AN ENEMY VERSION

Hokitika Guardian, 14 January 1920, Page 4

AN ENEMY VERSION

LUDENDORFF’S MEMOIRS

Since the war it has become quite the fashion for the leaders by land, and sea to describe their share in its operations and incidentally to justify their actions, but hitherto a German voice lias been lacking. The silence has been broken by General Ludendorff’s “My War Memoirs, 1914-1918,” which possesses a twofold interest. Not only does it give a comprehensive account of the war from the German point of view, but it is a revelation of the militarist mind. Ludendorff is a type; in him the spirit of militarism, with its virtues and defects, is embodied; this book enables us to understand the reason both of Germany’s strength and of her weakness. These two stout volumes were written in a few months during Ludendorff’s voluntary exile in Sweden and without tlie aid of notes, for, he tells us, during the war he was too busy to keep any record of events. It is a testimony to the intellectual power of the author that relying chiefly on his memory he can thread his way unhesitatingly through such a mass of detail, but it also exposes his narrative to possible criticism on questions of fact. Ludendorff’s part in the war began at Liege, where he commanded a brigade. His success there led to his transference ■vc chief of staff to Hindenburg to . the Eastern front. There at Tannenburg he converted a prospective defeat into a decisive victory. In August, . 1916, when the Field-Marshal was appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army, Ludendorff went with ihirn as “First Quarter-m aster-General.” It h a s often been said that Hindenburg was mrely the figure-head, while Ludendorff supplied tho brains. Whether this was true or not, there is nothing in these memoirs to lend colour to the suggestion. Ludendorff invariably speaks of his chief in the terms of the most respectful admiration; he never forgets or allows his readers to forget that he was subordinate; his plans arc always “draft” plans and are always submitted to the Field Marshal; even in the final collapse his loyalty is unabated. When Hindenburg assumed supreme command the position was one of some anxiety for Germany. The attack on Verdun, the conception of von Falkenhayn when he was Chief of Staff, had been responsible for terrible losses. Ludendorff says that he would not have persisted in it nearly so long had he been in Falkenhayn’s place. The British pressure on tho Somme was strong. Tlie food shortage in Germany was growing acute, and the civilian moral was not very good. To this situation came Ludendorff, who knew exactly what lie wanted, and set himself resolutely to have it done. From first to last lie kept tho. single object before him. The army was the one and only thing that mattered; everything else must be subordinated to its wants. I s man power failing? Then comb out more ruthlessly than ever, compel French and Belgians to work, conscript women. Is food lacking? Tako it from Roumania and leave the Roumanians to starve. Strip the occupied parts of France and Belgium of their machinery. Military necessity is the supreme law. Ludendorff thinks only of his soldiers and their needs. It is quite characteristic of the man that for him the German civilians’ only claim to existence is as a potential source of recruits or munitions. At the best he despises them; at the worse lie regards them as

an intolerable nuisance. He' is constantly complaining that the civil authorities fail to back him up in his plans. “In Berlin they were unable to accept our opinion as to the necessity of certain war measures or to steel their wills to the point of magnetising the whole nation and directing its life and thought to the single idea of war and victory. The great democracies of the Entente did better. With an iron will Clemenceau and Lloyd George enrolled their peoples in the service of victory. Our Government failed t-o recognise this inflexible purpose ,and the definite intention of the Entente to destroy us.” This is the burden of many a passage. He is particularly aggrieved because, in his opinion, the Government does not take effective steps to control the Press and restore the moral of the people by counteracting the Allied propaganda “by which we_were hypnotised as a rabbit is by a snake.” He does not seek to conceal his contempt of Germany’s allies, and then is surprised that they do not co-operate more enthusiastically with such an exacting critic. His inability to grasp any point of view save that of the ruthless efficient militarist is conspicuous; the intellectual limitations of his type are everywhere apparent. Thus he simply cannot understand why the Poles do not like Germany, or why tlie Belgians do not like being deported and compelled to make shells to be used against their own countrymen. Their objections seem to him to be merely perverse.

According to these memoirs, imdendorff himself never lost confidence in Germany’s prospects. In August, 1916, lie appreciated his responsibilities and the gravity of the situation, but ho did not doubt that he would be equal to it. During the Allied offensive in 1917 he had some uneasy moments, and on August 8, 1918, which he calls “the black day,” lie was frankly anxious. But in the weeks that followed he still believed that, given adequate support | from the nation, the German army jcouM hold its own. He even took comfort in the thoughts that tho closer the war approaches to Germany the more likely it was to inspire the German people wdth a new determination. “France, Belgium, aud Servia had suffered far more than w r e had, and had held out.” The collapse of the “Home Front” was a bitter blow; it was as integral a factor in Germany's strength as her military or naval forces, and that it should have failed thus was as shameful as if an army had surrendered without firing a. shot. Lndcndorlf can hardly find words strong enough to express his auger and disgust at the “betrayal.” Poliiticians, Bourgeois, and Socialists are all tarred with tho same brush. In his retreat at Hcsselholm ho (burned with anger and mortification. A Lucifer, dethroned but unrepentant, lie makes no 'secret of liis feelings; Germany’s humiliation must bo avenged; only tho power is lacking, not the will. That at least is the thinly disguised implication of the cpiloguo.