THE GALLIPOLI FAILURE.

Hokitika Guardian, 3 April 1922, Page 4

THE GALLIPOLI FAILURE.

; UNREST IN THE EAST.

A MYSTERY BOOK

LONDON, Feb. 1

Speaking at a dinner last night in Glasgow, bf officers Who served overseas with the 52nd (Lowland) Division, Sit- lan iUthiltdn spoke bitterly of the causes of failure of the, Gallipoli Expedition, and he traced the present unrest in Egypt and India to the failure of Grfe&fc Rritain to the Dardanelles and Constantinople, and to the long delay ih the victory over Turkey. He remarked that the achievements of the Division were set forth with a directness, humor, and Force he could never hope to rival in a book called ‘‘The sth H.L.1.” That book was something of a mystery to him. It arrived; the postman’s knock its sole voucher; no author’s name to it; marked, ‘‘For private circulation.” The anonymity with which that literary baby was laid upon his doorstep should now be cast aside; the proud father should acknowledge his labour of love; the book was alive; full of gaiety and fun, though set amongst the saddest surroundings. Sir lan proceeded: “As to one of these theatres where the division fought the Dardanelles—l should like very much to say a few words. They will not fie controversial, not in the personal sense at least, for the war is just getting far enough away to enable; us to take a detached bird’s eye view of it. The Great War is remarkable for the new war values assumed by two old fribnds —strategy and tactics. The basic idea of the war j as it was run became tactical; strntei gy was almost entirely overlooked. There' Were two strategical keys lying upon tho war map. One, for (

mans, was the Straits of Dover; the other, for the Entente, was the Narrows of the Dardanelles. Just as the seizure of the Straits by the Germans would at once have dislocated the war organisation of the Entente, so, conversely, the seizure of the Narrows Ity the Entente would at least have kbit together the war organisations of the Allies.

“Now take the year ’ls and see how | far these new developments were re- ; crtghiSed. Tn that year there were j two half-hearted bids for a strategi'eal s'olntibii. One was the second 1 rattle of Ypres, when the Germans marlh a hid for the Channel ports; the other was our bid for the Dardanelles. Nenve ChapeTle, Festubert with the Yimv II id go and Loos were tactical strokes which had no strategical eon- j caption behind them. None the less, they had one indirect strategical hearing, they ruined tho Dardanelles and so cut the throat of Russia. A CAUSE OF INDIAN UNREST. “Had the strategy of the campaign received the same thought as its tactics, the relief of Russia: by strnt'-i would have received as much consideration as the support of Franco, which, as carried out, was a tactical operation. Tho Dardanelles would then have been undertaken by the Entente as part of a considered plan, and with full conviction. Tactical efforts like those of Field-Marshal Lord French, Marshal Joffre and Marshal Foch, would have heen as much ns possible restricted, and. with the muni tions thus saved, we should have taken Constantinople and given ourselves unlimited man-power. As it was, the Dardanelles was never more than a brilliant flash of a great man’s imagination, an improvisation. The great man’s own subordinates fought tooth and nail against Ft. Except Lord Kitchener, the War Office were almost to a. man against it. Messrs Lloyd George and Bonnr Lqw were against it. The French were against it. The whole enormous weight of our army in Franco was thrown against it from th outset. And yet here we were to testify that it nearly came off.

PARALLEL OF HISTORY. “It did not come off, and iiow I liiive come to the consequences. The Turkish ordeis for that determined at--lack of theirs upon Romani, winch was found upon captured prisoners, read; “Order No I—l expect every officer, of whatever grade, to give an example of courage, to his subordinates. I expect the-rank-and-file to show the superiority of Turks to British troops, as their cotm-ndcs have done at Gallipoli and in Irak.’ Many people have been surprised to see unrest increasing by leaps and bounds ih E.ypt anil in India. It seemed strange tlint our prestige should lulve sunk in the eyes Vif Orientals just at the very moment of victory. The present generation has forgotten that the' Indian Mutiny" followed on Lie heels of the Crimean victory, hut by tho repeated stories of our military weakness which had preceded that lohg-dohu ed \ ietorv. Even our great British watchdog, ‘The T,imes,’ seems to have forgotten this historical parallel, when it sent out Sir Valentine Cliii'ol. most famous of its inquisitors, to repoit. Since then he has written columns suggesting sometimes that he has what we "all in Scotland, ‘the Sight,’ and that everyone else is ‘Hyp or. ii you prefer it, that everyone on the spot is ‘not on the spot.’ He Inis, indeed, been so devilish long-sighted that he has overlooked the fact which was .is a beam in Lord Kitchener’s eye. He forgets just what the Near East and the Far East remember best—the evacuation of Gallipoli. He shuts his mind to the thought which takes its place as Number 1 in the battle oVders of a Turkish commander. He closed his eyes to the fact thad» the tactical movement in the rear, on which, as a piece of tactics, we so justly plume ourselves, has omant the wipe out of Russia as a, European factor in the East and an apparent military climb down to Asiatics. No wonder there is unrest: Wha.t has happened once may happen twice; that is what Egypt and India are thinking.’