The Situation in Afghanistan.

Manawatu Standard, Volume IX, Issue 86, 14 March 1885, Page 2

The Situation in Afghanistan.

[Civil and Military Graze fc^e.] i | Fnnjdeh, an important strategical position north of Herat, was only saved the other day from Russian occupation by timely reinforcements sent by the Afghan General at Bala Murglihab. Although the Journal de St Petersburg may depreciate the misconstruction qf the English Ppaqs. -vyith regard' to, Russian policy m central Asia, wo may safely assume that Russia will annex, more or less formally and completely, every inch of ground m Central Asia not defended and safe-guarded by England. Whether she will next attack India must depend on the facilities which wo leave open for such an attack. These facilities will bo greater or less m proportion to our foresight m laying down the Line beyond which Russia may not advance without our declaring war, and to. tho strength of our irjeasures fqr dti: fending this lino. Lot as first take tilings as they are, and assume- that the , Delimitation Committee lays down a line of frontier following the course of the I Oxus, from its ' high mountain cradle m Pamorc ' to Khodja Saleh, and from Khodja Saleh to Serrakhs, or some point on the Tejend south of Serrakhs. Let us suppose, again, that the British Government claims that this is the line beyond which Russian influence nms.fc. not. adyarjqe, What will fyappjan when Russia conceives that the time has come for breaking through the barrieri with a view to embarssing us, while she was 'playing her game m Asia Minor or European Turkey ? We may be sure that some time would be chosen when we had troubles m hand elsewhere, say m the Soudan or m China. What would Russia's power of offence be then ? To begin with, unless English officers w^VQ fltatio.ijod UJ JJqrjjh^yqs.fc 4^4 ai^ s i an .> !il}ssift opjjld, under favorable ch-ciin}-s.tan.ces, occupy Herafc before we \mevf anything of the move, save perhaps, fqv uncertain rumours, ' Mory and B e Wfl^i3 w&re occupied "with tho same soqrat colei-ity. But tho hows that it had come to pasa reaohod us only after the fact had bo3n accomplished! and very, much the sumo thing might happen m j tho c;iko of Honit. From Sormkhs the ' Russians could reach Jlomt, marching m force, within littlo over a fortnight. ' Stnniltancoiis movements might be made ' on Balkli and Chitral, both of which po- j sitions might, like Herat, be bofore a British force could^ e.veu, be plao-

cd m Kandahar. Thesn movements arc pfcrf.,-c-Lly feasible. With Heraj, 'Jussia's coiiiiiiiinicntioiis uould bo qnicklv perfected by pushing on the trahs'-Caapian railway. From Btilkh an army could advance on Cabul, reaching the Ameer'n capital m loss than six weeks. From Cnitral Russia would intrigue with Kashmir and the tribes directly on our north-west frontier. Holding the others positions, she would be üble to insist on a rectification of the Afghan frontier, and England would have to recognise Herat, and probably Afghan Turkestan us a Russian province. However much we might confide m the good will and fair promises of Holy Russia, it is obvious that if Herat is allowed to become a Russian province, our defences must be made Stronger than they are now. Would it be better to wait till our Russian friends get near us? Competent, authorities reckon that if Russia gets Herat the European army iv India must be increased by one-fourth, and the native array strengthened proportionately. It would be found necessary to occupy Kandahar. Even a Liberal Government, we tirmly believe, would be driven to occupy Kandahar, were the Russians m Herat, if not Chunzi and Cabul to boot. We should want 40,000 men at least to hold Kandahar ; and a large force would have to be, kept m readiness to meet a possible advance from Herat via Furrah. And while we were watching the Kandahar gate to. India we may be sure that Russia would be threatening us, with more or less real purpose, from the direction of Cabul and Chitral. Thai an active policy is needed, we fully believe. Every effort should be made to render it impossible for Russia to reach Herat, and to put a stop, once for all, to her intrigues m Afghanistan. It should be generally recognised that a Russian occupation of Herat, and of Balkh and Chitral, would be a serious blow to our prestige and influence m the East ; and it is high time to state clearly and emphatically England's determination that the States of Afghan, Turkestan, Usbe£, though they may be, ought never to be allowed to fall under the dominion of Russia.