LUDENDORFF’S DFFENCE

Hokitika Guardian, 3 February 1921, Page 1

LUDENDORFF’S DFFENCE

VIOLATION OF BELGIUM’S NEUTRALITY.

In’ a review of General von. Ludendorff’s book, “The General Sit'd in:! Problems,” which has just been pubilislied, “The Times' says; The lxiok is one to bo studied rather than read continuously, and, unlike Hindcnburg as an author, Ludendorff has no airs and graces, and is content to throw his bundles of documents at the readers head. The variety of subjects discussed in the book gives a ; versitv of interest, and incidentally shows that what we call militarism in Germany was a philosophy of the whole of politics and not merely a theory if the art of war. The book opens with a citation of some documents on the German reparations for war. If is notable that in July. 1910, the General Staff lias just played a war game based on the ;issumption of war with France, Russia, and England, and that the chief prob- |l lem in this game was how to deal with an English landing in Schleswig-Hol-stein. By December, 1912, the General Staff had definitely made up its mind to invade Belgium. If there is no change in the political

situation of Enrojie, Germany's central .position will compel her to form a front on several sides. AA’e shall (says Ludendorff) therefore have to hold one front defensively with comparatively weak forces in order to be able to take tinoffensive on the other. That front can only be the French. A speedy decision may lie hoped for on that* side, while an offensive against Russia would be an interminable affair. But if we are to take the offensive against France, it will be necessary to violate tin- neutrality of Belgium. It is only by an advance across Belgian territory that we can hope to attack and defeat the French army in the open field. On this roufc we shall meet the English Expeditionary Force, and unless wo succeed in coming to some arrangement with Belgium—tile Belgian army also. At the same time, this operation is more promising than a frontal attack on the French fortified eastern frontier. (Memorandum of December lr 1912).

On such epics! ions as recruiting and labour, this book supplies many pieces just ilieativcs for the argunionts alreach set forth in General l.ndeinlonT’s forme! book. Ludendorff was surely right in thinking that German women were doing much less work for the war than women in England and Frame. Already, in October, 191(1, lie was urging a scheme of compulsory labour for women, and (lie closing ol t !i(> higher schools and universities. It is mentioned incidentally, ill tlie course of argument on man power in June, 191 S, Hint the Germans lost 300,000 wounded in March and April ot that year. On the submarine

campaign, the documents now quolpd iiild a good tlojil to our knowledge, hot.li d the so-c;illt‘d offer of |)e;ice made l>v lletliiiiann-Hollweg at the end of 1016. and of the reasons fur the delay in beginning unrestrieted submarine warfare The chief reason was that Ludendorff did not wish to begin sinking the shipping of neutral Powers at sea until lie was In the position to take military preeautions against their attacking Germany. Further, lie insisted that before any “offer of peace’’ was made, Germany must, he in a strong military position, and also able to begin her intensified naval warfare in the event of the offer being rejected. Ludendorff believes that America would have come into the war anyhow, and that the submarine campaign was not to blame. Liidendorlf guarantees the truth of the story that on July 15, 1918, Foc-li said, “If the German attack at Hlicims succeeds, we have lost the war.” On the same day Liidendorlf said to Lersner, “If my blow at Kheinis succeeds now, we have won the war.” In the

mass of documents on the peace and armistice negotiations, the most interesting is the report of the conference in Berlin oil October 17, at which Ludendorff, who sixteen days before bad been so insistent in bis demand for peace, argued against it. At this conference the War .Minister gave it as bis opinion ih«t lie could give Ludendorff some (100,000 new men. If I get those men,” said Liidendorlf, “J can face the future confidently.” He told the conference not to overrate the Americans. “They are certainly smart, but we have beaten them, hitherto, evon when we were very inferior in numbers. . . . Our men are not anxious about the Americans. They are about the English.” At this same conference General Ludendorff asked the Civil Government t,o do something to rouse the spirit' of the masses, to which the Secretary of Stale (Scheidmann) returned the reply that will become classic “It is a question of potatoes.” One of the important documents given is General von Eulit/.’s report on a

statement made by Ludendorff on September 110, ascribing the German defeats not so much to their dwindling numbers, but to the tanks. “Owing to the effect of the tanks,” said Liidendorlf, “our operations on the Western front hive now practically assumed the character of a game of chance. The General Staff can no longer work with definite factors.”