GERMAN MENTALITY

Hokitika Guardian, 5 January 1926, Page 2

GERMAN MENTALITY

ADMIRAL YON TIRPITZ’S VIEWS

[Australia & N.Z. Cable Association.]

(Received this day nt 9.0 a.m.)

LONDON. Janaury 5,

The “Daily Express” features an extraordinary special article from tho pen of Admiral Von Tirpitz, in which lie declares:—

“ The duration of the war was the fault of the Allies, who were seeking a military decision, when they must ha£e ~ realised that Germany, as regards Lgnl '* warfare, was not only able to lioldWicr own, but capable of inflicting severe punishment. Numerically, she was superior to her adversary allies and her supremacy was increasing yearly; therefore, the Allies should have attempted peace by conciliation, being aware that Germany was prepared to negotiate on a basis which would have left every nation the right of existence “Such a peace in 1915,” says Von Tirpitz. “would have been of infinite advantage to Europe and England. There would not have been debts, which cannot he paid, either liy the victors SBt. the vanquished, no danger of Bolshevism, no millions of workless, no Dawes plan which certainly will finally collapse; America would not he dominating the world and the coloured nations would not he menacing European civilisation. “ Allied brains before the war, and more so in war time, were centred nr London. The struggle became more and more between England and Germany. British statesmen did not foresee that the complete disintegration of Germany would carry the victors into an abyss; they did not realise their ' own interests demanded a short wav and a just peace hv conciliation. was plain to everyone in 1915 that a short-decision on land was impossible, hut the annihilation of the German fleet was not absolutely hopeless. “It is difficult to tell why Britain did not force a battle with every single shin at her command, she having the. additional advantages associated with an attacking force.” Von Tirpitz proceeds: “The bnttlesof Corenel and Falklnnds constituted a warning to Britain not to underestimate the fighting qualities of the German fleet; whereas Jutland effectively proved German superiority. History will decide whether Britain sfesright in favouring a war of attrition' in preference to risking her fleet, in. which, the result was doubtful. “When the German Fleet emerged in 1910 it had another purpose; the battle resulted as the merest chance and was a surprise to both sides.” The Admiral proceeds to describe in detail the movements. He repeats the opinion that Admiral Jellicoo acted correctly. In the tremendous numerical superiority of the British fleet and the absolute confidence of the average Englishman in its material and personal ascendancy, the hesitating naval strategy would be difficult to explain. Admiral Yon Tirpitz concludes: “The/" • imminent collapse of Europe has beeio l" staved off by the Locarno Pact; never- - theless, the work remaining to lie doncf** is colossal.”