WILL JAPAN RATIFY ?

Hokitika Guardian, 2 September 1930, Page 2

WILL JAPAN RATIFY ?

PROBLEMS BEHIND SCENES. TOKYO, July 7. The problem istill before the Tokyo Cabinet is whether it will be able to surviv© its consent to the London Naval Pact in defiance of tiie Naval General Staff. Even if the Pact be ultimately ratified by the Emperor, it is unlikely that the Cabinet can sufficiently overcome the aversion of the Privy Council to be able to continue in office, although the Pact cannot be officially approved without prior consent of the council. These wheels within wheels leave the outcome very uncertain. If the Privy Council at last feels obliged to sanction the Pact for the sake' of keeping! Japan in step with England and the United States the council cannot be expected to forgive the Cabinet for forcing it into so ignominious a position ; and if the council puts up sufficient opposition, the Cabinet must go, as the Tanaka Cabinet went. The most strenuous opponent : of tlie Pact, Admiral Kanji Kato, was removed from his position as head of the Naval General Staff ,to an advisory council, to avoid a direct clash with the Cabinet; but the change has intensified rather than lessened his opposition; ifor he knows that the leudlng members of the Privy Council are with him on the question. The army and navy services have always claimed that the Imperial Constitution places them under direct command of the Emperor, and that, consequently, they are in some real sense independent of the government of the day. The present Cabinet will have great difficulty in obtaining ratification of the Naval Pact without denying this traditional claim of the defensive services.

ANOTHER OBSTACLE. Three years ago the Naval General Staff made an exhaustive survey of 1 the national defences and readjusted them in accordance with the Washington Treaty of 1921; and these plants were duly approved by the Emperor as Commander-in-Chief. Approval of the London Pact would involve a radical change in these plans and be regarded as a reflection on the Imperial imprimatur. As nothing has since happened to change the absolute naval requirements of the nation, the naval authorities affirm that they cannot accept less than the minimum defences considered necessary without endangering the nation and proving disloyal to the throne. Then, behind all this opposition, there is a rankling resentment against Japan’s being obliged to alter her naval requirements at the dictation of foreign nations with superiors naval forces of their own. It is deemed contrary to the spirit of old Japan to concede the right of any foreign power to decide what Japan’s defensive requirements are. Neither France nor Italy were willing to concede this at the London Conference; and why should Japan be expected to do so? Despite these grounds of local difference and disputation, the wisest leaders in Japan, including the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Finance believe that any sacrifice of defensive forces involved in Japan’s ratification of the London Treaty will ultimately redound to Japan’s credit and safety in world affairs for if Japan works thus wholeheartedly with England and America for the peace of the world, these great nations will never consent to see Japan suffer in consequence from the menace of any alien power. As for relations with England and America themselves, Japan must know that the less these are made to depend on naval ratios the sounder and/ safer they must remain. The very idea that Japan’s future depends on being able to defend herself against English speaking nations is inconceivable.