A GERMAN RIDDLE.

Manawatu Herald, Volume XXXIX, Issue 1675, 15 February 1917, Page 4

A GERMAN RIDDLE.

It will ho a nice point for the consideration oi' historians whether (he responsible naval and military authorities in Germany ever had any hope that, in face of a superior fleet they would be able to land troops in large numbers on our shores, Germany had everything to gain ,from convincing the British people that in case of war an invasion would not only l)e attempted, but that plans existed which ensured the success of the operation. It may be assumed that the reputable naval and military writers in Germany who set out to prove how easily this country could be overrun wrote under inspiration.

It is not good strategy to announce beforehand the plan of attack which it is intended to adopt; thereby the future enemy is warned and enabled to take precautionary measures. Why did Germans, and, in particular, German officers of

high rank, write books in which they attempted to prove how simple a proposition it would be to land Geiman soldiers on our coasts'? They not only wrote books, but they were delighted when those books were translated into English and circulated far and wide. If such plans were entertained, success would depend largely on secrecy. And yet the scheme was discussed in elaborate detail.

This war, it may be suggested, lias supplied the key to the riddle. When Germany fought she intended to light Russia, and, if necessary, France and Russia, lhat. it may be confidently assumed, was the fixed purpose which she kept in view. The German fleet was created to frighten us. “Germany must have a battle Heel so strong that even for the adversary with the greatest seapower a war against it would involve such dangers.as to imperil its position in the world." It was argued that when the emergency arose, the British people, impressed with the size of the German navy, and not less impressed by the arguments of German writers as to the peril of invasion, would decide against sending an arm.v to the Continent. It was believed that fears as to the home position would cause us to retain, as Lord Roberts bad anticipated, the whole of the British military forces in the I nited Kingdom; Germany would be left with a free band to work her rvil! on the Continent. With the supreme British Hoot and the mobile British army neutral, the Germans calculated that they were assured of victory over France and Russia, and that it Great Britain coniined her activity to the sea (he result would be the same. H hey were right. Their calculations, tested and re-tested, were accurate. There was only one Haw —the common sense of Ibe British people convinced (hem lhat until the British fleet had been defeated it was impossible for the British Isles to be invaded in force, and hence they were free to act on the offensive on the Continent from the very opening of hostilities, sending the expeditionary force acr the Channel without hesitation or delay.—Archibald Hurd, in the Fortnightly Review.