The Lyttelton Times.

Lyttelton Times, Volume VI, Issue 425, 29 November 1856, Page 6

The Lyttelton Times.

Saturday, Nxmember .29. 'That, portion ofMr.'Fitz'Gerald?s,pamphlet of which we gave a sketch on' Wednesday, i 'dealt chiefly with .matters .of finance.; He next turns his attention ,to another' cause of expense .in tthe present duplicate' form of government, the. conflict of-jurisdic-tion Taetween two authorities. That the "present state of things can last he does not \ believe. There are now in the colony ,two , authorities with concurrent jurisdiction and opposite interests, in a position .of .normal hostility. One must destroy the other. to me, on'carefully .considering the subject, with the experience of the past three • years, that 'there are -three .-possible < changes ■which may be made m the Constitution; all of 1 them, with a certain amount of .advantage. lEirst—The whole Legislative and .Executive power can be restored to the General ■■ Government'; and the Provincial Governments, as Governing-Bodies, properly so called, destroyed • or'permitted to lapse into municipalities, with no powers of'legislation. * * * # A second possible result is the full and complete introduction of the system of Government in. the United States. That is to say/ to maintain''the separate and independent jurisdictions of the existing provinces, but to remove altogether the controlling power of the General Government: not only to debar the provinces from legislating on such and such subjects, but equally to debar the General Assembly' from legislating upon any subject within the legislative jurisdiction of the provinces.' + * •* ' #

"I coma now to the third change which it is possible to,,make in the Constitution ; I mep the entire amalgamation of the General and Provincial Governments into one, not by getting rid of the Provincial Governments, but by localizing the General Government in each nrovince; and this can only be effected by abolish^ ing the office of Superintendent altogether, and making the Governor the head of every Provincial Government; ■so that the Provincial Ordinances would run instead of as now, "Be it' enacted by the Superintendent of the province of —, with the advice and consent of' the Provincial Council thereof, &c."; "Be it enacted by the Governor of New Zealand, by and with the advice," &c.

I The Constitution "of 1846 made the GovernorI in-Chief of the Colony to be also Governor of ; each province so long as he resided therein. I would return to that system, except that there should not he a Lieutenant-Governor to take the Governor's place in his absence, unless the province wished it.' Auckland would desire it; Ofcago and New Plymouth probably would not. By this simple means eyery officer in the public i service would be an officer of the General Government; the Provincial Government >vould, in fact, be the General Government localised in ' 1 the provinces; and the Government would be | administered in the provinces by the Secretary, having, as now, a seat in the Provincial ■CounciL, and retaining the confidence of that body. | The practice of Responsible Government might then, indeed^ be consistently carried out in all the Provincial Governments. .The objections to .the two .first propositions ,are forcibly staled. With respect to the-first, Mr. Fitz Gerald points out the difference between a " municipal corporation" and a " local government." Each district in the province might be made a corporation from which' all .powers of legislation would be taken away, and " the •Superintendent -and Provincial Council of would then be arn,ere .parish board for "the purpose of .making1 and mending the .roads, and perhaps of appointing .consta^ , bles." - " i ' ■ As to the second -or federal theory, we { are glad<to find that Mr. -Fita'Ger.ald rep'u- ! -diates it altogether. - The inapplicability .of the United States ■ form-of government to > .this colony isplaced in so clear a light by aj "few words, that we .quote the whole passage. - i

1 The.only persons who hold :this doctrine 4re, so j far^asj know, Mr.-Fox, and his .fiiends at Wei-' .lington. ,It>appear,s to me to be a, form pfcGovern- ; meat wholly inapplicable to this colony, for,,in the " first place, it would be found necessarj' to add ,a -second"Legislative Chamber to each Province. In America, this 'has been found indispensable, so -much so, that those States which bad originally but one-chamber, have altered their Government, and have>now two. We may follow their experience, so far. -Secondly ,'this-would be the most expensive • Government imaginable, because it would be neces■sary.to maintain-a-General or Federal Government -with very little or nothing to do. At present, the General Government takes a real part in the :Governraent.of.the Colony by its power of disallowing the Provincial Acts. .In the United States, it exer T cises the supreme authorities over the army and the navy:—it declares war, and make peace:—it controls all rtlatiorii-hips with" foreign powers. 'But the General-'Government-of New Zealand would do none of these; 'for all of "these are done by the Crown tif England. The General Government of 'the United States-manages the lauds', but here the ■\Ya*.te Lands '.are-transferred to the Provinces. There is therefore,no analogy between the 'General .Government of this Colony and the, Government of the United States. Another point of, dissimilarly is, that in the United States, the Federal Government not only controls the Customs Revenue, but expends it. The Separate States do not share the revenues of the General Government, but each collects its own revenues by taxation. ■ And this I believe to be an essential part-of. the successful working of the United States system. Where the authority and jurisdiction of Governments are distinct, their revenues must be .distinct also ; and the of our finances in this-Colony-for the-last few years has deeply impressed this pn ,my mind. If, therefore, wa are to introduce ..the American system in this Colony, we must look to \ this as an inevitable result which must.shortly follow ; —that the' General Government will have to raise taxes by Customs duties, sufficient for its purposes, and then the Provinces must raise revenue, each for itself; by •directtaxation. Now,'(lnset taxation, for the-pur-

pose ut ii)..nit.<iimi£ the kUff «f Gpveim.renHr not prep .re f i to .submit to. ' ?ut» v *e a*e I h.iv«r indeed, wiSer and Wronger ground t objecting to the form of Government i.^, v , °5 btatrt, hiimiik from the elective fhuat'w of n pu >lie executive and judicial offi CtS ]" im " sudded that the system of popular ileciion'to IT cutive offices, iMiot ti.e best sw em ,„ 8e e*e < rynt men m the right pUcab.'i L has not secimS the best men in America for the pubhc service and the tenlble scenes now enacting , n Californ nnd Kansas pu>ve that it does not secure the tii quillity of society, or the hipping of individual*"l Hut J wi 1 not nouble you with this wide field of I discussion. 1 have ghen above specific teasons f objecting to see the dpctiines (as I undemaudtwi ot the ul ra-Provincial party triumphant j n jJ Colony. '^2 The tliiid course :—Jhat of localising ft e Central Government., unites the aih unlade of the central and provincial theories without their greatest eviis. Local S,elf Government and .uniformity of Goverurneut would be attained a,t the same time. w The Secietary' for each province would hold office so lon«-------only as he proved himself to be really the' leader of the community. Tlie gr^eat objection to this plan mil no doybt be that it involves pelting rid of the elective Supeun. , tendents. Ignorant politicians and designing poll. ' ticians will no doubt ciy out against r.his ass.udt on the liberties of the people. But though fuj men will ask themselves whether th.it office i udlly forms' any safe-guard for popular libert\. Tnose who speak of' the necessity ' of elected Supem.teiideuts to popular liberty, should go much iaither and insiht upon having an elected And it would be far more rational to have an elected Governor, by whom the shouid be nominated, than to have the present system pregnant with elements of inevitable vStnj'e. And jet such pc-sons should remember ,that the several colonies of Australia,, which have at least as much Jove of liberty as ourselves, have, in their several Constitutions which they have recently diavmup for themselves, and sent to England ioradoptim, never even suggested the idea of elected Governois. It is not in "their minds .necessary ito the lull enjoyment of <popular institutions that the head of the >J&xe,cutive should ,be elected. Nor is it at all necessary for the purpose of main.taining an efficient i;esponsib}lity on the part of the -Gover.nment that ,its administrators should be directly elected by the people. J am peisu<ided that a far moie real and ,wliolesprn,e control over the acts of Government is maintained when its members are responsible to the legislative body, thani when that responsibility is weakened and divided] by an additional direct responsibility to the electors Hence, by getting rid of an elective'head to the Government in each province, <I believe that t re people 'will gain instead of losing a wholsome contiol over the acts of th« Government. So far from sneering with-"-the Times," or " the -Lyltelton limes " in its ■wake, at the Constitutiop, because every second man you -might ,meet m^y be a representative M .some place in.some Assembly,,l honestly winh that .ever.yin^p I met who could read and write were a member,of some'legislative Assembly. For in a .free country, every nun pught to be a*ked for his assent to the laws which he .is to obey ; and it is only because of the physical difficulty, that he gives 'his assent by 'his Repiesentative, instead of per-* >sonally. And so here, J. wish every i'lector, if it were possible, were a member of the Provincial Council, and could take^a pait in assenting to the laws.of the Jand. This .latter proposition we do not understand. "If it were possible "is certainly a paving clause. Either-the sentence means nothing at all (such ,an assembly being impossible), or else we cannot but.^hink that it -asserts a rfallacy^ * Qae of the leasons why the-people <pf England have-succeeded -in working the freest .Constitution 'in the world, is that 'they have .always avoided pushing theoiies- to their extreme consequences, and'have'been satisfied with the mos practical means of attaining the objecl required. In Poland, the theory upon Whp representative 'institutions are based J». as carded out to its fullest extent: every-SKe-man claimed his right to be present at tnc pacing of iaws :—the consequence wju 'that such assemblages became;battle-teias and Poland was-a nuisance to civilize Eurppe. We believe that the Wort "American Indians pf old had soru .such custom ,as this; pur Anglo-&a^ /ancestors in their .semi-barbarous ,«" .certainly .bad ;,,feut S ent ? t^.e InsUtu -tiojis.v^ere'founcl&d in,civilised times topw

the requirements qf qivilised people, and we see no reason t'qv yirsiting to irtupe. our i steps, to adopt'the f'<i*hir\i winch <>Uit>da primitive state of society. We ctitamly do aifiee with ' T|je Tunes' in thinking Miat Ne\y Zealand is blesspd wild 100 in my leyi-'litois, especially iti a countty when* those legi-iatoi s take such caie to pay thejneeKe* libeially for the tune Mevotcd to the geivice ot their countiy. The following lemaiks aie well woilhy of con&uleralipn:— JJut, I do not wish to see any or every electoren- , gnged in the cxc cution of those laws and tlie administration of Government. It lias seen fit to Proudence to give to men vauous abilities, and those who hive studied the histoiy of mankind, well know, that those qualities which .ne requisite successfully to govern men .aid countries are amongst the raiest gifts of Gi>d. Now the pcopje have ho means of ascertaining what a man's ad nitnstrati've qualifications <n c Ihe public can readily ascei tain a man's opinion, and can judge of his poweis of speikmg in public; but his habits of business, his capaui'y for conducting a public office, and foi contioihng the public s^ivaiitb under him, —surely ft is plain tjiat the public at laige must, on these, points, vote] wholly in ihe dark. And jet, these are the points ' on which the election ought to turn, if' the rght ' man is 40 be put into the light place. All must ' admit, tJiat in a popular election, men will rare,lv <r ' ne\er be elected owing to their character, kno\y ledge, < or abilities, bu,t, g,eneially, far their opinions A j man pie-eminently fitted ior admmisteung govern- | ment —and by tins I mean a man well-inlormed, courteous, and liberal—such a man would, in ' jnne ca\es> out ot ten, jf he ,held unpopular '/opinions, I be set aside in favor of popular candida'e, however coarse, bigoted, illiterate, or unscrupulous If tins be «o, and who will^say that it is not, the principle of diction is not a sWe.n applicable to administrate c offices. And should this happen, what will be the result? Wqe.to that nation makes of the lowest people I Priests in the high places; which refuses to do Jionor to learning, to gei\iu.s or to public virtue, lo | every people is _given its heipes, and its leaders; s and it rests with the people in a fiee country, Whether tky will recognise jar lefuse'the gift ot God. ! In qne case a nation advances in in power, apd in all that can make ( it great i at home, and lespected abroad; 'in the, other case, if it despises its best citizens, and, in j them, dishonors learning, worth, md intellect, such , a people,'as the nistory of the world has repeatedly , shewn, is on the downward road to destruction. And I confess recent events in the Colony ha\e led me seriously to apprehend, whether the elective character of the Executive officeis in the Provincial Governments may i,ot endanger the handing over the large powers of those Go\einments to men wholly unable to wield them ; and may not seriously imperil all true liberty in the Colony. Nevertheless, as the elective Superintend is an institution^ existing, aiid m favour of which theie is much prejudice, it would not be wise, for the sake of my abstiact theory of Government, to discurb tke arrangement. I should onjy be induced to do so as the mjeans,to a greater end, the cheapening, localising, aud amalgamating \he Government in the manner pointed 7 out above. ' But I ask^ou to consider this question soberly Supposing the powers of the Piovincial Councils' to he' etffarged < and consolidated, is it worth while to lose 6,000 a jear to" the ( prbyince, £or ,tUe sake ,of having an , elected Superintendent ? Mr. Fitz Geiald holds the same opinions' on the subject of the over-ruling legislative < power of * the-General Assembly'that Jie' expiessed upon the hustings. ' ' In a country like this, with six separate Legislatures, marking sjx, separate cpdes of laws for different parts of the colony, there could har/lly be a j more useful institution than a General Legislaturell meetjng once m every few years, nhose/business ltd should be to revise from time to time the Provincial'i laws, leducing the whole code of the country to ' something like uniformity. Fiom time to time the)! ktipreme^Couit wilhhave to be enlarged, and fresh; salaries seemed to Judges; the Customs Laws will| occasionally want reusion ; the postal department will require change. These matters will all lequiiej ; the meeting of the General Assembly. But, as i fere should,,te r ,rio,annual..appropriat]on of 4:evenueS °y l thatj body, meetings would not require to be "eld more fiequently than once in ioui 01 five Jeais. No pait of tlje pubhc<.expendituie is moie outiageous than that at present incuned by the sittings of the General Assembly. Every farthing ot this might be saved; the few servants necessaij u «ng hnuUfor the occasion of the laic meetings "Inch would in future occui. After pointj^g^ out that there mny he other ,op i inio l ns m reference to the development of the Constitution diflVutig \yjder

from these of the two i*ieat paities, tlie nltpcentialists and the \\\\)-,\ pn)\i cJalibU, the letter concludes with (he following ieinaiks, which lequire no comment tunu us.'

In conclusion, —I think it possible that pome few will attubute to me-interested piotives in denning to get rid of elective Supeiiutendunts. Men who adopt this mode of reasoning unconsciously express what their own conduct would be under b'milar circumstances. I shall not pay you so b.td a com pliment as to supprse that jou aje of that number. As in forming these opinions, I have not /eaied such a charge, so in v tiling them I shall not (lelend myself against it. But, having had some pxperience in the working of tins colony, both in the aspect which it bears from the General and the Provincial positions., I give you the results at which I have arrived, and wnich should I again'attend a session of the General Assembly. I desire to advocate ; <md I shall hone to find that in doing so, I shall faithfully represent the majority ot my constituents. ■„