Extracts.

Lyttelton Times, Volume X, Issue 591, 3 July 1858, Page 3

Extracts.

THE POLICY OF HONESTY IN INDIA

(From the JohnJßull^ March 6.)

.While the various phases of our past Indian policy are being subjected to such a terrible test as the mutiny affords—or rather, we should say, the war arising out of the mutiny—it may be well to east our eyes at two distinct quarters of India, and see. what we have done in. each, and see whatj are our several , fortunes accordingly. First of all'let us look at Oude, now, indeed, the cynosure of all eyes that watch, the great Eastern rebellion, Oude is described as bristling with. troops and studded with fortresses. The population to a man are excited against us, and the number of rebels under arms now round Lucknow is stated at 100,000= It is plain enough that Oude is the centre of hostility against us, that Oude will, be the seat of war, and. that our work is amply cut out for us there. Now let us consider what we have been doing in Oude, or what Lord Dalhousie has been doing there for us. Some time ago, as every one knows, we annexed Oude: we despoiled the hereditary Sovereign of his dominions and took them ourselves. The plea for such annexations is generally that though we dispossess the rulers the people are very rmich gratified by the change. Our deposition of the King of Oude, however, does not- seem to have had this effect. Certainly our administration was not calculated to please the wealthy class of proprietors. We immediately began tampering with the rights of property., In India, as our readers may be, aware, all proprietary rights in the land are based on ,the land revenue system ; the Sovereigns have granted the land tas: in particular districts to certain great chiefs, who pay him a regular assessment, and collect the tax for their own behoof from the actual occupiers of the soil. Those who; are acquainted with the. gradual growth of ownership of the soil out of our ancient feudal tenures will easily cpnceive how the grants thus made to these Oude Barons, ov Talooledars, from conferring. at firstonly: a .right to the land-tax came to "be considered i a property in the land itself. Such a transition has been taking place in Oude. The Talookdars were regarded as the lords of the villages and districts, under a right which had been unquestioned for many years. But when the Indian Government took possession, of the kingdom it re-settled the whole country, and whenever a decent pretext could be found in. a particular case, divested the Talookdar of his proprietary rights, for the purpose of handing them over to putteedars or cultivators of the soil, a class which generally claimed to he the original owners. It is probable enough that there may have been some ground for this claim, just as in the gradual development of our law which gave a proprietary right to the copy-

jhqlder, the Lord of the M anor miKht at any S^* mere tenant at will. We were \SZh£ OWe? ci A to, res Pecfc vested r^hts as *c found them m,Oude, and to apply to the law of u^undeHt 7 relations wh^ch had grown ! Of course, therefore, all the wealthier class of |the OudQ inhabitants regarded us with deadly ihatred. Among the names which have been iremarkable .throughout the rebellion, our readers (may recollect that of Maun Sing. The Royal (family of Oude being expatriated, Maun Sing jwa^the greatest man in the country. In our jsettiement ofthe country, two-tnirds of the |land which Maun Sing and his father before I him had peaceably enjoyed for many years, was , taken from him and handed over to the iputteedars. Yet, when the rebellion broke out ;Maun Sing, notwithstanding his ground of i complaint against us, refused for sometime to join it. Ibe Government were aware of his i power and influence in Oude, but made no f attempt to secure him till he had begun to yield Ito the entreaties of his rebellious countrymen. ■ ihe, n,fch£,authorities made, him large and reipeated offers, but it was too late. Maun Sing jdrew with him the whole of the Oude landi owners. But did the putteedars whom we haa I favoured favour us in return P It is from this ■class that the sepoys are drawn, and we know ! what,part the Oude sepoys have taken in the T° n jCS; Such» then, have been the fruits of ! Lord.Dalhousie's policy as exemplified in the kingdom of Oude.

Now let us look afc another side of the picii% The *ast Indian correspondence of the News' remarks that " the Maharajah of Gwalior has saved our Indian Empire." Nor is this saying too much. The Gwalior Contingent is the only body of rebel" troops which has gained any sort of advantage against us. The Gwalior Contingent, by the way, was not composedof Gwalior men, but was levied in Oude. Seindiah could not prevent them from rising at* Gwalior. But when they did rise, what would have been the consequence if he had acceded to their urgent entreaties to lead them against Agra ? At that time the sepoys were in possession of Delhi; the whole district north-west of Agra was in arms and our garrisons were closely shut up, and threatened with destruction at Cawnpore and Lucknow. The descent of twenty thousand men on the region where the fate of our Indian empire hung trembling in the balance must at once have extinguished all trace of European rule for the time being, and have imparted a prestige to the mutiny which we should not have easily broken down. Scindiahhad a difficult part to play. He was himself in serious danger; he could not control the Contingent by the weight of his authority or even by his Mahratta troops. He could only temporize, and this he did with such good effect that the opportunity was lost, and when the Gwalior mutineers did march, they fared as we know at the hands of Sir Colin Campbell. What made the Maharajah of Gwalior thus stand-our friend, contrary to the direction of his own ambition, and even to his great personal risk ? That well-known publication, the Red pamphlet, wil supply the answer:—

" When, in 1843, Gwalior lay at the feet of Lord Ellenborough, its army discomfited, their leaders disheartened, and its king a minor, that^ far-seeing nobleman conceived the idea of so binding it to our interests, that without any violation of faith, without any infringement of the rights of the native ruler, it might be hereafter a source of strength to our empire; and the means by which he proposed to accomplish this result were these. To the lawful ruler, of whose infancy his councillors had taken unwise advantage, Lord Ellenborough returned the whole of his patrimony, but his army he disbanded. In lieu of it, he raised another army, officered and paid by British officers—the money for the purpose being furnished by the Maharajah. He placed near the person, of that prince a resident, armed with plenary powers, whose duty it should be to guide, instruct, and educate the j'outhful monarch ; to make his policy, though he remained Maharajah, and in name the despotic master of Gwalior, entirely dependent on the views and instructions of the British Government.

" By these means, no shock was offered to the feelings of the native princes: these were not suddenly and rudely, even treacherously, as in the case of Oude and Nagpore, made to feel that their existence depended on the pleasure of one man. On the contrary, the generous policy of Lord Ellenborough drew from them all the expression of satisfaction, with a devotion to our rule. Nor was it in any other respect a less wise policy. Instead of weakening our empire, as it was done in the two cases referred to, by transferring to our rule, and to a more dreaded ordeal—to our civil Courts, a wild, rude, and untamed people, untaught in the technicalities and trickeries of law, he strengthened it by retaining them under then'native laws, and by imparting thereby a sense of security to all who had inherited or purchased property under the ancient regime." In the midst of all the disasters which have occured in India it is no small comfort to know that the just and statesman-like policy which has thus had the effect of saving bur empire in India, is now called upon to animate our home , Government with respect to that country. <