LAST DAYS OF THE SIEGE OF DELHI.

Lyttelton Times, Volume IX, Issue 548, 3 February 1858, Page 3

LAST DAYS OF THE SIEGE OF DELHI.

The following letter from a correspondent of the 'Lahore Chronicle 'of the 30fch September conveying an account of the last days of the siege of Delhi, andthe assault of the place, will be quite new to our readers, and read with much interest r . "Your readers will have understood, from the intelligence which has: been from,, time to time published, that fromithe period of the arrival of our army before Delhi, in June last, up till very lately, the position occupied by our troops has - been in effect a purely-defensive one. It extended from the picket at Metcalfe's house, close to the river on the left, along the ridge facing the north side of Delhi as far as the Subzee" Munde "suburb oh bur right, where this ridge terminates, distance from the city wall averaging from 1,200 to 1,500 yards. We had'from the first no choice as to the front of attack, our position on the north side being the -only one that could secure our communication with the Pnnjaub, whence our supplies and reinforcements were drawn. Whether the- city might or might not have been carried by a coup de main, as was contemplated first in June, and afterwards in July> it is needless now to inquire. But judging from the resistance: we afterwards experienced in the actual assault, when we had been greatly- reinforced in men and guns, it appears to me fortunate that the attempt was never supposed to consist in the strength of its actual defences, though these were most undervalued * but every city, even without fortifications, is, from its very nature, strongly defensible (unless it can be effectually surrounded or bombarded), and within Delhi the enemy possessed a magazine containing upwards of 200 guns and an almost inexhaustible supply of ammunition, while their numbers were certainly never less than double those of the besiegers. Few will doubt then that the General in* command exercised a sound discretion i^ refusing to allow, a handful of troaps, unaided by siege gum;, to attack such a place, knowings as he did, what disastrous results must follow a failure.

By the beginning of this < month, however, we received the siege .train from Ferozepore and further reinforcements of European and native troops from the Punjaub, and, it being known that there was no hope of any aid from down country for a considerable time, it was resob/ed that the siege should be at once commenced arid prosecuted with the utmost \igov. Our available force amounted in round numbers to 6,500 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and 600 artillery, Europeans and Natives—the regiments in camp being H. M's < 9th Lancers, H. M's 6th. Dragoon Guards, Guide Cavalry, Hodgsons's Horse, and detachments of the Ist, 2nd, and sth Punjaub Cavalry. - H. M's Bth Foot (part of), 52nd Foot,.6oth Rifles (part of), 61st Foot, 75th Foot, Ist and 2nd Bengal Fusiliers, Sirmoor and Kumann Battalions (Ghoorkas), 4th Sikh Infantry, Guide Infantry, Ist, 2nd, and 4th Regiments Pttfjaub Infantry. Four troops: of Horse Artillery (Tomb's, Turner's, Remington's, and' Rennie's); two light Field Batteries (Scott's and Bourchiev's), and some Foot Artilleryattached to the siege guns, which numbered 'about 40 heavy guns and .howitzers, 10 heavy and 12 light mortars. The means of the engineers were very' restricted, not in officers, but in trained men, of "whom there were only about 120 regular sappers. Some companies of Muzbee Sikhs had, however, been rapidly ■.■raised,, and partially trained; and a body of coolies had also been collected, whd Worked remarkably well; the Park had been at work for some time in col: lecting material, and 10,000 fascines, 10,000 gabions; and 10,000 sandbags 'were ready for future operations; field magazines, scaling ladders and spare platforms had. also been duly prepared, and great credit is due to Lieut. Brownlow, of Engineers, in charge of tho Park, whose activity and intelligence contributed not a little to the eventvial success of our operations. •■••'

The north face being the side to be attacked, it was resolved to hold the right in check as far

as> possible, and to push the main attack on the left first, as the river would completely protect our flank as w« advanced ; second, as there was better cover on that side; jthird, as after the assault the troops would not find themselves immediately in narrow streets, but in comparatively open ground.

The front to be attacked consisted of the Moree, Cashmere and Water Bastions with the curtain walls connecting them. These bastions had been greatly altered and improved by our own engineers many gears ago, and presented regular face 3 and flanks <of masonry with properly, cut embrasures; the height of the wall was 24 feet above the ground level, of which, however, 8 feet was a mere parapet 3 feet thick, the remainder being about four times that thickness; outside the wall was a very wide berm, and then a ditch 16 feet deep and 20 feet wide at the bottom, escarp and counterscarp steep, and the latter unrivetted, and the.former rivetted with stone and 8 feet in height. A good sloping glacis covered the lower 10 feet of the wall from all attempts of distant batteries.

On the eveningl of the 7th September, No. 1 advanced Battery, in two portions, was traced about 700 yards from the Moree Bastion, the right portion for five 18 pounders and one eightinch howitzer was to silence the Moree and prevent its interfering with the attack on the left. The left portion four 24-pounders was intended to hold the Cashmere bastion partially in check. The working parties were very little disturbed during the night; the covering parties in front kept the musketry at a distance, and except three well-aimed showers of grape thrown from the Moree which knocked over . some workmen, we l'eceived no further annoyance. By the morning the two portions of the battery were finished and armed, although not ready to fire until nearly sunrise; a trench was also made connecting the two portions and extending a little to the right and left so as to give communication with a wide and deep i-avine which, extending very nearly up to our left attack, formed a sort of first parallel, and gave good cover to the guard of. thetrenches, the coolies, &c. : -. For some time we were well pounded from the Moree with round shot and grape, but as our guns'in the new battery got gradually into pliiy, the enemy's fire grew less and less, and was at length completely overpowered. This battery became known as Band's, being worked by that officer with great effect till the end of the siege.

On the evening of the Btli and 9fch, No. 2 Battery was ti*aced and commenced. To our surprise we had been allowed to seize this advanced position at Ludlow Castle, within 600 yards of the city, without even a fight for it on the previous day. In fact there is little doubt that the enemy still thought the attack was to be on the right, where all the fighting had hitherto been, and where all our old batteries were located. Ludlow Castle and the Koodsee Hagh were now ,occupied by strong detachments and formed our chief supports to the left attack. During the 9th, a sharp fire of musketry, shot and. shell, was opened on these positions by the enemy from the jungle in front, and from the Cashmere and Water Bastions, and the Selimgurh, but no great damage was done.

During the nights of the 9th and 10th, No. 2 Battery was . completed and partially armed, but not yet unmasked. It was in two portions. One immediately in front of Ludlow Castle for nine 24-pounders to open a breach in the curtain between the Cashmere and Water Bastions immediately to the left of the former, and to .knock off the parapet to right and left for some distance, so as to give no cover to musketry. The other portion, some 200 yards to the right, consisting of seven 8-inch howitzers, and two 18-pounders, was to aid the first portion and work with it for the same end. No. 3 Battery was also commenced on the left, and No. 4 Battery for 10 heavy mortars completed in the; Koodsee Bagh, but not yet unmasked. Major Tombs was in charge of this battery, the light mortars under Captain Blunt were afterwards worked from the rear of the Custom House.

During the night of the 10th and 11th, No. 5 battery was strengthened, armed and unmasked, and No. 3 battery completed.; This was made in the boldest manner, within 180 yards of the Water Bastion behind a small ruined house in the Custom House compound —and under such a fire of musketry as few batteries have ever been exposed to; it was for six 18-pounders, which were, to open a second breach in the Water Bastion, and was worked by Major Scott. The enemy also went to work to-night and made an advanced trench parallel to our left attack, and about -350 yards from it, from which at daybreak they opened a very hot fire of musketry, which was maintained throughout the rest of the siege. They had previously got some light guns and one heavy one out into the open on our right, which caused considerable annoyance by their enfilade fire.

On the 11th ouv batteries opened fire, a salvo from the nine 24-pounders opening the ball and showing, by the way.it brought down the wall in huge fragments, what effect it might be expected, to produce after a few hours. The Cashmere Bastion attempted to reply but was quickly silenced, and both portions of No. 2 went to work in fine style, knocking the bastion and adjoining curtain to pieces. Majors Campbell and Kaye, Captains Johnson and Gray, had charge of No. 2. No. 3, however, did not commence fire till the . following day, when the full power of our artillery was shown, and the continuous roar of 50 guns and mortars pouring shot and shell on, the devoted city warned the enemy that his and our time had at length come. Night and day until the morning of the 14th was this overwhelming liro con

tinued. But the enemy did not let us have it all our own way. Though unable to work a gun from any of the three bastions that were so fiercely assailed, yet they stuck to their guns in the open, which partially enfiladed our position ; they got a gun to bear from a hole broken open in the long curtain wall; they sent rockets from one of their Martello towers, and they maintained a perfect storm of musketry from their advanced trench and from the city walls.

On the night of the 13th, the Engineers stole down and examined the two breaches near the Cashmere and Water Bastious(*) ; and, both being reported practicable, orders for the assault were at once issued, to take place at daybreak the following morning. The arrangements for the storming were as follows :—

Ist Column—Brigadier General Nicholson. H.M.s 75th Regiment, Ist Bengal Fusiliers, 2nd Punjaub Infantry. To storm, the breach near the Cashmere Bastion, and escalade the face of the Bastion.

Engii leer Officers attached—Lieuten ants Madley, Lang, and Bingharn. 2nd Column —Brigadier Jones, C.B. H.M.s Bth Regiment, H.M.s 61st Regiment, 4th Sikh Regiment. To sborra the breach in the Water Bastion.

Engineer Officers attached—Lieuts. Greathead, Hovenden, and Pemberton.

3rd Column—Colonel Campbell. H.M.s 52nd Regiment, 2nd Fusiliers, Ist Punjaub Infantry.

To assault by the Cashmere Gate after it should be down open. Engineer • Officers attached—Lieuts. Home, Salkeld, and Tandy.

4th Column-—Major Reid. Detachment of European Regiments, Sirmoor Battalion, Guide Infantry, Detachment of Dograhs. To attack the suburb Kiseeugunj, and enter the Lahore gate. Engineer Officers attached—Lieuts. Maunsell and Tennanfc.

sth Column—Brigadier Longfield. H.M.s 60th Rifles, Kuthron Battalion, 14th Punjaub Infantry. The Reserve.

Engineer Officers attached —Lieuts. Ward and Thackeray.

At 4 a.m. the different columns fell in, and were marched to their respective places, the heads of No. 1, 2, and 3 columns being kept concealed, until the moment for the actual assault should arrive. The signal was to be the advance of the Rifles to the frout to cover the heads of the columns by skirmishing.

Everything being ready, General Nicholson, whose excellent arrangements elicited the admiration of all, gave the signal, and the Rifles dashed to the front with a cheer, extending along and skirmishing the low jungle, ■which at this point extends to within .fifty yards of the ditch. At the same moment-the heads of No. 1 and 2 columns emerged from.the Koodsee Bagh and advanced steadily towards the breach. Our batteries had maintained a tremendous fire up to the moment of the advance of the troops, and not a gun could the enemy bring to bear on the storming columns; but no sooner did these emerge into the open than a perfect hailstorm of bullets met them from the front and both flanks, and officers and men fell fast on the crest of the glacis. For ten minutes it was impossible to get the ladders down into the ditch to ascend the escarp, but the determination of the British soldier carried all before it, and Tandy declined to meet the charge of the British bayonet. With a shout and a rush the breaches were both won, and the enemy fled in confusion.

Meanwhile the explosion party advanced in front of the 3rd column straight upon the Cashmere Grate. This little baud of heroes (for they were no less) had to advance in broad daylight to the gateway, in the very teeth of a hot fire of musketry from above and through the gateway and on both flanks; the powder bags were coolly laid and adjusted, but Lieutenant Salkeld was by this time ' hors de combat' with two bullets in him. Sergeant Burgess then _ tried and succeeded, but paid for the daring act with his life. Sergeant Smith, thinking that Burgess too had failed, ran forward, but seeing the train alight, had just time to throw himself into the ditch and escape the effects of the explosion. With a loud crash the gateway was blown in, and through it the third column rush.cd to the assault, and entered the town just as .the other columns had won the breaches. Gen. Wilson has since bestowed the Victoria Cross on Lients. Home and Salkeld, on Sergeant Smith, and on a brave man of H.M.s 52nd, who stood by Lieut. Salkeld to the last, and bound up his wounds. General Nicholson then found the troops in the main guard inside, and with his column proceeded to clear the ramparts as^ far as the Moree bastion. It was in advancing beyond this towards the Lahore gate, that ho met the wound which has since caused his lamented death, a death which it is not too much to say has dimmed the lustre of even this victory, as it has deprived the country of one of the ablest men, and the most gallant soldiers that England anywhere numbers among our ranks.

The 4th column, I regret to say, failed, but as it was too far for me to know anything of its real progress, I prefer leaving its story to be told by another instead of sending yon a vague and imperfect account. Had this column succeeded, its posession of the Lahore gate would have saved us much subsequent trouble.

Mr. Editor I regret that my account must stop here,.as, being wounded myself at this stage of the proceedings, I was unable to witness

■"Lieutenants Mailley ami Lang examined the former. Lieutenants Greathed and Home tiie latter.

the subsequent capture of the magazine, the Burn Bastion, the Palace, and finally the whole city. Some one else will doubtless conclude my story in a more worthy manner th;m I told it. Thus determinated the seige of Delhi. Our loss during the actual siege was about 300 men. On the day of the assault, it was 64 Officers killed and wounded, being nearly one third of the -whole number engaged. The Ist Fusiliers alone lost 9 Officers, and other regiments, 1 believe, in proportion; the engineers suffered heavily; the three Officers conducting Nos. 1. 2 and 4 Columns (Lieutenants Medley, Greathed, and Maunsell), were all struck down early in the figlit, and of 17 Officers on duty that day 10 were put ' hors de combat.' The loss of the enemy is never likely to be correctly ascertained; but, at the end of the operations, it is probable that at least 1,600 men must have been killed between the 7th and 20th, and a very large number wounded who were carried away. For the complete success that attended the prosecution of the siege, the chief credit is undoubtedly due to Colonel Baird Smith, the Chief Engineer, and to Captain A. Taylor, the director of the attack. On this latter officer in fact, (in consequence of the Chief Engineer being wounded) devolved the entire superintendence of the siege works, and his energy and activity will doubtless meet with their due reward. Throughout the operations he seemed to be omnipresent, and to bear a charmed life, tor he escaped without a wound. The plan of the attack was bold and skilful—the nature of the enemy we were contending with was exactly appreciated and our plans shaped accordingly. Pandy can figlit well behind cover, but here he was ont-nia-noeuvered, his attention being diverted from the real point of attack till the last, and then the cover, which might have proved a serious obstacle to us, was seized at the right moment without loss, and all its advantages turned against him. With plenty of skilled workmen the siege woi*ks might have been more speedily constructed; but, with the wretched means at our disposal, the wonder is that so much was done with so little loss. If the siege of Delhi was not a regular siege, in the same sense with that of Bhurtpore or Seringapatam, it may yet bear a fairer comparison with a greater than either, that of Sebastopol. In both, the strength of the fortifications was as nothing, it was the proportion of besieged to besiegers, the magnitude of the arsenal inside, and the impossibility of a thorough investment, that constituted the real strength of the place; in fact, neither were, properly speaking, sieges, hut rather attacks on an army in a strongly intrenched position.