BRITISH POLITICS.

Hokitika Guardian, 16 May 1930, Page 5

BRITISH POLITICS.

NAVAL CONFERENCE DEBATE

(British Official Wireless).

(Received this day at 12.25. p.m.) RUGBY, May 16.

The Prime Minister to-day opened the debate in the House of Commons on the London Naval Conference. He said it aimed at making a substantial contribution to the problem of general disarmenient. We must lend our attention, not merely to the sea, but to the air and land, because by the mere limitation of one form of armament we Were not going very far to secure the peace of the world. We had also to note another very serious circumstance.

Since the failure at Geneva in 1927, a great deterioration in the peace spirit bad taken place. Although since the war the League of Nations had been created and arbitration and peace pacts had been signed, when they c..:uc to close grips .with the problem of the provision of arms they found very little value placed upon those peace pacts, and those organisations to secure the peace of nations undoubtedly were falling buck into year old mentality, old fears and old superstitions, Regarding security they were turning and exactly the same kind of argument so familar before 1914 was coming up unblushing and unassumed to-day, He did not say these things in order to striae a pessimistic- note, quite the oppoite, because the time was still with us when we could, and by making spirited efforts to change tiiat mentality, we would still save Europe and the world from what was called the next war. They had those things in mind during the long days of the London Naval Conference. There was a general view, said Mr MacDonald that very little could be done by way of advancing naval disarmament until United States and ourselves had come to an agreement. He thought that view was sound. The Government’s predecessors had said- they were perfectly willing that United States should build to parity. There was a certain school which expressed the view that it was unnecessary to pursue agreements any further as we never could imagine a conflict with America, asked why should we worry about the force America was putting in the water, whether eight-inch cruisers • or six-inch cruisers. Whatever they cared, to build was no concern of ours. That view was a very attractive one, but it was very unsound. If the' whole world copied with America the same relations which we had, it would be a sound view, but unfortunately that ivas not the case, and whether we took notice of what was being done on the other side of the Atlantic or not, other nations would and it was with those other nations We Were concerned. He had come to the conclusion, after careful consideration, that the foundations of real security and international understanding relating to naval building, must be agreed between America and ourselves. Such as they had been able to effect at the London- Naval Conference, that piece of work had been done.

There were two other prominent objects, continued Mr MacDonald that the Naval Conference had to try and achieve. The first was this—what was so disconcerting to peace was not always the size of fleets, but owing to competition in the building of fleets. Competition in building was wortli a great sacrifice. They had succeeded as regarded the three Powers at an\ rate, in stopping that competition, ario they had also succeeded in getting from two other Powers, which for various reasons were unable to subscribe to that part of the treaty, a declaration that they were going to consider the situation in which they found themselves, with a decisive determination to accommodate their buildings in future to a standard that had been put in Part Three of the 'London Agreement. That was a very great achievement.

The second point was that relating to reductions. So far as reductions were ‘ concerned they , Lad only been able to get three Powers to agree to it, but the story was not yet finishes. It was still being continued, and all he could say at present was that after such speeches as that delivered by Signor Grandi the other day, he was encouraged to entertain hopes that these continuing conversations would be successful. Mr McDonald said there were various suggestions that we ought to use this opportunity either to devise a new battleship or to reduce tonnage of battleships. A battleship at the present time was 35,000 tons, and it was suggested ive might put 10,000 ton battleships at sea, instead of 35,000 tons. They could not get any two Powers to agree to- any sort of reduction in battleships. If they began to tamper with battleships they did not know where they were going to end. Instead of having a programme of a small type of battleships of 10,000 tons, the chances were that their naval designers would provide a new type ol fighting vessel and they would have to put a ileet or section of a fleet of this smaller type on to the sea in order to keep up competition. I think, said Mr MacDonald, that I the view we took was a sound one, and that instead of tampering with battleships we should stop building them until 1933, and by 1936 there will have l)oon plenty of time to consider what is the •function of battleships in naval strategy, what is the sin* of battleships, and what is the use of a heavier type of war vessels or what would please mo far better to see, whether we can’t come to a eoncluson that battleships had better be loaded as obsolete altogether. AVith regard to cruisers there bad been a great deal ol controversy in which the Admiralty had been blam-