KITCHENER AND FRENCH.

Manawatu Herald, Volume XLI, Issue 2005, 22 July 1919, Page 1

KITCHENER AND FRENCH.

DISCUSSION IN PARIS.

A FORTUNATE TERMINATION.

Field-Marshal French, in the course of his articles in the Daily Telegraph, deals with the interview between Lord Kitchener and himself at the British Embassy in Paris, towards the end of the great retreatin September, 1014, and just prior to the battle of the Marne. The field-marshal says:—“l touch with some diffidence on less agreeable features of the memorable discussion in Paris, Lord Kitchener arrived on this occasion in the uniform of a field-marshal, and from the outset of his conversation assumed the air of a commander-in-chief, and announced his intention of taking the field and inspecting the troops. On hearing this, the British Ambassador, Sir Praneis, now Lord, Bertie, at once emphalically objected, and drafted a telegram to the Foreign Secretary, slating clearly and unmistakably his views, and demanding instructions. He gave ibis despatch to Lord Kitchener to read. The latter then asked for my opinion, and I said my views on the subject coincided entirely with those of the Ambassador. After some discussion, (he .Secretary of State decided to abandon his intention, and the telegram to Sir Edward Grey was not, sent. In the conversation which followed between us all, Lord Kitchener appeared to take grave exception to certain views which I expressed as to the expediency of leaving the direction of the operations in the field’ in the hands of the military chiefs in command in the held. He abruptly closed the discussion, and requested me to accompany him for a private interview in another room. “When we were alone he commenced by entering a strong objection to the lone I assumed. Upon this I told him all that was in my mind. I said that the command of the British forces in France had been entrusted to me by His Majesty’s Government; that I alone was responsible to them for whatever happened, and that on French soil my authority as regards the British Army must be supreme until I was legally superseded by the same authority which had put that responsibility upon me. I further remarked that Lord Kitchener’s presence in France in the character of a soldier could have no other effect than to weaken and prejudice my position in the eyes of the French and my own countrymen alike. I reminded him of our service in the Held together some thirteen years before, and told him that I valued highly his advice and assistance, which I would gladly accept as such, but that I would not tolerate any interference with my executive command and authority so long as His Majesty’s Government chose to retain me in my present position. I think he began to realise my difficulties, and we finally came to an amicable understanding. “Important telegrams and messages were then brought me, and I told Lord Kitchener that it was impossible for mo to absent myself any longer from my headquarters, whither I at once repaired with all possible speed. It is very difficult for any but soldiers to understand the real bearing and significance of this Paris incident. If the confidence of the troops in their command is shaken in the least degree, or if his influence, power, and authority are prejudiced by any display of distrust in his ability to conduct operations, however slight the indications of such distrust may be, the effect reacts instantly throughout the whole army. This is more than ever true with troops which, as at the moment in question, were being subjected to great and .severe demands upon their courage, endurance, and, above nil, faith in their leaders. Then again, there wa-s the effect which might have been produced on the French. Ministers and generals were present, and witnessed Lord Kitchener's apparent assertion of his right to exercise the power and authority of a command-er-in-chief in the field. Fortunately, the incident terminated in a manner which led to no regrettable publicity. Lord Kitchener realised his mistake, and left Paris that night.”