SECRETS OF THE NAVAL WAR.

Hokitika Guardian, 31 January 1922, Page 4

SECRETS OF THE NAVAL WAR.

GERMAN OFFICIAL HISTORY

HOW SPEE CRUSHED CRADOCK

BATTERING A SILENT* FLEET

(London Daily Mail)

The mystery attaching to the operations of the German Count von Spee aired Iris squadron of fast cruisers during the war is cleared tip and many new and important details of the battles qf Coronel and the Falklands are giyen in the forthcoming volume qf the German official history of the naval war. In the coming instalments the public iwill learn how the British Intelligence 1 Department most skilfully decoyed Spee to the point where ap overwhelming - t British force had gathered to destroy him, and how the Germans suffered under the terrific fire of our battlevruisers. TRAGEDY OF ADMIRAL CRADOCK. It has hitherto been uncertain exactly how the Battle of Coronel was fought, in which Admiral Cradock’s little force ef two old ships was destroyed, as there was no full German account of it. It has not been known

what his exact intentions were, nor have there been full particulars of the Battle of the Falklands, one of the most important of the naval war from the German point of view. All these remitters are now cleared up.

Tlie new volume is by Cnpt. E. R|) e " der, who was chief of stafF, to Admiral Hipper, in the “baby-killing” Ger-

man battle-cruiser squadron. His atthitude to this country is one of hostility throughout, and he loses no opportunity of accusing the British Navy of inhumanity, violation of international law, had strategy, and most Indifferent gunnery—charges which perhaps come a little oddly from one of those who bombarded Scarborough.

The chief difficulty of the German

cruisers wap always coaling and their lack of bnjses, though this had been, remedied, he says, by fixing on secret points where ships could refit and refuel—such as the island of Juan Fernandez, -off the Chilian coast, famous as the homo of Robinson Crusoe’s prototype. Kiaochau was “entirely useless” when Japan entered the war. TOO SOON FOR TTRPITZ.

If war had come a little later the British would have suffered much more: “Tirpitz had planned the stationing at Wilhelmshaven of a. cruiser squadron independent of the High Sea Fleet, which was to have been composed of the newest and fastest battle-cruisers and small cruisers. They were to have been kept in readiness to proceed to sea at 24 hours’ notice, for a' cruiser war in the Atlantic.”

Captain Raeder insists that Germany did not expect war, but this thesis is a little damaged by the fact that on July 7th, 1914, Spee was warned as follows :

“Political position not free from danger. Await developments at Truk or Ponapo (islands north-east of New Guinea). Definite results expected in 8 or .10 days.”

Two clays later he was warned: “War between Austria and Serbia possible; intervention of France and Russia not out of question”; and on July llth lie was informed, “England probably hostile,” long 'before any measures were taken in this country.

When war oanio, Spec, in view of the danger from Japan, decided to cross the Pacific to the Chilian coast and there attack British trade. His intentions were not to engage with superior forces, thfough at the outset lie tried a stroke against Apia, in Samoa, which .had just been seized by the British. Nothing came of it, as tiie British had gone. He destroyed the cable station on the line between Canada and Aus-

tralia at Fanning Island; bombarded Papeete, the French base in Tahiti, destroying a small gunboat there; and Dually reached Juan Fernandez in October 1914. CR ADOCK’S POOR CHANCE, llis whereabouts were quite uncertain ; and in all directions large forces, British and Japanese were moving to locate and attack him. He had a squadron small in numbers but extremely formidable—the two large and powerful armoured cruisers Scliarnhorst and Gneisenau (each mounting eight B.2in and six (Sin guns, and steaming 28 knots) and three small protected cruisers—Leipzig, Nurnberg,

and Dresden —(each ten 4in guns and

steaming 22-24 knots). These ships were much mor.' dangerous than they looked on paper, as they were famous for their fine shooting: the Gneisenau and Sehnrnhorst indeed were the crack gunnery ships of the German Navy. Against this formidable force, by some aberration which t’apt. Raeder castigates with the utmost severity, the British Admiralty (not then under Lord Fisher) despatched a squadron of extreme inefficiency under Admiral Cradock. It consisted of the old ar-

moured cruisers Good Hope and Mon-

mouth, both ships many years older than the German vessels they would have to meet; manned by hastily mobilised crews with a largo proportion of reservists and therefore entirely out of practice in gunnery; and poorly armed. Against the sixteen heavy B.2in guns of the two Germans they had between them only two big weapons, the 9.2 in guns of the Good Hope. They also carried between them thirty 6in guns, but of these most were so mounted that they could not be fired in any sea-way. In speed the two British ships were about equal to the Germans. Cradoek had also one small modern cruiser, Glasgow, with two 6in and ten 4in guns, a better and faster vessel than the German light cruisers. Attached to his small squadron was an old battleship, Canopus, whioh wa., so slow that, tethered to her, he could not get near the Germans. The orders given him, he considered, directed him to seek out the enemy and fight, and that interpretation is endorsed by the British official naval historian. He is said to liave stated beforehand that there was ho hope of victory, but he may have expected to inflict sufficient damage on Spee to prevent him from harrying the; British shipping. Capt. Raeder points out that a battle-cruiser ought to have been sent to deal with Spee, and that one was available in the Australia. It is a just criticism to which there is no answer. BATTLE IN HEAyY SEAS. At 2 a.m. of November E 1914, Spee !

received news that a British cruiser , ■was at Colonel/on the Chilian coast, and took steps to catch her. About 5.30 p.m. Cradock’s British squadron was ill sight, steaming south, with the armed merchantman Otranto in line, as well as Good Hope, Monmouth, and Glasgow. Canopus was still far away. A little before 6 Cradock sent his last wireless message to Canopus, “I am going to attack the enemy now” ; but the battle did not open till 6.34, when the German guns broke the silence. The sea at that time was running very high. Waves were washing right j over the forecastles and conning towers of the small German cruisers; both squadrons were steaming south against wind and sea and both were making heavy weather of it. Spee rightly argued that his armoured cruisers, with tlieir guns for the most part mounted high and* served by well-trained gunners, would make better shooting than the British scratch crews in such conditions. And he was right: “At the third salvo Scharnhqrst picked up the range with a hit m Good Hope between the forward 9.2 in turret and the conning tower, which caused a fire. Gneisenau got on her target in a few salvos; at the very opening of the battle a iiit was observed'on the forefront of Monmouth, which completely destroyed it and set the forwaicl jiait of the ship on fire.” The range was 11,000 yards, so that in such weather the shooting was remarkable; in fact,'the battle was lost before the British could reply, which they did not do till the distance had fallen to 10,000 yards: “Good Hope fired at first with only Per heavy guns in salvos at 50 seconds interval. The medium guns (6in) apparently fired with the heavy guns, but no complete salvos (in which all the guns were employed) were observed perhaps because some of the first Germa» hits which struck Good Hope amidships hampered the service of tlic 6in weapons. Monmouth at hist hied very rapidly; her salvos soon slowed down as the result of the' numerous hits she received. As soon as the Goiman armoured cruisers had found their targets they began an effective fire with salvos every 15 seconds. To maintain such a marked rapidity ot fire the whole strength of the gun-crews was required. The heavy guns fired with armour-piercing shells; the medium guns with common shell!” The Germans thus were firing thrice as rapidly as the British crews, though in old days Nelson’s ships owed tlieir victories mainly to the tact that tlieir gunners fired thrice as rapidly as the French. In British ships similar rates of fire were attained with well-trained crews; the reviewer watched loading practice at Scapa in 1916, when 15i» guns were loaded, trained, and discharged (in imagination) every 15 seconds. TURRET BLOWN UP. The effect of this “hurricane of fire” on the old British cruisers is thus described by the spotting officer of Seliarnhorst. “Twice I thought I made out explosions (ju Good Hope) of ready ammunition. Flames followed immediately after the burst of the shells and were quite different in extent and shape front the glare of the shell bursts. After some of the hits, probably those which struck the d e eb, sparks Pew out far and wide. When our shells struck the armour, sharply outlined dense clouds of black smoke showed. No hits on Good Hope’s turrets were observed, hut one was noted on Monmouth’s fore-turret.

‘‘The shell blew up the turret-roof and the turret inside blazed up, though the sides remained, so that it looked like a boiler from which flames were pouring. An explosion of ammunition must have followed with fearful violence, sweeping away the turret from its base, as it could not be seen after llie hit.”

The range was now about 5,000 yards, and every shot was bitting, while the British fire had almost ceased:

“At 7.23 p.m. Good Hope received a hit on the deck from a heavy shell between the 2nd and 3rd funnels. Suddenly there rose from her starboard (right) side a huge pillar of flame, high as her masts and 60 to 90 feet wide, against which the funnels were plainly silhouetted. The flame was pale red in the centre and the edges still painted in colour where there was a greenish glare from sparks which looked like those of rockets.” About the same time Monmouth had ceased firing and could he seen ablaze in many places, though the heavy seas speedily extinguished these fires. Glasgow and Otranto had been directed to escape, and were in full flight; about 7.30, when night had fallen, Spee had lost sight of both Good Hope and Monmouth. Good Hope had been blown m half by the great explosion seen, the stern half of the ship sank with all on hoard about 8 p.m. The German cruiser Leipzig soon after 8: “Steamed for ten minutes through a mass of debris in which planks, casks and hammocks were made out with bodies clinging to them. The officers the bridge were keeping a sharp look-out for the enemy and had not observed this debris in the neighbourhood of the ship. There could, therefore he no attempt at rescue.” This passage is to he remembered when Capt, Raedcr’s charges against the British in the battle of the Falkland s are reached. (To be continued).