An Assets Board Estate.

Manawatu Herald, 19 May 1904, Page 2

An Assets Board Estate.

Judgment was given in the Supreme Court to-day (says Tuesday’* Post) by Mr Justice Cooper in the case of John Stevens, Herbert Austin, and Frederick Spencer Easton v. Wm. B. V. Pearce, a suit for specific performance of an agreement made between plaintiffs and defendant of 13th August, 1903, for the lease by plaintiffs to defendant of certain land, part of the Moutoa estate, in the Manawatu County. Defendant had refused to accept the lease. The proposed lease covers about 2120 acres, part of the Moutoa block, had a currency ofJpx years and five mouths from IsWseptember, 1903, and gives the lessee flax and other rights, and purchasing power. The defence was that the contract was obtained by misrepresentations of plaintiffs; that the Statute of Frauds has not been complied with, and that the agreement is incomplete and uncertain; that plaintiffs’ title is not such as defendant is bound to accept; and that plaintiffs have lost the right to specific performance by laches and delay

His Honour holds that the defences of misrepresentation, and of acquiescence by laches and delay, have not been sustained. In the question of title, the Assets Realisation Board plays a part, and on this matter his Honour states: “ The land is under the Land Transfer Act 1885, and the registered proprietors are the Assets Realisation Board. By agreement dated 4th February, 1903, the Board agreed to sell to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs to purchase from the Board the Moutoa Block, of which the land in question forms part, for the sum of £66,975 8s sd. The plaintiffs paid upon the execution of the agreement £6697 10s, being 10 per cent, of the total purchase money, and it was agreed that the balance of the purchase should be paid by instalments.” The judgment goes on to detail the terms of the instalments, which finally were fixed at 12} per cent, on 31st March, 1905, 10 per cent on 81st March, 1906, and the balance on Slat March, 1910. Interest at 4} per cent, on the unpaid purchase money was agreed upon up to 31st March, 1908, and current bank interest after that. The agreement between the Board and the plaintiffs also provides that the plaintiffs may at any time obtain from the Board a conveyance of the property upon executing a mortgage to secure the balance of the unpaid purchase money. If plaintiffs take a conveyance in this wa f, and if they afterwards sell any of the property at prices which the Board shall approve, and if they pay to the Board the full price at which the sale is made, the Board undertakes to join in a conveyance of such portions of the estate so sold. His Honour proceeds at some length to enquire into the nature of the title which under this agreement plaintiffs could, with the assistance of the Board give. He concludes by stating that fendant first claimed to rescind tlnf contract he did so on the ground of fraud, and the questions of title was not raised till after the present action against him was' commenced. In the interval plaintiffs obtained the consent of the Assets Board*to join in the lease, and as the delay of three months in bringing the action is not held to amount to acquits-

cence, it follows that as plaintiffs are now prepared to obtain the con■Widiof the Assets Board the incomof their title has not prejudiced defendant. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to a decree for < specific performance subject to a good title being made as proposed. 11 The defendant’s title under such a lease will not be subject to being affected by any default in performance of any of the conditions by the plaintiffs of their agreement with the Assets Board, while the defendant will have the full benefit <of hia contract with the plaintiffs, and be liable to the performance of no other covenants and condition 1 * than those stipulated in his agreement. The joining of the Assets Board is a question of conveyance.” As to the objection that the Board’s undertaking to so join is not under the Board’s seal, “ Mr Foster’s letter is 'written under direction by the Board, and is sufficient evidence that the plaintiffs are in a position to obtain the consent of the Board to the lease.” Judgment is for plaintiffs forspecific performance of the contract, plaintiffs undertaking to procure the necessary consent of the Board in such form as to enable the registration of the lease under the Land Transfer Act. Plaintiffs are allowed coats on the higher scale for the statement of claim and preparing for trial, and tbe costs of the trial are fixed at £SO. Mr Treadwell appeared for plaintiffs, and Mr D. M. Findlay (for Mr Baldwin) for defendant.