Hokitika guardian & Evening Star MONDAY. MARCH 12, 1917 THE DARDANELLES,

Hokitika Guardian, 12 March 1917, Page 2

Hokitika guardian & Evening Star MONDAY. MARCH 12, 1917 THE DARDANELLES,

Thu Oommission’s report on tbe Dardanelles campaign is not cheerful reading, That someone had blundered was long ago painfully evident—hence the setting np of the Commission. Its report and in a degree inconclusive deoision, are not. particularly helpful to the public. It would seem that it were better to have kept the whole matter private to the end of the war. The N.Z. representative (Sir Thomas Mackenzie) has put it on record that it is premature to report or express an opinion on the general restilts. Sufficient material is not available yet to decide on those lines, and will not be till the Turks at the end of hostilities put forward their aide of the case. Then it might be found how narrow was the partition between suocess and failure at some steps of the enterprise. In a general way the report gives to all the world the impress how Britain set about muddling through the war. That Britain was quite unready for the war as a who’e, is all too plainly exposed by the official statements. There was a complete abaencs cf cor ordination between the two great arms of defence. Each pursued its own way in its own methods, and they were quite distinct. The political side predominated, and the strangest thing of all is that after Ending out how sadly the politicians failed, both the Australian and New Zealand representatives still agree that individual Ministers should decide details of defence rather than the State experts who are primarily employed for such purposes. The Dardanelles should open the eyes of the people to the pnblia danger of politics dominating the scheme of national defence in the future. The War Council was a bod y in name rather than in faot. Fancy that august body adjourning in March, in the critical

stages of the war, and not assembling again till May ! The conduot of the war wap. left to inexpert Ministers who were not in sympathy with tbtnr expert advisers. If tbe course of events bad not brought national disaster in their train, the situation would have supplied the Gilluch cf to-day with an unique plot for a modern comic opera. It seems etrenge that Mr Churchill was allowed to dominate the War Council with his trusted expert, Admiral Fisher, opposed to him. As for the military Bide a fair share of blame is attached to Lord Kitcherer whose chief offence was in tunning the military side without cor suiting the naval p si:ion fully. £Ls wisdom in despiitchiog the 29th Division, however, will not. be gain-said in the light of the important work d : scbarged by that magnifleenfc force. Aa far as we have studied the report th?re does not appear to be any analysis of the land campaign. This is an omission which is bard to understand, because the success or failure of the expedition was built up od the actual work performed. The Suvla Bay di-aster had been probed earlier to ?ome extent and blame in that case meted out to individual officers, but the* effect of the failure of those operations does not appear to have been weighed in the light of tbe whole campaign. There are other aspects which if ventilated might have altered the outlook on the failure as it turned out, bat on these, also, there is silenoe, so that the report as far as it goes is inadequate. Nor is there any credit given for tbe magnificent way in which tbe position was evacuated. There were, at le at, some compensating matters to the side of failure. There was the. pressure from Russia for help to be considered, and that need does not appear to be sufficiently stressed in the report. Above and beyond all was the splendid gallantry of the soldiers and sailors taking part in the caorpaigD, and the glorious record they have left behind. la that high honor the colonial troops participated, for they did everything asked of them and more. It was the blooding of the colonial army, and they coaid not have faced the foe in more exacting circumstance?. The pity of it wan that it waß all in vain. But the progress of the war has upset many ardent hopes and expectations, and perhaps the Dardanelles was the flower of them all. _ The best to be hoped for now is that tho mistakes have baeu profited by, and that the muddling has long siuce ceased and given place to Bound order and wise jadgment,