ACCURATE FORECAST.

Manawatu Herald, Volume XXXVI, Issue 1293, 5 September 1914, Page 4

ACCURATE FORECAST.

GERMAN PLANS ANTICIPATED.

WHY BELGIUM WAS INVADED.

Many forecasts have been made of German plans in the event of an attack upon France. Few of them have so many points ot accuracy as that of Colonel A. W. Alsager Pollock, who anticipated the course of the present campaign with remarkable accuracy, except that he did not foresee the heroic defence of Liege, or indeed, any part of Belgium’s great stand in defence of its neutrality. Colonel Pollock says:— “Germany, enjoying as she does, a considerable numerical superioty, may 'be expected to open the war with an attempt to invade France. There is not space on the Franco-German frontier for the deployment of the Teutonic forces, and that Irontier is, moreover, strongly fortified. It seems justifiable to assume that in case of war with France a portion at least of the German right wing will traverse Be’gium, and probably a part of Holland, with or without the consent of the Governments concerned. Until comparatively recently I was of the opinion that the Germans would cross the Meuse south of Namur, and thence advance trough the rugged and thicklywooded Ardennes, but after examining carefully, ou the spot, the line of the Meuse from Namur to Mezieres, I realised the practical impossibility of such an enterprise being successfully accomplished by a large army with the needful rapidity. The Meuse runs not between banks, but between precipices; there are but two points that afford useful opportunities for crossing, and even assuming the actual passage itself to have been effected, the railways beyond the river do not readily lend themselves to the movement or supply of a great army. Single lines, numerous tunnels, erratic directions—all these things aie serious impediments, actual or potential. The railways of the Ardennes were constructed for local convenience, not with a view to through traffic. The line from Givet to Hirzon is an exception as regards directness, but damage sufficient to render it useless for many weeks could and would be easily effected by the French.

I,iegk and Namur. “Why, at any rate, should the Germans deliberately face the difficulties, great or small, involved by crossing the Meuse in the district of the Ardennes, while an easy country with admirable railways is at their disposal further north ? But it may be said, ‘The fortresses of Liege and Namur block the way.’ This is to some extent true, on paper ; but there are plenty of lines which are blocked by neither place, and in actual fact it is extremely unlikely that either would be seriously defended, if at all—for reasons that will presently be stated. Even, however, assuming both Liege and Namur to be held against the invaders, the fact remains that neither is in a condition to resist a determined attack for more than a few days. The forts surrounding Liege and Namur are quite up-to-date in themselves, but the ‘clearances' needful to give a useful field of fire are wanting. Either place would furnish a strong pivot for

the operations of an active defend* ing army, but neither could long hold out as a besieged place in the ordinary sense. Supposing the entire strength of the Belgian Army to be devoted to the defence of Liege and Namur, I am of opinion that both places, if attacked, would fall within a fortnight, or could be effectually masked by forces no stronger than the garrisons. Invasion Near Lieee. “In the opinion of a very distinguished French general, communicated by him verbally to the present writer, the German right wing will cross the Meuse about and north of Liege, and on the 21st or 22nd day after mobilisation will be deployed on the French frontier in the neighbourhood of Lille. But it is probable enough that a moderate sized detached force, say two army corps, may cross the Meuse about Dinant and Givet, and having traversed the Ardennes, be afterwards disposable to assist the right wing, or, wheeling to its left, to take part in operations against the French defenders of the line Verdun-Toul, who would meanwhile be violently assailed in front by other troops. Even, however, for a comparatively small force, the passage of the Meuse is no light matter. The only favourable feature of such an operation is that the bridge at Givet is a very massive stone structure, which, after having been blown up by the French, would furnish a useful breakwater to protect a temporary bridge erected by the Germans. The river is about 100yds wide, and comparatively rapid. “Finally, assuming the Germans to enter Belgium territory at all, surely it is reasonable to assume further that they will scorn halfmeasures. The neutrality ot Belgium would be as plainly violated by entry upon a mere corner of the country as by marching through the centre of it. How much of Belgium is actually traversed by the Teutonic hosts will depend solely upon the convenience and advantage of the latter, and both would seem to be better consulted by a movement north ot the line Liege-Namur. “The French Army is ready, its staff is very efficient, and many of the French generals are men of great ability. The British Army would serve to make good, to a considerable extent, the inferiority of numbers unless Holland and Belgium should make common cause with Germany. At worst, the Anglo-French combination would have a good sporting chance of victory, while at best the odds seem slightly in its favour.”