NOTES ON THE WAR

Hauraki Plains Gazette, Volume 52, Issue 3272, 4 June 1943, Page 7

NOTES ON THE WAR

USE OF ALL MAN-POWER KEY TO THE PROBLEM SITUATION VERY COMPLICATED Despite the crash of bombs falling on military targets in the various theatres of war, the key problem both for the Allies and for their enemies remains and will remain the proper use of their man-power. The survey of the position in the United States, given in a report of the Office of War Information, Washington, illustrates the essential factors of a problem common to the Allies.

The size of the armed forces of a nation, or a group of nations, at war is determined by the job they have to do in defeating the opposing forces. This is the ruling factor, settled by men who have made a life study of the problem; the other factors, such as the production of war material to equip and supply the armed forces and the maintenance of a minimum .standard of life on the home front, must all be adjusted accordingly. Thus in the United States the military authorities have decided, after a most exhaustive examination of all the problems of the war, that armed forces of a total of I'l,Q'o'o,o0 | 0 8,50>0,000- army and air force and 2,500,000 navy and marines—are required from America to do the job. The rest of the work must be done by the rest of the population. This entails the organisation of the people for total war, and particularly the use of women in industry to> take the place of men. That is the general conclusion of the authors of the 0.W.1. report.

Why should an armed force of this size be required of the United States and proportionate armed forces according to population and resources from the other Allies Hanson Baldwin, in a comment on the statement by the U.S. Secretary for War, Mr Stimson, in the New York Times, puts it this way: “The United Nations hold a very definite and growing qualitative and quantitative superiority in the air. We hold a marked edge in surface naval strength. But we hold no such edge in land power. In fact, the best esti-

mates indicate quite clearly that the United Nations are inferior in total land strength to the combined Axis armies, measured by trained, equipped divisions, not population figures. Mr Baldwin estimates the Axis land strength (in trained, equipped divisions) at 510 to 605 divisions, and the strength of the United Nations at from 395 to 505 divisions. Russia has the greatest land army by far, but her strength is not accurately known. It may number, according to Mr Baldwin, from 225 to more than 300 divisions—some of them in Siberia. Moreover, from 50,000,000 to 70,000,000 of Russia’s estima.ed population of 193,000,600 before the war lived in territories now occupied by the Axis. ■Germany has probably still, despite

losses, as many as 300 divisions, twothirds of them on the Russian front, and possibly outnumbering the Russians as they seem to have done right through the series of summer and winter campaigns in Russia.

'Potentially, of course, the Allies have much greater man-power at their disposal, 353,000,000 in India and 458,000,000 in China. But in India, according to Baldwin, only 1,500,000 are under arms, and China’s soldiers are still wretchedly armed and, still on the defensive against the thirty-odd divisions Japan maintains in China. The Transport Problem For the Allies, particularly for the United States, the situation is immensely complicated by the necessity of transporting armies and their equipment and supplies across the ocean to the scenes of action. This means the employment of much manpower to build and man ships and maintain overseas bases and lines of communication. The Axis has no such difficulties in Europe, and Japan much shorter and more sheltered sea-lines in the Pacific. These considerations enforce on the Allies great prudence and caution in the use of their—at present—limited manpower for land operations. There is little or no margin for disaster; and the utmost economy must be practised by undertaking, in Mr Churchill’s words, only such operations as are “sensible and practicable.” Armies cannot be improvised at a moment’s notice nor wars won “on a shoestring,” as General George Marshall, Chief of .Staff of the United States army, put it recently. To win the war there must be more than a major land effort by Britain and the United States, as well as by Russia, in Europe; but to challenge Japan on the continent of. Asia, Chinese forces alone will not be sufficient, and another big Allied effort will be needed there.