WAR PROSPECTS.

Lyttelton Times, Volume XI, Issue 694, 2 July 1859, Page 5

WAR PROSPECTS.

The following article from the 'Times' of the 16th April, written in a tone of ominous despair, will give our readers an index to the true state of, feeling in England when our last advices left upon the absorbing topic of war : — If there remains a spark of hope that the peace of Europe can be pi eserved, it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of making known at this crisis to all foreign powers the exact sentiment-" of the people of England with relation to tlie subjects in dispute. The vas! ness and universality of our commerce give up great material interest in tlie tranquility and prosperity of all neighbouring nations; affection for our own free institutions excites our sympathies for all who "cry against a ■tyranny ; our military power, if brought into exercise, would be likely to prove decisive in a quarrel where the partita are not unequally matched ; and wealth would certainly give v* a very predominant influi'ncc in that system of modern warfare where it hah beou said the last guinea decides the issue.

Moreover, oar insular poiiuon ♦•naLles us 1o examine the whole quesLion in dispute with a calm and dispassionate judgment, and to regard the theatre of the coming struglc IVoin a safc'distance. We could clioonc our piirty at ouv leisure, and j strike at the moment and on the spot that wn might choose. The public opinion of England I upon the matters that now threaten to wrap all Europe in flames cannot, therefore, be without a very impoitant influence oven in those Counsels where tlie most desperate designs find favour. Perhaps it is not the least among the dangers now threatening the peace of the world that each party at this moment believes if she were once engaged in actual war she would immediately possess the sympathies and might hope eventually to receive the material assistance of this country, Austria relies upon her ancient alliance, and in the certainly that we see in our own intercut a necessity for her existence as a first-rate European Power"; she leans, also, upon the respect which the English people bear for vested'rights and for treaty obligations, and she reminds the world that her connexion with Italy was in a great l-iC.isure imposed upon her by the Powers assembled at the Congress of Vienna. She pres*es upon our recollection that, throughout the wars of the Empire Italy had freety given all her resources to aid Fiance in subjugating or miking war upon the rest of Europe, and that her perseverance in that course rendered it absolutely necessary to sever her connexion with Prance. These are, doubtless, important facts ; but we fear that Austria builds too confidently upon then), and imagines that it she should grow weak during the contest in which she is about to engage she may count upon all the resources of England being put forth to preserve her from any absolute, [defeat. The Emperor of the French is, it' we mistake not, no less sanguine in his' belief that when the people of England see the fighting actually going on their old combative spirit will come over them jand lead them into the melee. - When this shall hap,pen he counts upon the fervour of the new alliance ■between England and France as more powerful than :the old habitual connexion between England and Austria, and he does not doubt" that those highsounding words "liberty," "nationality," and "Italian unity," will conjure all the sympathies'- of 'English constituencies to his side, and compel the. English Minister of the day to regard the sentimentalities of the Italian question more than the solid interests of his country.- :

We believe'that both these expectations would, if they should unhappily come to be tested by experience, be entirely .disappointed. We think it would be found that, while neither Austria nor Trance had secured- the 'sympathies of the English people, the ;Power which appeared to be most intent upon war had most Signally drawn upon itself the opprobiuin of the most sober and most powerful classes in this country. English opinion does not go, with the tyrants who have so crushed the Italian people, .nor with the Imperial liberator of Italy who reigns so absolute in Prance. Every Englishman is. profoundly convinced that Italy is, and long has been, in an abnormal state. Austria is in possession of twothirds of that peninsula, partly under the justification of treaties, but partly without any justification except that of an alleged necessity, and without any excuse except that of having thrown into the Roman States a force capable of opposition to the encroachments of France. Austria's treaties with the smaller Italian' powers have madeher. in effect the arbiter of the destinies of the whole Italian race. It is: the belief of all;who are not Austrians, that this influence has for the most part been used to enforce those systems of government which gratemost harshly upon the sensibilities -of an Italian,' and that her power in her own provinces has beeiv exercised rather to crush all opposition than to protect and encourage the reasonable liberties of a sensitive and intellectual people. We cannot believe in England that this state of things can be consistent with a condition of permanent peace.. We cannot hope that peace 'will-arise, from the chronic antagonism of France and Austria in the Roman states. We cannot see peace in the interference, which has now become habitual to Austria, with the small Italian powers,'-and which enables every little tyrant to tell his discontented subjects that he possesses an army of an hundred thousand men on the further bank of the Po. We cannot see peace in that martial law which rules throughout Lombardy and is so strong at Venice. With out reference to the questions which are now filling the minds of statesmen, there is sufficient in the ordinary position of Austria in Italy to create a chronic disquietude in Europe, and to occasion Avar at any moment. Public opinion in England, which desires the preservation of peace in Europe and the improvement of Austrian rule in Italy,* is certainly not-in favour of things as they are; and any Minister ■would be thought mad who should propose to an English House of Commons to declare war against France in order to support Austria in the position she has occupied since 1815. If England has ever taken any part in discussions on Italian questions, it has been with offers, not of support, but of mediation, and the means proposed have always been to modify those dangerous existing conditions which afford a standing excuse for war. If Austria is rushing into war with a hope that she has England behind her, if is only charitable to bid her pause and reflect before she takes a step that cannot be recalled.

So far as we know the minds of our countrymen, we should-say that there is certainly no more probability of the Emperor Napoleon finding sympathy, or applause, or assistance from England than that there is that we should go to war for the sake of Austria. It is true that, to a certain extent, the policy towards Italy avowed by France, and that approved by England, are one andthe same. If we had full and entire confidence in the singleness of purpose and moderation of all those who profess to seek the well-being of Italy, we might perhaps be content to join in putting pressure upon Austria to compel her to be merciful. But our difficulty is with our ally. How can we tell whether his objects are our objects ? How can we say what may be the ultimate result when the plains of Lombardy and all the fortresses of the Roman States are occupied by French armies? There is not in all England a roomful of enthusiasts so credulous as to believe that the Emperor .Napoleon is>: in this matter altogether disinterested, or that his views are bounded by the desire that Italy shall be free and independent. All men see that while the Emperor Napoleon is talking the language of the Carbonari he is acting out the policy of the Bonaparte family. If we judge by what he is doing, rather- than by what he is saying, France, under his guidance, is now seeking to become an Italian Power. She has got Piedmont within her grasp, and, as, Tuscany and Modena must fall • if/ the Austrians, are. beaten in . Lombardy, we may. not unreasonably suspect, that our libertyloving ally sees as a possible contingency the. restoration of the kingdom of Etruria and the accession of Prince Napoleon and the Princess Clotilde to. that throne. As a necessary consequence of the success of such a policy, we cannot but foresee the Italian' States would then all become dependencies of France, as they are now of Austria, and that France, disposing of the resources of Italy by land or by. sea, would then become to a great extent mistress of the Mediterranean, and perfectly able to prosecute any designs she might form against this country or against Germany. With these considerations pressing upon us it will not be difficult for Continental Powers to believe that the sympathies of England are in this coming war not attracted more powerfully towards the Emperor of the French than they are towards the Emperor of Austria.

Tlie conduct of Napoleon 111. in those preliminary discussions which" were intended to precede the Congress has not been of a character to allow much hope that we have b?en mistaken as' to his ultimate intentions. The present position of'" tl^ose negotiations may be thus stated:—Austria long "and stubbornly insisted on the disar'mftfnc'ut of Sardinia as a preliminary to going into Congress. " This England and France refused to ask her to' do, saying, " If tlie other Powers are to enter Congress armed, let not Sardinia be requested to disarm before tlie others, and alone." After almost endless discussion, Austria was moved from this position, and she agreed to disarm at once, and before going into

Congress, if.France and Sardinia-would do thesame. Nothing-apparently could he fait-ftr; France consented to. disarm, as well ns. Austria,- hut. when Austria aslu-d as :i■first instalment of this obli»a-« tion that she..should see some diminution in the Sardinian levies Franco turned round and stated that she herself never had armed, and that she had no idea Sardinia was included in the disarmament. She, moreover, altogether declined even to aslc her: ally to disarm. Such, we believe, is now the hitch, in the negotiations; and this unexpected obstacle raised by France gives occasion to. the suspicion, that the Emperor has no intention of allowing the present difficulties to he settled. by diplomacy. Well-informed men now believe that, he is only amusing Europe with the promise of a Congress while he exhausts Austria and matures all his own preparations for taking the field. The position of Austria is, indeed, highly critical.' Ihe very worst that could happen to her is the present state of suspense. ' To maintain those great armaments in inaction/is sure ruin. The fortune o£ battle is uncertain; perhaps she may be victorious; but, even in the very improbable event of her losing rapidly all her Italian provinces, and suffering great successive defeats, she would not bo in a worse posi ■ tiori than she will be under a perpetual armed peace. She is bleeding to death, and she may as well be ; killed by the sword as by the lancet. But, however, this may- be, the policy of England.in this matter ■mustnot be misunderstood. Above all things, our desire is to maintain peace; but, if this may not be, then " let him who takes the sword perish by the sword."