U-BOAT CAMPAIGN.

Hokitika Guardian, 27 October 1923, Page 4

U-BOAT CAMPAIGN.

A WEAPON USED TOO SOOX

OKIIMAX GENERAL'S VIEWPOINT.

"Xo one who can use liis b-rains and his common sense can well have any doubt that in our light lor Germany s existence we were entitled and bound to make ruthless use of the T'-boats. states General Hoffmann, Chief of Staff to the German Eastern Front, after l.udendorff left in 1910. General Hoffmann is publishing his memoirs under the title of "The Mbit of Lost Opportunities.” extracts from ’.illicit an* appearing in the "Mauehcsti-i Guardian.’’ "It is ridiculous to talk of inhumanity anil the like in face of the fact that England began it with her food blockade against the German women and children. Me Germans had no means of escaping llie consequences of tlio blockade; there was nothing, on the other hand, to compel the Americans to choose for their holiday trips precisely our blockaded country. From the outset 1 had only one scruple: that we might he opening the F-boat war too soon, that wo had perhaps insuflicienl boats to carry the war through to the end. i often recall a discussion I had on this question with Dr I'oAoko, chairman of the tanners Alliance, in Kovno. oil the occasion of his visit to the Field Marshal (Prince Leopold of Havana). In I In- course of isir discussion lie made the worst accusations against me ot luck ot patriotism and sii ini. when I expressed scruple-- as to an immediate and ruthless l -boat campaign. "The latter eour.se oi event- bore out mv view. Mi- began too -onn. that is. with too small a of U-boals, and mileli the -am,- thing happened a«i til the gas war. Me showed the enemy what a dangerous weapon we had at a time when our weapon was not strong enough to make it impossible for the enemy to take the lieets--ary measures for deience. I have no hesitation in saying that complete sucees would have been possible in the F-hont tvar if we had in advance, that is, from the outset of the war, set all our resources to a rapid mass-pro-duction of F-boafs. "The naval authorities had more or less mmle up their minds not to send out the fleet to a great naval battle, so that, as Admiral Tirpilz says in Ids hunk, their was nothing to gain by the further construction of battleships during the war. "Tite curt refusal with which the Entente met the Central Powers’ proposal to negotiate was the signal for our ectiimeneemcnl on February Ist, 1917 of the restricted F-boat war. There "its something childish about iu the American outbreaks of rage because Germany tried to prevent Americans from travelling in safety to England or wherever else they chose. The Americans might as well have claimed that operations should lie broken olf and liring suspended in any part of the theatre of war if they wanted to go for a walk there.

“Unfortunately, our first attempt at submarine warfare had given the British the time and the opportunity to think out effective counter-measures, and we had also omitted to set all hands in good time to tlie construction of U-boats. Thus the assurances given liv the naval authorities that Great Britain could lie brought to terms within .-ix months were too optimistic. It would ho interesting to learn what were the grounds for this optimism, ami for running the risk of an American declaratinn of war . To answer these questions would require more exact information as to the extent of the Admiralty's knowledge of tlie enemy's clofen-ive measures, an,! ns to its grounds for hoping, nevertheless for success that 1 have at my disposal

"The decision to conunenceun restrict "The decision to commence unrestricted submarine warfare shifted the centre of gravity of the war from land to sea for the time being. The task for tiie land forces was now to wait on the defensive with the minimum of losses through the months which must elapse before the U-boats brought Britain to term-. Tlie re followed accordingly the retirement in tlie West front the salient between Arras and Soissons to the so-called Seigfried position. In this way we discovered the enemy’s plan of attack, and delayed them, compelling him io make fresh and time-wasting preparations, which were made all the more difficult for him by our widespread destruction of communications and means of support, fn addition to tin's tlie considerable shortening of tlie line meant a saving in troops of occupation. *‘Tt goes without saying tiiat the destruction necessitated by our retirement was made the occasion for a howl of rage in the whole of the enemy Press. But every expert, even in the enemy army, will admit its absolute