SECRET STOCKS OF ATOM BOMBS

Grey River Argus, 8 October 1948, Page 5

SECRET STOCKS OF ATOM BOMBS

Not to be Let Go By U.S. and Britain

“Because We AH

Fear Soviet!”

PARIS, October 6.

On Wednesday at the meeting of the Political Committee of the United Nations Assembly, the question of destroying all stocks of atom bombs and disclosing the secret of their composition, was again discussed in connection with the report of the Atomic Energy Commission. ’ The British Minister of State, Mr Hector McNeil, told Russia that fear of the Soviet prevented Britain and America from handing over the secret and destroying their stocks of bombs. He said that an unbridgeable gulf existed between the Western Powers’ majority and the Soviet Union and its supporters’ minority in the Atomic Energy Commission. He added that an adequate system of inspection wuld have to be built up, “if we are to succour the world from this fear that inhibits all our normal international relations. The United States, Britain and all the Governments who signed the majority report will not agree to hand over information and destroy the bombs and stock of nucleur fuel semi-conditional-ly, because we all fear Soviet Russia”. SOVIET’S ANNEXATION OF TERRITORY Mr McNeil continued: “Russia has enriched herself territorially to an extent beyond parallel in modern times. She has pursued outside her borders a policy of daring and aggressive political warfare. Visitors are few inside her borders. . The newspapers are controlled, and even diplomatic personnel are now formally denied the courtesies of travel. Fear of Russia might be unjustified, but in Britain it is real and abiding” WOULD SOVIET CO-OPERATE? Mr McNeil put three questions to the Soviet delegate, designed to elucidate whether Russia was prepared to accept effective international control :— (11) Did the Soviet Government agree that an adequate control system must be operating before _ the second convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons was put into effect? (2) Was the Soviet Government prepared to accept the majority report of the Atomic Energy Commission as providing a general basis for a’ convention establishing control? (3) Was the Soviet delegation prepared to agree that the operations of the international agency should not be subject to the veto? NO SOVIET THREAT

The Soviet delegate, M. Jacob Malik, did not answer Mr McNeil’s questions. He said he would deal in detail with Mr McNeil’s speech, “because it was replete with slander and falsehood”. The Soviet people threatened no one. The general war psychosis and propaganda unleashed by the press of many countries was not based on the Soviet threatening anyone. PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE

Mr Eric Louw, for South Africa, said that South Africa had its own supplies of uranium, but, while his Government supported the principle of atomic energy control, it could not commit itself, in advance, to handing over the ownership of gold-bearing ore to an international agency. It could not blindly agree to control measures which had yet to be worked out in detail. A DEADLOCK?

Colonel Hodgson (Australia) said the Soviet’s delegate’s failure to replv to Mr McNeil’s questions made it seem useless to set up a sub-com-mittee to study the possibilities of compromise. NO MONOPOLY?

M. Julius Katz-Suchy (Poland) said he doubted whether America had a monopoly of the atom bomb secret. “The United States claim to be ready to share the secret is hardly reconcilable with its efforts to prepare more numerous and more effective atomic weapons for an atomic blitzkreig”. A POSSIBILITY YET

General A. G. L. McNaughton (Canada) earlier asked M. Vyshinsky whether the latest Soviet proposal was sincere. General McNaughton said that if M. Vyshinsky meant what he said, the choice between the two conventions —the Soviet proposal and the majority proposal —would be a drafting matter and would present no political importance. If the Russians really meant to establish international control in the sense of the majority proposal, then all was plain sailing; If not, then the two and a-half years work of the Atomic Commission must be discarded and it must start work again. CZECH SUPPORT OF SOVIET The Czech Foreign Minister (M. Klementis) said he did not accept the Soviet proposal simply because his country possessed some of the world’s oldest uranium mines, but because the Soviet plan gave a greater expectation of effective atomic energy control in the interests of mankind. SOVIET VETO OPPOSED Dr Hector Castro (El Salvador) said: “It is most encouraging that the United States, Britain, and Canada, working in complete harmony, are willing to give up their secret in return for complete certainty that no nation will use atomic energy fo r warlike purposes. They are willing to this end to accent far-reaching international control”. Dr Castro criticised the Soviet stand, principally on the grounds that the Soviet insisted on applying the veto to controls. SOVIET LINE

M. Kysselev (Byelorussia) said that an unbiassed study of the facts showed that the United States was responsible for the impasse in the Atomic Energy Commission. He added that evidence of America’s- ambitions was offered by American bases abroad, the Marshall Plan, and the Truman Doctrine. MEANING IN DOUBT

General Carlos ?,omulo (Philippines) said that the Sioviet resolution constituted “a clink in the wall letting through a ray of light to dispel to some extent the gloom which has hitherto prevailed”. General Romulo said that if .the resolution meant what he took it to mean, .t was an act of courage. There can only be pride, not humiliation, in anv stens which bring us closer to a compromise based on truth”, he said. 1 The committee decided by 27 votes to seven, with nine abstentions, to postpone the next meeting, so as no. to conflict with the Security Council meeting.