GERMANY'S NAVY

King Country Chronicle, Volume VIII, Issue 698, 26 August 1914, Page 6

GERMANY'S NAVY

ACTUAL STRENGTH AT,SEA INCREASED STRIKING FORCE (Berlin Correspondent of London , Titles.) Berlin, July sth The British naval visit to Kiel, although its final festivities were dimmed by the tragedy of Serajevo, was a great success and gave fine proof of naval comradeship the world over and of German hospitality. The recaption was warm and sincere. It is not an empty convention that exalts Emperors and Kings to the highest rank in the armies and navies with which they sometimes come to blows. It is rather a symbol of brotherhood in arms—exhibited at Kiel alike when the Emperor William hoisted the flag of a British Admiral in the King George V., when Sir George Warrender and the President of the German Navy League exchanged enthusiastic speeches in Kiel Town Hall, and when the German and British bluejackets made merry ashore. The Bpirit that prevailed on both sides was admirable, and needless to say—the din of politics was hushed. There could be no better place for purely naval celebrations.

Kiel, with her magnificent harbour, is a child of the Navy. Her population grew rapidly after the Danish, Austrian and French wars, but it was only 108.U00 in 1900, the year of the first great Navy Law. In 1913 it was more than 218,000 The chief home of the Navy, and the gatewaythanks to the Kiel Canal—of the Baltic and the North Sea, Kiel is the home also of a new breed of Germans. Nothing is more striking than the rapid development 0! the naval type. It is already almost impossible to distinguish between BritiEh anil German naval officers, the younger they are, the lesß they resemble the traditional Prussian lieutenants. The imitation of England has been no less deliberate as regards personnel than as regards ships and guns, and it has been no less Bjccessful While the two navies, then, had pleasant occasion to improve their acquaintance and increase their respect for one another, there were no politics at Kiel. So absent were they that it was not considered inappropriate to announce in Berlin on June 28th that there is to be a still further increase of the striking force of the German Navy and of Germany's naval representation abroad. It is evidently believed that the situation at home, where Grand Admiral von Tirpitz has both the Treasury and the Reichstag "in his pocket," and the situation abroad, and eppecially in England, where Germany's efforts seem for the prsent to arouse less apprehension,are favourable to at any rate a slight accleration of peace without fear of new complications German politicians have argued themselves into a very comfortable state of mind. On the other hand, there is a general admiration of ihe brand new formula invented for the last Reichstag debate by Dr Heckscher, a Radical Deputy and Director of the Hamburg-Ameriku Line: "A detente between England and Germany has been possible only because Germany has provided herself with a strong navy." On the other hand, if Mr Churchill had accepted the German invitation to Kiel, he might have beard —no doubt in more polite terms —what the new volume of the semi-ocffiial "Nauticus" puts as follows: —

"The Navy panic artificially created in England in the year 1909 was followed until quite recently by attempts to influence German naval policy. Arithmetical formulae were invented. The "holiday year idea" wa§ produced, Germany nas branded as the promoter of larger armaments and increased displacements, reductions of the English programme of construction were BUggeßted as possible —all this in order to obtain influence over the development of our naval armaments and to break down and destroy the Navy Law even at the eleventh hour, bo that the Government in power would be freed from itß financial anxieties and domestic difficulties and the English taxpayers be saved still heavier burdens. But in reply the German press uttered quietly and decisively and almost unanimously its "Unacceptable," and the public opinion thus refused absolutely to admit any further interference with the nation's right todecide for itself." Thuß the wicked ambition of the British Government to stay expenditure has been foiled, and the German politicians, blandly assuming that British opposition is finished, have provided themselves with a new theory capable perhaps before long of reading—"The larger the German navy the better Anglo-Ger-man relations will be."

THE LAW OP 1912 The main feature of the Navy Law Amendment Bill of 1912 was, as Mr Churchill said in the House of Commons, "not the increase in the nsw construction of capital uhips," but "the increase in the striking force of ships of all classes immediately available at all seasons of the year." The objects of the Bill were to increase the Active Battle Flaat evon at the expanse, if necessary, of tha Reserve Battle Fleet, ana very greatly to increase the personnel. The Bill was very fully explained in tho Times of July 23rd and 24th,1912, and it need only be recalled that the main effect was—to quote the explanatory statement appended to the Bill —the "gradual formation of a third active squadron" by meanß which involved additional permanent commissioning of three battleships, three large cruisers, and three small cruisers. Fresh definitions were given of the Reserve Battle Fleet" and of the "Foreign Service Fleet," and an elaborate explanatory table showed the distribution of additional personnel amounting in all to about 15,000 men. The table was beautifully neat, and showed, in detail, ranging from two vice-admirals to eleven probationary paymasters, the exact additional requirements of the Navy under the new Bill up to one the year 1920. The annual average was calculated from the total in the year 1920, but it was arranged, for reasons which were not disclosed, to take 500 men more than the average in each of the years 1912, 1913, and 1914, and it was actually- promised that 500 men less than the average would be taken in the years 1918, 1919, and 1920. It was, naturally, assumed that the increase of personnel was all that would be necessary for fulfilling the requiiements of the law, which indeed fixed everything in advance ecxept perhaps the commissioning of the Foreign Service Fleet This last matter waa one loophole in the Bill. A second loophole lav in the statement that the Third Squadron was to be formed "gradually." It seems that advantage is now to be taken of both these openings. About the moot remarkable feature of German Navy Estimates, and the best index to the growth of Germany's actual Btrongth at 8e«, is the rapid incres.se in expenditure on ; "keeping ships in oommisßion." The amount has practically doublad in seven years. The total voton in 1908 amounted to £1,836,000, in 1909 to £2,149,000, in 1910 to £2,206,000, in 1911 to £2,362,000, in 1912 to £2,5700,00, in 1913 to £2,905,000, and for the present financial year the figure is no less than £3,4100,0. Some part of the increases is of course attributable to the improvement in type of ships, but as a matter of! fact the increasee due to this cause has in no year been more than about £IOO,OOO, and in the present year, when the total increase is more than £500,000, the amount due to alterations of type is less than £62,000.

THE IHTRD BATTLE SQUADRON The procedure followed with regard to the formation of the Third Battleship Squadron created by the ljaw of 1912 haß been curious and is difficult to explain except upon the assumption that the Law of 1912 was deliberately applied in away which was sure to lead almost immediately to the further increases now in preparation. Great importance hitherto has always been attached to the formation of squadrons of eight Bhips. each containing two divisions of four ships apiece. It was assumed that the formation of the existing two squadrons would be left intact, and that the third squadron would be, as the authors of the Bill indicated, "gradually" built tip an new ships became available. A beginning was made in this way last October by forming * new half squadron. In the meantime, however, the old formation has been abandoned, and at the expense of the homogeneity already mentioned Germany will before the end of the preeent summer hare, together with the Fleet flagship, three squadronß of about equal strength in commission—the first squadron nt Wilhlmohaven, con»i«ting of seven of the earliest Dreadnoughts; the second squadron at Ki'pl, conaioting of the Dreadnought Wentfalen, and either five or six older ships; and the third squadron, also at Kiel, consisting of seven quite new ships. The picture presented to the country is thsrefore already that of an almost complete three-squadron fleet, Which it is eminently desirable to fill up as soon bb possible. A 9 "Nauticus" puts it: "The reduction of numbers (in the separate squadrons) ia tolerable in view of the great gain in striking force, especially as the loss of homogeneity in a squadron is a matter of mhior importance now that we have three of these tactical units. At the same time it ia urgently to be desired that we ehall attain as soon as possible to the full number of twenty-five

battleships Hin commission contemplated by the Navy Law and that tho money necessary for this purpose shall be expended"