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Hokitika Guardian, 1 October 1920, Page 2

If hfip often bean said that the Germans to&t the war at the first battle of the j Marne, and that for this defeat Von <

K 1 tick’s tactics were mainly responsible. 1 His -apologia, notes a reviewer, is contained in “The March on Paris,” if indeed the term apologia is applicable to a work of such detachment. He hardly seeks to justify himself, but ! gives a. plain account of his movements j during those fateful days, and of the , reasons which prompted him to act as , ho did. He blames no one directly, ' although it is clear Hint he did not get on well with von Bulow, the command- , er of the 2nd Army, and that von Moltke found it increasingly difficult to secure complete unison between them. Differences of opinion first developed bc_

tween them after Mona, when von Kluck, in the hope of outflanking tlx? British army and taking it in the rear, Avighed to advance in a westerly direction. Von Bulow, however, objected, on the ground that he might get too far away and be unable to support the Second Army at the right moment. Von Kluck hints that he was 1 gravely embarrassed by his colleague’s insistence, which deprived him of the chance of crushing the British before they had time to recover from the heavy blows received in the early battles and reform themselves after the retreat. The chief criticism directed against von K 1 tick’s conduct of operations is that, instead of aiming at the Seine west of Pa,ris, I and thus enveloping the capital, ho struck south-east—in disobedience of orders—and exposed his flank. Theoretically his tactics were sound enough. The city was there and would remain there; he could dea;l with it afterwards, and meanwhile its garrison was immobilised. Von Kluck thought it was more important to dispose first of all the armies in the-field. But his calculations wer upset by one fatal error; he had underestimated the recuperative powers of the French and British troops. Where'he had counted on oxhaustion and demoralisation there was the offensive spirit, and as a result of the fighting that ensued the Allies

were able “to joompel the German Supreme Command to arrange a completely fresh grouping of the Western army,” a- strategical success the value of which von Kluek -admits. He repeatedly speaks in complimentary terms of Allied leaderships, and of the skill and courage of the Allied soldiers, while the stubbornness of the “old conternptibles” in particular won his thorough respect.