DARDANELLES STRATEGY.

Hokitika Guardian, 27 November 1918, Page 2

DARDANELLES STRATEGY.

DISCUSSED BY GENERAL SANDERS,

fAUSTRALIA?? & N.Z. CABLE ASSOCIATION])

(Deceived this day at 9.2,3 n.m.> LONDON November 26.

Mr Ward Price writes from Constantinople:—“l interviewed General Liman von Sanders, who said, he had found tho British a brave chivalrous enemy, both at the Dardenelles and inPalestine. He telegraphed to GeneralLudendorff in August, stating unless he received reinforcements there was nothing to prevent a debacle. Tho Turkish weakness was duo to sending the available reserves to Ozebayon and Persia, for tho conquest of tho Caucasus, despite German protests. Discussing British strategy at the Dardanelles General Liman said th 0 . naval attack in the 'Straits could not" have succeeded owing to mines. I purposed to flood tho Straits broadcast with mines. The function of the forts was simply to protect the minefields from interference. If I had been attacking tho Dardanelles, I would not have landed at Cape Helles or Anzae Cove, but would have made tho principal landing on tho coast of Asia Minor;, off Tenedos. Such a landing would have given a convenient base close at hand, while a two days’ march would' hav e brought the Allies to tho rear of the Dardanelles forts, which can onlyfire seaward. At the same time r should have landed in the neck of Gallipoli, close to the Bulair lines. So strongly did I expect you tochoose these places, that when I took: command, months before the landing,. I posted two of myi six divisions opposite Tenedos, two on the Peninsula, and two at Bulair lines. In regard to the Suvla landing, I would have preferred to land between Anzac Cove and Capo Helles, where the Peninsula is narrow, and the Turks could have been * attacked from the rear.

WHAT MIGHT’ HAVE BEEN,

EVACUATION CLEVERLY DONE

(Received This Dnv at 10.35. n.m.) LONDON, Nov. 26. Mr Word Pi-ice’s interview with General Liman continues:—•

The landing at Suvla might have succeeded if hard pressed, as there'were only two battalions of Turkish Gendarmes, two squadrons of cavalry atio two batteries of old guns to oppose it during the first twenty-four hours. If the British troops had pushed inland with .several columns, some would havemade good the position on the height* General Liman hurried up a divisioi* by a forced march.

There was another critical moment when a push was made for General Liman rushed a division from the Asiatic side, which would have been blown to pieces hv the British guns if they had arrived half an hour later. Only three battalions were left on the Asiatic side, where' there wa= great anxiety of a fresh British landing. It was also a touch and go at Kierechkeny, on the north side of Suvla Bay, #-her o the Allies attacked three days after the landing.

General Liman expected a withdrawal after Lord Kitchener’s visit, and he' entirely agreed with the wisdom of thedecision. The Turks were constantly being reinforced, and at the end he had twenty-one divisions. The withdrawal was extremely well carried out, and the concealment devices at Suvla Bay most effective. Patrols on the last night sighted red flares on the beach and thought for a while that fresh troops were being landed. When the news was received that the British position was empty, General Liman galloped from headquarters to organise a pursuit, but the Turkish telephones were so bad that he was unsuccessful. Turks advancing in the fog stumbled on British land mines, and there were heavy losses. Ninety mines were found in front of single divisions, .General Liman saw the preparations for evacuation from Cape Helles, hut was unable to guess the date.