MANCHURIAN CRISIS

Hokitika Guardian, 14 January 1932, Page 3

MANCHURIAN CRISIS

THE LATEST PHASE. (Wellington Dominion). The action of the United Government in invoking the procedure embodied in the Nine-Power Treaty for the settlement of Far Eastern questions has opened up a new phase in the Manchurian crisis. Whether it will give a different turn' to the present course of events remains to be seen. When the crisis first developed there were at the disposal of the parties two methods of isett-ling the trouble by peaceful' negotiation. They had recourse to the League of Nations, and also to the Nine-Power Treaty. Botdm parties, )vor, were morally bound by their adherence to the Paot of Paris (the uvuiogg Pact for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy) to resort to either of these agencies. China duly invoked the procedure of the League, whose handling of the case has been marked by a disappointing appearance of futility. Whether its efforts might have been more successful had it been left entirely to itself may he an arguable question, but at least it seems probable that the intervention of the United States had not a little to do with the refusal of the Japanese delegates to come into line with the suggestions proposed for controlling the crisis.

It will be recalled that at an early stage of the impasse the United States 'Government evoked considerable comment and criticism by formally conveying to the League it s opinion that its 'Covenant provided permanent and already tested machinery for handling such issues, and that it was most desirable that the League should “in no way relax its vigilance, and in no way fail to assent al l pressure and authority within its competence toward regulating the 'action of China and Japan in its premises." Thi s from a nation which had refused to become a member of the League was regarded as unwarranted, to say the least of k, and was strongly resented bv the Japanese, who declared that while they were prepared to admit America’s participation in discussions validated by the provisions of the NineiPower Treaty or the Kelogg Pact, they dissented from her intervention in Lea-1 gue matters. The general result of this diplomatic finessing has been to isolate Japan, who, however, adheres firmly to the declaration addressed to the Chinese Government before the present crisis developed that if the latter could not control th" bandit forces in Manchuria the Japanese; Government certainly wou/d. The League apparently is powerless to prevent Japan from giving full effect to this declaration, 'and the United States Government, clearly convinced by this, is now pressing for the alternative method provided by the Nine-Power -Treaty. The 'Manchurian dispute* 4si clearly within the scope of this agreement, but Japanese resentment may be further intensified by the implication resident in the American Note invoking the Treaty that it is China’s interests that 'are a.t stake rather than Japan's. Japanese economic interests in Manchuria in respect of trade, rail and sea transport facilities, and captnl investment represent a greater percentage than those of any other nation. Hence the right claimed to defend them, and hence, consequently, the possibilities of trouble over the Nine-Power Treaty, which prohibits any agreement “designed to create spheres of influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in •’esiirnated parts of Chinese territory." This un- . doubtedly is applicable to Japan’s assumption of military authority in •Manchuria. Japan, of course, can claim special privileges in respect of her rights under the Si no-Japanese Treaty of 1915, by which, under pressure, say the Chinese, 'the leases of the Japanese snheres of influence in ‘Southern Manchuria were extended for a lengthy period. From whatever angle the situation is regarded, it is one of extreme complexity, and it may be gravely questioned whether in the present temper of the parties, it will yield to diplomatic treatment. America’s latest move has by no means improved the prospect.