GALLIPOLI GAMBLE

Hokitika Guardian, 21 June 1926, Page 4

GALLIPOLI GAMBLE

FAAIOUS SOLDIER’S CRITICISM. LOXDOX, April 20. The example of the mischief caused by amateur strategy, which General Ellison selects in this most telling and valuable military study, is tho Dardanelles campaign of 1915, in which he personally played such a distinguished part. Lord Esher specially commends the. book because it draws attention “to the weakness of our naval and military system. . . Sir Gerald Ellison (ho says) is rendering a public service in drawing attention to this vital k nest ion in so telling a form.” THE ATTACKER BESIEGED.

The author shows that Ihe attempt to force the Dardanelles with a fleet nlojno was foolish, but that the plan of capturing with a weak Allied expedition the great fortified Gallipoli position, held by good troops in equal or superior number, was even more mischievous. IfaVing re-examined thebattlefield recently, be says: “Tho main Turkish position, is as formidable as can he found anywhere in the world. Tho attacking

army never got within striking distance of this position: all it did was to gain minute strips of ground ashore, where for all practical purposes it was itself besieged.” Had the Dardanelles been forced, ho dismisses the theory that the links would immediately have capitulated: “Tn 1922 a strong British squadron was supreme in the Sea ol Alaroniurn and covered Constantinople end the adjoining coast-line with its guns, the tow n itself, the fsmid and (lullipoli peninsulas were held by the land forces of tho Allied Rowers. Act. in 1922 Turkov was undismayed.” LORD KITCH EXER “HOPELESS.” ’Lord Kitchener, when lv visited. Gallipoli, admitted that “the country is ranch more ddficidl than 1 expected” and the enterprise hopeless. 'I bo loss from sickness was terrible. “At cue time well over 1.000 sick men a dev were being evacuated Irma file Peninsula, suffering mostly I rout dysentery, which in August ami f opteniher was epidemic. During those two months, it- is officially recorded. 78 per cent, of the troops mere suffering from dysentery and /intestinal complaints, (>-! per rent had ’•’cmic sores, and 50 per cent of the troops who had been longest on the Peninsula showed symptoms ef cardiac debility.

S‘ik]i Avoro 1 lu* men of the Gallipoli gamble. Tn .'.li Hie plans and preparations the !>•>?«• lieians lost sight of the tact that "li'“ defeat of the main Turkish Army was the one thing that mattered.” Because oT the difficulty in achieving that defeat in a terrain to which water had to he brought trom F.gypt at the cost- oi -Id or (>d a gallon, the British Staff in IX’Cfi had decided that an attack at Gallipoli was impracticable. But its verdict was ignored hv Afr Churchill.

THE A'UI.XERABLE SPOT. The point where Turkey was ''rally vulnerable was Alexaiulretla, as Enver Pasha always said; and Tfindetihuvg asks why the British never attacked there.

The answer, says General Ellison, is j tragically simple. General Bird wood s nrmp corps in Egypt was in February 1915 to h ive undertaken this very operation. and the necessary orders for . aetie.ii after landing had actually been issued and explained to all concerned. But on February 1(1 this corps was > taken for Gallipoli, and the sound plan j was abandoned through political ineil- j dliug lV.r tho unsound. A'AGUE XAYAL PLANS. The author attaches too lunch iiuportance to Admiral Sir A. lx. Aidson's supposed plan for campaign before the war, and M.unes the Government for not acting on it. But in actual fact, when Bcresford in 1901 asked for it, on succeeding AVilson in ! the command of the home naval force, : lie. found that it did nut exist except j in a most vague, and imperfect form, j Nor can Fisher’s plan for a landing j ill the Baltic ho regarded as much I happier i hen the Gallipoli scheme. It. ' was never properly worked out and if had little chance of success. Indeed, to he fair to the politicians, one of I heir troubles was that the naval plans in 191-1-15 were in a most riidtinen- . tary and unsatisfactory form. General Ellison writes vigorously end ! incisively, and we hope flint his aide book will be widely read, all the more because it so closely concerns the j nation's safety. ;