THE NAVY

Hokitika Guardian, 17 November 1932, Page 2

THE NAVY

IMPORTANT CHANGES

CO-O'PEiRATION OF DOMINION'S SOUGHT.

LONDON, November 8

Although Admiralty circles are reticent on the subject, the indications of impending c-hangeg in the organisation of the British Navy are too plain to be disguised. Dominion co-operation is essential to the execution of the plans now being considered, but there is no reason to doubt that this will be forthcoming in generous measure. This ie the opinion of Sir Hector C. By water, the “Telegraph’s” naval correspondent. Informal conversations at Ottawa during the recent Imperial Conference revealed to British Ministers an unexpected readinless on the part of Canada, Australia and) New Zealand to recognise their obligations to the common cans© of Empire sea defence. A substantial increase in the naval establishments of all three Dominions is one of the probabilities of the future. The principles on which British naval strength is organised and distributed no longer conform to practical requirements. This is fully appreciated by tlie competent authorities, but for obvious reasons any sudden or drastic change is deprecated. Foreign observers keep 'a much sharper eye on British naval developments than is generally realised, and this in itself affords the best reason for avoiding revolutionary action. Nevertheless, those responsible for national defence have now to face' the disconcerting fact that a sudden emergency would b e apt to find the Navy unprepared. 1 . Our floating . forces at home and abroad are still organised on the plan adapted soon after the war, when the balance of power at seia was believed to be established.

Since then, however, the outlook lias entirely changed. While, during this interval, the British Navy has been steadily reduced, every foreign navy of major importance ha,s grown in power —in more than one case to tlie extent of from 50 to 100 per cent. In European waters alone over 150 submarines have been built or laid down in this period, together with more, than 120 torpedo, and forty-one cruisers of high speed' combined with formidable armament.

Cbmnared with t(his vast increase in the naval armaments of Continental Europe, the British Navy has received an almost negligible reinforcement. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that since the wlar every important foreign navy has been entirely reconstructed, whereas our own Fleet still consists largely of obsolete material. Amioiug the latest developments abroad are so-called “pocket battleships,” which are notunlly miniature battle, cruisers; heavy armoured cruisers and super-destroyers, which are twice as large and' twice as powerful as our best torpedo craft. These are types in which the British Navy is entirely lacking, and which we are, in fact, precluded from building by one-sided Treaty restrictions.

As a result, we should find l ourselves dangerously handicapped in a future naval war. For want of adequate strength in cruisers and destroyers it would be impossible to provide secure escort for convoys—the principal safeguard against submarine and surface raiders. Audi in the outer seas-our feeble cruisers would be liable to We overwhelmed by an enemy’s large and well-armed ships of modern design. Since we are debarred both by Treaty rules and financial stringency from building keel for keel against foreign rivals, the remedy muist be’ sought elsewhere. In this connection a clo.s’er concentration of our resources is foreshvadbwed.

Eventually the two battle fleets, how in home waters and the Mediterranean respectively, will 'be merged into one force, the Mediterranean command being reorganised on the basis of light tonnage only. It will then consist of cruisers, destroyers land submarines, with several aircraft-carriers of. the new medium type which is under consideration. The Admiralty, I understand, favours a return to moderate dimensions in every type of warship, preferring numbers to exaggerated individual ■power.

It is considered most probable that if the British Navy continues to build ships of medium tonnage, other Powers Will sooner or later follow suit. On this assumption the risk of turning out vessels smaller and .more lightly armed than their foreign contemporaries 'appears to have some justification.

The dominating fact of the present situation, from which has arisen the necessity for the Reforms indicated above, is Britain’s steady decline in relativo naval strength coupled with the reappearance of problems of defence in the home seas. Ten ye o rs ago our chief concern was the maintenance of our position in the Pacific. To-day we have ugent commitments .not only in that ocean, but jn the Med it rrhnrru, the Channel, and the North Sea—commitments -which our existing resources, as now distributed are totally inadequate to meet.