GERMANY’S NEXT MOVE.

Hokitika Guardian, 9 March 1917, Page 4

GERMANY’S NEXT MOVE.

She Wilt Try to End the War, But How? (By Lovat Fraser in London Daily Mail). France has just given at Verdun 1 the only possible answer to German peace talk. The Imperial Chancellor spoke in the tones of a conqueror. Within three days he was reminded before Verdun that the western front continues to crumble. We are told on the one hand that Germany has began to talk of peaoe becanse she is in desperate straits. We are also told that her Note is a gigantic piece of bluff and that she expects it to be flouted. These two views are contradictory. They cannot both be right. Either Germany is serious in her peace proposals or she is not. If she is in desperate straits for men or for food, then she Is serious. I do not believe that Germany is yet in absolutely desperate straits, and it is reasonably certain that she never expected the Entente Powers to discuss her peace proposals. Her motives were probably twofold. She wished to convince her own restive populace that the war was being continned against her will, and she wanted to influence the attitude of neutrals. In short, her Note is not seriously meant, and if that is the case, we may assume that she has further war plans which will rapidly be put into operation. We onght to bo thinking of Germany’s next move in the war and not of her peace Note. The Allies are still losing far too much time. The recent political crioes, in this oouutry and in France and Bnseia, all mean

unavoidable loss of time and attention which ought to ba devoted exclusively to the war. Odo suspects that action would have been taken in Greece many days earlier if the Allies had not been temporarily engrossed in domestic political differences. The urgent task before ihem is to discern and forestall Germany’s next military act, and they can leave tbe peace to take care of itself. Altbcngh Herr von Bethmaun Hollweg’s talk of paaoe is in the main humbug, yet it leads to one very useful conclusion. It implies that the German Government recognise that they are unable to go on fighMog for an indefinite period. They must win quickly or not at all. They must therefore stake the whole issue on their mo?es early in the New Year and in the coming spring. Such seems to be the true significance of the peace Note. We a-e perhaps approaching tbe culminating phases of tbis gigantic struggle. *** * • * The more Germany is pressed, the more "frightful” her methods of fighting will become, until she perceives that the game is up. We may expect manifestations of savagery during the coming year such es even this war has not yet witnessed. I am not ranch perturbed about the threat to drop on London and elsewhere bombs laden with disease germs. This villainous trick was tried at Bucharest in the early days of the Ramacian campaign, but it failed. As a matter of fact it is far more difficult than is commonly believed to start an epidemic by artificial means. Some time ago I personally investigated a supposed attempt on the part of Germany to sow widespread disease in this country,

The evidence was extremely suspicious, but the point is that the infection which was traced did not prodnoe an epidemic. Similarly, we need not pay too much heed to the expectation of a far more ferocious submarine oampaignThe probability is that Germany is already doing ns all the misohief she possibly can with her submarines. The daily list of losses of oar mercantile marine is sufficient proof, as well as the reoords of the destruction among neutral shipping, The only conceivable change for the worse is that in all oases German submarines may in future sink without warning, bat in that event the United States may have to be reckoned with. If we armed our merchant steamers efficiently, there would be no more oases like that of Captain Blaikie. No, if we would know what the Hun proposes to attempt next, we mast look for a fresh blow on land. Remember always that Germany has no time left for what.Mr Leo Maxse calls "side-shows.” Tbe Rumanian campaign was to a great extent a sideshow. It produced a considerable amount of booty, it raised the spirits of the enemy, but .it did not bring Germany perceptibly nearer tbe kind of victory she craves. She must new deal knock-out blows or find herself acknowledging failure within a few months. Where can Germany attempt to deal knock-out blows ? Five courses appear to be open to Marshal von Hindenburg. He can: — 1. Attack General Sarrail and endeavour to thrust the Allies out of Macedonia. 2. Continue his pursuit of the still undestroyed Rumanian Army, and make for Odessa and the rich cornlands of Southern Russia. 3. Strike at Riga, from which his outposts have never been very far, and try to advance to Petrogcad later on. 4. Hammer tbe Italians. 5. Try to strike again in tbe west,

***** The idea of an early blow at Italy can doubtless ba dismissed. The Austrians discovered last spring that an offensive through the Trentino is a slow and dangerous enterprise. I he Italians have a very firm lodgment on the Carso, and an enemy attack on the Upper Isonzo would not bring the end of the war much nearer. The Germans have to end the war—if

they can. They will not do it by hitting Italy any more than we shall do it by hitting Turkey.

I do not in the least believe that tbe enemy will materially improve their position if they try to penetrate to Odessa. Such an undertaking would impose upon them a price they cannot now pay. When every allowance is made for th 9 losses of tbe Rumanian Army it ia still a factor to be reckoned with, Russia has huge concentrations of troops and gnus in the south. OJessa would be another “ brilliant” episode in Germany's roll of successes, but it would not spell the approach of peace. The Austro-Ger-man armies might march over half the world, but while they have failed to defeat the principal armies of the Entente Powers they are nowhere near victory. Much the same reaeons may be applied to tne suggestion thit Hindenburg may strike at Riga end Perrograd. He has been Bitting almost w thin sight of R ; ga for more than a year, It would taka him alPthe summer to get to Patrcgrad, even if the utmost good fortune attended German arms; and when he got there be wonld still be far from peace. Nothing can now detach Russia from the Allied cause.

The popular belief has been that the next German move would be to try to thrust Genera! Sarrail out of Salonicaj King Constantine’s acceptance of thß demands of the Allies suggest*, however, that the expected flow of AnetroGerman reinforcements through Serbia

is not bo near as was supposed. There may be an attempt to retake Monastir, King Constantine may again violate his pledges, but Germany cannot expect to end the war on the Salonioa front.

Tbe point np to which I have been leading must now be clear. No onlooker can pretend to say what Germany will do, bat it is possible to discern what she may do if she adheres to her own principles. The tradition of Prussia is to attack the strongest point. Germany overwhelms minor States but doss not win the war. Her principal enemies are massed in the west. If she wants to end the war quickly she must strike herd and repeatedly in the west. However much von H’ndenburg is attracted by the eastern front I believe be will be compelled to torn again to the west. Bat the Allie?, who bold and retain the initiative in the west, may save the Germans the necessity of making a choice.