MR SNOWDEN'S SUCCESS.

Manawatu Herald, Volume L, Issue 40013, 22 October 1929, Page 4

MR SNOWDEN'S SUCCESS.

RETURN IN TRIUMPH. DOMINIONS AND OPTIONAL CLAUSE. The return in triumph of our “Iron Chancellor” has been likened to that o| Disraeli when he returned from Vienna bringing “peace and honour,” wrote the London correspondent of the Auckland Star under date September fith. Hut it was far different. There was a spontaneity and a sincerity in the public greeting of Mr Snowden quite lacking in that of Disraeli’s homecoming, the picturesque description of which was the Victorian darling’s own invention. There was no worked-up stage-managed enthusiasm in the reception of the .Chancellor on his return from The Hague. There is, however, still some critical feeling, made vocal to-day in'ihe Saturday t Review, as to Mr Snowden’s work. ’ If Mr Snowden’s brilliant defence of national interests should encourage other countries to snppose.that tlie British Government: have abandoned or weakened tlie policy of working iir.st for international ends, and should thereby encourage nationalist and jingoist tendencies in those countries, the result of his victory .wpuld not he all good. This is a danger he must guard against. There is, of course, no change in the British attitude, and the Government must seize every occasion that offers to make that clear. It is plain front comments that have appeared not only in the foreign Press, hut in a seel ion of our own, that Mr Snowden’s policy has been imperfectly understood At The Hague an unseen struggle was going on between nationalism and internationalism. It may he that both have won.” a Broadcast address. But Mr Snowden’s broadcast address should have cleared the air. It was notable in every way for effective delivery and for lucidity and interest. But even that clear statement has not escaped some apprehension. One feature of it escaped public comment at least—tjio emphasis with which in his introductory remarks he condemned the whole post-war system of reparations and inter-Allied debts. “Three rears after the end of the war,” ho observed, “some wiser heads began to realise that the whole idea of receiving reparations and discharging inter-Allied lebts was financially and economically mpossiblo without inflicting injury on i lebtor and creditor alike.” Later he i

stiffened this up -to “disastrous consequences” ; and it was lairl.v clear that it was ill reparations Hint he was ..holly thinking in this ' connection. .Accordingly lie proceeded: “I made it clear in niv speech at the conference that the British Government not only accep.edj but welcomed the reduction in German reparations proposed in the Young Report.” ‘‘ln giving so much prominence to these opinions,” says the Nation, “Mr Snowden may have been partly *nflucneed hv a desire to put himsc-li right with his international critics, hut they are opinions which, of course, he has long held with an intense conviction; anti paradoxically enough, they may well have served to strengthen his bargaining position at The Hague. The most obvious and concrete danger attaching to a breakdown of the conference was a collapse of the whole reparations system. normally the position would have been that, failing some other arrangement, the Dawes Plan would have continued to operate. .But the Dawes Plan would have required a large increase (say £30,000,0ut) to £40,000,000) ia the German annuity; Germany would certainly liavo revolted against paving on this scale merely because he? creditors had failed to agree as to how the smaller Young annuities should be allocated. A revolt against reparations might well have, ended in relusal to pay at all. This would have been extremely disagreeable to France, to ltalv, to anyone (including the Conservative British Government) really anxious to receive reparations. It would not have been nearly so disagreeable to Mr Snowden; and in this fact, we may suspect, lay a large pari of the strength of his position.” BRITAIN AT GENEVA.

After the day to day excitement at Tile Hague, Geneva falls somewhat flat. British prestige there-under the late Government had sunk to a low ebb, but Mr Snowden’s handling oi things lias provided a real asset to the British delegation at Geneva in its rebuilding of our prestige. The Prime Minister’s speech had that note of authority and decision that has been too long absent Jrom the spokesman of British policy. Curiously enough it is the Conservative Saturday Review which points to repercussions of Empire responsibilities in respect oi Groat Britain’s part in the League. it says: “There is indeed:onlv one iaetor that can attenuate the full measure of support for the purposes of the League that should lie forthcoming from Great Britain, lhat factor is the British Empire. We cannot sacrifice the League which is represented by the British Commonwealth of Nations to the League at Geneva. In no circumstances ought we to he asked for any such sacrifice. The British Empire can have no interest of any kind that is not entirely consonant with the interests oi the League. At the same time the novel compulsion under which we net--to take no important decision in foreign policy unless and until each of the self-governing Dominions agrees t>o it in advance —is one that may prove a serious limitation on our freedom ot action.” , , ... , .. Wliat exactly, then, will be the course of action with regard to the Optional Clause? Mr MacDonald announces that Great Britain will sign it, and that he “believes” the Dominions will authorise their representatives to sign it. This is independence in full measure. The Nation remarks on this / “Some of the Dominions, notably Canada and Ireland, have, of course, long been advocates of adherence; but, unless rumour lies, the Australian Government, at least, has been protesting with some warmth to the Foreign Office against the decision which Mr Ramsay MacDonald has announced. The significance of Mr MacDonald's words is that he expects that Australia will prefer to sign along with the rest of the Empire than to stand out by herself. This is good news, lor the position would he highly anomalous and undesirable if different parts of (lie Empire were to be subject to dil-_ ferent obligations on a matter of this importance. The Liberal weekly, the Nation, reads into the Prime Minister’s speech a momentous aim—to employ “sanctions” against a disturber of the peace rather than to provide for security by agreements, and it concludes: “It would not be. discreet or helpful to probe this question further. What seems to emerge without any reasonable doubt is that Mr MacDonald would now like to take sanctions out of the Covenant, and that this motive can only be to make it easier for the United 'States to associate itself with the League. This amounts t-o a new departure of the very first importance; and it will be interesting to observe whether any steps are taken to follow it up during the present Assembly. It will clearly not'be an easy matter to persuade the other members of the League to agree to a pruning out of Article 16. The prevailing trend of endeavour is still in the opposite direction; and a proposal for ensuring financial assistance to a State which is the victim of aggression has reached an advanced of preparation. It is true that most of the objections to sanctions commitments do not apply to this proposal; none the less, it is in the nature of an extension of Article 16, and it would not be very easy to reconcile support of it with the general tenor of Mr MacDonald’s remarks. Such considerations and such difficulties serve, however, to strengthen the impression that Mr MacDonald is striving after a very big prize.”