THE RETREAT OF BOURBAKI TO SWITZERLAND.

Grey River Argus, Volume X, Issue 861, 1 May 1871, Page 2

THE RETREAT OF BOURBAKI TO SWITZERLAND.

[europkax matt,. I A note has been communicated by the Government at Bordeaux, which points out the disastrous efff.eta uf tho armistice on the fortunes of the Army of the East, and explains how Bourbaki was compelled to enter Swiss territory. It says: — "At the very moment when the Convention of the 28th January was notified to the Delegate Government, a double strategical movement was taking place. On one side the Army of the East was operating, while on the other General Garibaldi, who had received reinforcements numbering 50,000 men, commenced a diversion in force in the rear of the enemy, advancing towards Dole and the forest of Chana. Had this movement ended as successfully as it began, the Prussian troops might have been placed in a very critical situation between two fires. On the 2nd February the Army of the East suspended it 3 operations, and the Army of General Garibaldi halced within three kilometres of Dole, which had been almost completely evacuated by the enemy. During the two following days,' while the French Generals were negotiating with the enemy to clear up what seemed to be a misunderstanding, the enemy continued to advance, sending considerable reinforcements against Garibaldi, occupied important positions, and rendered it impossible for the French army to pursue the original plan. When the full text of the armistice became known, Geueral Garibaldi was obliged to evacuate Dijon and to fall back on Magon, and the Army of the East was compelled to enter Swiss territory, with the exception of the 24th Corps, forming the left wing, which succeeded in escaping the pursuitofthsenemy." The Bund published a letter from the Franco-Swiss frontier, dated the 28th January, which gives some particulars of the retreat of Bourbaki's army. "The retreat," says the writer, " was carried on along a single road, which was covered with sheet ice, so that the horses could not keep their footing. One may easily imagine the confusion which resulted. Men and horses suffered terribly from the cold. A third of the troops had frost-bitten feet. Owing to incomprehensible negligence, the Prussians were allowed to restore the bridges at L'lsle, Olerval, and Beaume-les-Darnes. The consequence was that the army was intercepted in the rear and flank, and shut up between the Donbs and the Swiss frontier. Some of the divisions, cut off from the line of retreat on Besangon, were driven into the mountains. General Canvagnie's division drew back on Morteau, and thence towards Pontarlier. On Jan. 27, while I was at Morteau,. General Castella arrived with his adjutant and escort, followed by remnants of the army, which he had saved after an unsuccessful encounter at Pont-aux-Moulins. It was stated that he was directed, with scarcely 3000 men, to take a position held by 25,000 Prussians. The French officer told me that General Castella formed the extreme covering detachment of Bourbaki's army, and that he guarded the retreat from Arcy to Clerval with rare energy. Castella has advanced further towards Pontarlier. All the troops which are marching through have a melancholy appearance. They give the impression of wanting a few days' absolute rest if they are again to take the field. Poor France is in a very sad plight. " Borne received 20,000 men, Zurich 11,000, Argovie 8800, Canton de Vaud 8000, Saint Gall 7000, Glaris 7000, and other places in proportion, the whole force interned number 84,900. Switzerland will not suffer financially through the internment of the French army, as the amount of French war material in the hands of the Confederation consists of over 100 guns and mitrailleuses and 80,000 rifles. A correspondent, writing on February 4, says: — "The retreat of Bourbaki's army southward was made under disastrous circumstances. The enemy — an indefatigable enemy— harassed them on all sides, allowing them not a day, not an hour, to rest from their fatigues, or to re-form their disordered ranks. Heads of hostile columns debouched on every side — in the rear, on the flank, and in front, to cut off their line of retreat, and to intercept their communications. All issues were closed up at once ; they marched and slept, or rather watched, surrounded by dangers. Every moment an alarm was given ; they had to fight, to dispute foot by foot a village or a house ; then, in place of halting to take breath, to march and march again, leaving behind them a long line of killed, wounded, and sick. And all this without food, almost without ammunition, above all without that hope of victory which sustains such great privations. They arrived thus in less than 12 days from Cherval, Blamont, Pont de Roide, and St. Hippolyte, as far as Morteau and Pontarlier, but a few leagues from the Swiss frontier. If they had entertained any hope of returning to France by passing along the Swiss frontier, to take the road from Bourg by Lons le Saulnier, or that from Gex la Faneille, they were obliged to abandon it, for every road to the north, south, or west was occupied by the indefatigable cavalry of the enemy, behind which were strong columns of infantry, supported by formidable field artillery. On January 28, the 2nd Corps d'Armee (Pomeranians), recently arrived from Paris, under the command of General Iranseky, captured a train of waggons near Noseroy, 30 kilometres south-west of Pontarlier. On that day the French army was completely surrounded by the army of General Manteuffel and the Swiss frontier." General Cremer, on the staff of Bourbaki, effected his retreat from Pontarlier in the direction of Gex, through Fancelle ; but on account of the bad state of the roads, he was obliged to abandon 40 guns, which he previously spiked. The following account of the sufferings and collapse of the Army of the East, just received from a correspondent who was an eye-witness of the disasters of which he speaks, will be read with painful interest: — " The original plan of the campaign of the Army of the East was drawn up by Lieutenant-Colonel de Bigot (of the e'tat major of the regular army, and attached to the 7th division at Besangon), and having been approved by M. Gambetta, the command-in-chief was at once offered by the Minister of War to Colonel de Bigot, who refused it, because he ' could accept no command from a revolutionary Government.' This was the greatest misfortune that could have happened. On his refusal, however, the plan was adhered to, and General Bourbaki entrusted to

carry it out. The 20th and 24th Corps were to move from Besangon along the left bank of the Doubs, its right (the 24th) passing by Blamont, and both crossing the river near Audincourt, so as to debouch into the so-called plain of Belfort. By this means they would take the Prussian position at Montbeliard and Hericourt in the rear, while the river Doubs and the Canal dv Rhone au Rbin were to serve as a line of ravitaillement, and at the same time cover the army from a flank attack. In the event of a failure the same roads, which were not only numerous but exceedingly good, and notwithstanding the snow and frost perfectly practicable, were to serve as the line of •etreat to Besangon and Lons de Saulnier in the direction of Bourg and Lyons. " In Cremer's movements through Gray and Vesoul a great mistake was made. It had been intended to destroy ali the bridges in his rear to prevent any movement to cut him off ; but, instead of seeing to this himself, the general left the operation to the civil engineers of the various localities, and these, through fear of Prussian reprisals, not only did not blow up the bridges, but repaired all that had been damaged by the Germans ; and thus it was their army got into our rear, took Dole, Gray, and Vesoul, and forced us to Besangon. It may be well to mention here, par parenthese, that during our retreat to Besangori in no single instance was any attempt made, either by cutting the roads or otherwise, to obstruct or delay the active pursuit of the enemy ; and yet there was a company of engineers attached to each division, and whether due to the conviction that they would ultimately defeat us or not I cannot say, yet it was remarked by many'experienced old officers, that the Prussians when defeated, and retiring before our advance, made no attempt to delay our march by the mean 3 usually taken to cover a retreat. We reached Lure on January 14, cold and hungry, and wearied with a march of 25 miles in the snow — wearied, you may well imagine, when it is remembered that the French soldier carries 601 b ; cold you will not doubt, fjom the fact that the shoes of the soldiers were of the shape we call Oxonians. Many were so worn that parts of their feet rested on the ground at each step. Fatigued, without a ration of meat for two clays — in fact, nothing but bread ; yet, in spite of this, we pushed on to a distance of six milea, three battalions to act as outposts ; and preparations were made to resist an attack on the following day. General Cremer issued a flaming address, calling on his men to crown their discipline with courage ; and orderec that full rations of meat, bread, wine, and brandy should be given to all, and then went in to dinner with the Mayor. But it is one thing to order and another to supply. Bread for about one-half of the division was obtained, one-third received half-a-pint of wine, and no one got an ounce of meat or a drop of brandy. On the 15th, at seven o'clock, we marched out, and everything seemed to indicate that an engagement was imminent. We had heard of the victory at Villersexel, and knew that Werder was in full retreat ; yet our generals looked grave, and for the first time knew that Bourbaki had lost five days, an incalculable misfortune when time was the essence of the plan. The fatal consequences of the topographical ignorance of Bourbaki's staff, and the deviation from Bigot's arrangement, now became evident. Instead of taking the Route lmpemle, through. Bonchamp to the rear of Frahier, we moved along the Route Departementale by Lyoffans and Magny to Belverne, a few miles before reaching which place our division was cut in two by the 18th Corps, of thirty thousand men and seventy-two cannons, moving on Chagey from Faymont, Athesans, and Mignavillers, thus causing a delay of three hours in the advance of the second brigade of Cremer's division. We finally got clear of the 18th, and reached Etoban at half-past 3 p.m., from which position we at once opened a heavy fire from our Armstrong battery on the enemy at Chenebier, about a mile and a quarter distant, so protecting the advance of our first brigade to the plateau of Thure. The second brigade left Etoban, and joined the first on the plateau late the same evening, thus committing two grievons errors, by order of Bourbaki, viz., leaving the position of Etoban, and not driving tho enemy out of Chenebier at once, more especially as the main road to our position lay through Chenebier, while we took our way across the surface of a frozen lake, which half a dozen solid shot from the enemy's guns would have broken and rendered impassable. Neither officers nor men had anything to eat from 7 o'clock the previous morning till 6 p.m. the following day. Nor had forage been issued to the horses and mules of the artillery since the morning of the 14th. The Prussians were distant from our main body but 800 yards, yet, notwithstanding this proximity, in contradiction of all military rule, we lit fires with such faggots —all green wood — as we could collect. Round these fire 3 huddled, without distinction of rank, generals, officers, and men, aye, and even horses, all with the same anxiety to avoid being frozen to death. The thermometer marked 18deg. below freezing point, a strong cutting wind swept across the plateau, carrying clouds of snow before us, blinding na, i drifting small monnds that buried the merj up tp the knee. Sitting on our knapsacks we passed this night with our feet stuck in the fires, in the hope of retaining the vital heat. Our craving for food was forgotten in the torpor that gradually stole over the camp, and the sleep so anxiously looked forward to was found by many in that eternal rest which knows no waking. "On the following morning, the 16th, at half-past 7, the enemy commenced throwing out skirmishers, and placing his batteries of 12-pounders at Chenebier. General Tevis deployed his brigade on the crgst of the plateau, and opened fire j with his four-pounders. After two hours J of this artillery iduel at 3hort distances, the enemy's guns were completely silenced, and, much to the chagrin of the men, Cremer sent an order to Tevis to cease, firing, although column of attack had been forme*! to take the village with the bayonet. Moanwhile, strong reinforcements of infantry and artillery could be distinctly s.e.i entering the village by the Echava n ■•» r.iad, and under cover of the houses tiling along towards Etoban on our left, in order to obtain a cross-fire on our positiou. Matters looked very serious, and when, at half-past 11, the cannonade recommenced, we found that the enemy, profiting by the morning's experience, had established his batteries on the hill-side in

rear of the village, on a level with our position, and at a distance beyond the range of any except the Armstrong fipis. The fire of the smaller pieces was tEerefore concentrated on the infantry. Up to 2 p.m. a storm of shot, shell, and bullets swept the plateau so fiercely that all were obliged to lie down. Then Tevis perceived that the Prussian left was ungnarded, and could be turned under cover of a hill, and the 83rd Regiment was immediately led up to the attack. The men advanced very creditably for raw troops, but, in their eagerness, began to fire too soon, so drawing the enemy's attention before the 57th line regiment, which v the general had sent for a support, could come up ; thus they • suffered heavily, and broke more than once, but were rallied by their officers, and succeeded in holding the crest of the hill for nearly an hour. Then their gallant colonel, Pech Lectaniere, "ell with a bullet through his heart ; and as a column of Baden troops turned their right, they, gave way in confusion, and were driven back to the road. At last the welcome sound of the drums of the 57th beating the charge was heard, and down the slope in front of the plateau poured the linesmen. The Ist battalion v of the 86th Mobiles joined the movement, so did the battalion of the Gironde and and the remnants of the 83rd ; and with a loud shout of " Viva la France !" the French dashed into the village, and the battle of Chenebier was won just as Admiral Penhoet broke the Prussian right and drove him out of Etoban. Unfortunately, like all our successes during this war, our victory wa3 not followed up, and General Dajenfeld got away with all his guns to Frahier, which line of retreat would have been cut if the movement of the 2nd brigade had been supported by the right, as it had been commenced, instead of by the centre. The losses on both sides were about equal — the Prussians confessed to one thousand two hundred killed and wounded ; ours, perhaps, was a little less. The 2nd brigade lost seventeen officers and five hundred and ninety rank' and file killed and wounded, mostly from musketry. On the evening of the 17th, orders came from the commander in-chief to abandon all our positions and retire on Besangon. "Two days afterwards General Bourbaki shot himself in his room at Besangon, after reviewing the 18th Corps, and the whole army began a tumultuous retreat, by the route of Ornans and Pontarlier, towards the Jura, through whose mountain passes General Clinchant, who had now assumed the command, hoped to lead his troops safely to Lyons. " It would need columns to describe the. awful sufferings of this unfortunate army, and give the least idea of the horrors of its march from Besangon to the Swiss frontier. Most of the men were shoeless, others had only the tattered remnants of their uniforms, many had thrown away their rifles and knapsacks. The majority had eaten nothing for three days, except such as had been furnished by the charity of the poor peasants in the wretched villages along the route, and this was not much. There were no rations provided at Pontarlier for the troops, and the first comers fell on the private stores in the town and its environs like an army of locusts, so that the rear guard found ab? solutely nothing. A few lugky ones, anc| they were rare, profiting by past esperi* ence, had fastened to their knapsacks lumps of horseflesh, cut from animals that fell on the road, and these dainty morsels, through countless accidents, had finally assumed the shape, color, and consistency of mud. Nearly all the troops, and with them their officers, were obliged to bivouac in the snow, as they had done for ten days past. Baggage and ammunition waggons were abandoned on the road through want of means of transportation, and every 100 yards might be seen dead and dying horses, victims to the triple scourge of hunger, cold, and fatigue. Through all this terrible march, Cremer's division, as we had done from the first moment of retreat from the Lisaine, formed the rear guard, suffering even" more thaji the others, for we, were the lssfc to share in every distributiqn of fqod that might be made. We marched in excellent order, not from esprit dz corps — a sentiment dead in the present French army — but simply through the rigid discipline of the brigade commanders, who were ever at their po3ts encouraging and rallying their soldiers. Elsewhere Linesmen, Zouaves, Mobiles, Chasseurs, and Turcos were mixed up in wild confusion, and at every step it was ' mon officier pouve&-vous me dirt ou tel corps se trouve V — all force of cohesion was lost, and this army had become a disorganised starving mob. It was not so with us of the rear-guard ; the 32nd, 57th, 83rd, and 86th, marched steadily in their ranks, hungry, footsore, and weary, but like true soldiers. All felt that our last chance was gon§, that not alone victory, but even a retreat to. Lyons wa.s. impossible, and the announcement of an armistice of twenty-one days was hailed with joy. Alas ! we are again doomed to disappointment ; the thunder of the German cannon at Planches, between Mouthe and Morez, taught us that to trust to the honor or mercy of the enemy was to place oneself in the power of a wild beast. Manteuffel had decided upon the destruction of tiur army, and so disregarded these to him formal and vain words. But one course lay open to us— in Switzerland wq would be prisoners, but at least oi^r gaolers would be friendly, and at the close of the war this great materiel would be restored to France ; and so General Clinchant concluded articles of capitulation with the Swiss general, and 85,000 marched into Switzerland. It is impossible to give you the number of cannon lost during the last few days, but it may be safely assumed that 80 pieces were spiked and thrown over into the ravines of the mountains. Thus ended this retreat ; we are beaten, thoroughly beaten, and now ilfaut attendre avec patience P'