreadnought and super-Dreadnought type, cruisers being exempted with other classes of warships. And the cruisers that are being built to-day appear to be almost, if not quite, as formidable as battleships. The Anglo Treaty, which was “denounced” by the British Government prior to the Washington Conference, in deference to the wishes and susceptibilities of the American people, constituted a strong bond of friendship between the British and the Japanese people. How far that friendship lias suffered by the abandonment of our Treaty obligations with Japan it is impossible to say.