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GALLIPOLI.

(Per Press Association.)

FURTHER CRITICISM CHRISTCHURCH, May 17 Keith Murdoch continuing his criticism says:— _ Sir Inn Hamilton misquotes one oi the many sentences 1 wrote about Sir William Birdwood. I think Sir William will agree that I saved him at times with ihard work during the war, and that I showed my judgment in ins leadership. WANTED BIRDWOOD! ‘The sentence, quoted by Sit; l-ui Hamilton was my frank opinion, and .1 thought it necessary to state it, because the recall of Sir lan Hamilton would leave a big possibility of General Birdwood being appointed in his place, especially as Lord Kitchener was a tremendous believer in Birdwood. • The truly essential tiling was a fresh mind. Had Sir William Birdwood been airpointed, the evacuation would not have come off. Sir lan Hamilton was dangerous, because he declared time and again that evacuating was “unthinkable.”, Sir William Birdwood was dangerous in Chief Command, because later on, when General Monro went out, he was the only corps commander who declared against evacuation, and the reason he gave was the moral effect on British prestige in India. Sir lan Hamilton, now says that I hit him below the belt. The violence of his language, after four years, is an evidence of the hardness of the blow. That makes me glad; but it was a fair and square blow. As he says, 1 had tlio confidence ol not only the Australian Cabinet, but also of the British. ‘The way they had been kept in the dark about the truth of Gallipoli remains, to my mind, as one of the most dishonest incidents in the muddling of those dayst I began with Sir Edward Carson, then the Chairman of the Dardanellcs Committee, and Sir Edward Carson put me' through a cross-examina-tion at breakfast before he accepted my statements. Sir Edward Carson is a good lawyer. He reminded mejjust the other day of that strange interview. He took the facts fo the Cabinet, and 1 was invited fo meet nearly every uiembei ■ singly,‘ and-met them all except Mr Asquith, to whom 1 had a letter from the Australian Prime Minister, hut: who broke two appointments., Mr As-,' qiiith was of course deeply committed lover \the expedition. The most pregnant? interviews were with Mr Lloyd George and Mr Bonar Law. The former, said to me: “You are writing to .Mr Fisher?” I said that I was. He said: “Then it is your duty to let Mi' Asquith have a copy ol your letter for the British Cabinet.” I sent to Mr Asquith a copy of a very long letter T had ‘ written to Mr Fisher (for himself, Mr Hughes and Senator Pearce), and it was : printed as a secret paper by Mr Asquith, and 1 shall never regret it was acted upon. As for its general accuracy, lam i quite prepared to have it published and criticised. Cabinet Ministers later told ■ me that Sir Charles Monro’s report bore { out my report with a striking similarity j as to Hie main facts, and within a very ; few days- of this report the troops were | .off the'Peninsula. Now as to Sir lan | Hamilton’s charges, I broke no censorJ. ship pledge. I was on Gallipoli as . a

newspaper correspondent, and in this connection took a correspondent’s pledge and kept it explicitly. I was there also as a representative of the Commonwealth Government, which had given me a commission of inquiry into certain phases of administration. I wrote nothing for publication without consol ship. I wrote a report for the* Prime Minister, of my own country, and received his thanks and also the thanks oVthe succeeding Prime Minister. There was nothing in my pledge forbidding that. How could there by. when Sir lan Hamilton himself knew that I had _ come to write reports for the Australian Government? That report was vital to the situation and compelled the uaveiing and hesitant Coalition Cabinet to make up its mind ancl send out new generals in Monro and Kitchener, who both at once agreed that the evacuation "as necessary. I have met many Generals at the front during the war and never heard one question the absolute necessity of the evacuation. As to my war record, I leave that to the Australian Army, to whom I devoted myself through the rest of the war as completely and unquestionably as I. did when openly and squarely for their sake ] took the action for which I now have to hear a General’s rebuke.

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/HOG19200518.2.36

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Hokitika Guardian, 18 May 1920, Page 4

Word count
Tapeke kupu
747

GALLIPOLI. Hokitika Guardian, 18 May 1920, Page 4

GALLIPOLI. Hokitika Guardian, 18 May 1920, Page 4

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