ENGLAND AND THE FRENCH ALLIANCE.

Globe, Volume XXIV, Issue 2611, 19 August 1882, Page 4

ENGLAND AND THE FRENCH ALLIANCE.

['• Pall Mall B idget.”]

The attacks upon our Egyptian policy 'which are appearing in some French papers will occasion little perturbation at Downing street. Lord Granville could wish for no better fortune than to have to open the dobate by refuting the absurd charge that ho has acted disloyally to France. The eocufation which he hss most season to fear is exactly the opposite. No one can road the recently published official papers in the light of recent events without being convinced that the present crisis is largely due to the extreme fidelity with which Lord Granville adhered to the policy of the Joint Control which ho had inherited from his predecessor, 110 insisted on keeping step with Franco in season and out of raison, and the result has been that wo havo marched to the edge of the abjss. Wo do not blamo Lord Granville for feeling very strongly the importance of the Anglo French cooperation in Egypt. His dread of an isolated or adventurous policy was natural and commendable. Perfect agreement between the two Powers was the sino qua non of the smooth working of tho Control. It was even Justifiable to strain a good many points and run no small risk to keep the co-partnership going, in order to avoid the obvious and serious peril of taking an independent course. But it is to be feared that Lord Granville, from his anxiety to preserve the means, has sacrificed ono great end of our policy in

have no intention of entering into

barren recriminations with our French con-

temporaries concerning tho past. Our business is rather to point out with the light of the recently published official despatches hew unfortunately the influence of Franca has operated in tho development of the present crisis in Egypt. Lord Granville’s despatch of November 4th, almost tho only isolated step we have taken in Egypt since tho purchase of the Suez Canal shares, was tho only measure which has excited universal approval. After that despatch was published the position of this country in Egypt seemed to be established on firm foundations. Alika at Oonstantinoplo and at Cairo it was accepted as a satisfactory declaration of English policy, compatible alike with the claims of the Sultan and the legitimate aspirations of the “ Nationalist ” • Egyptians. From that date down to the despatch of the ironclads to Alexandria the story of our Egyptian policy shows a steady progress downwards, and in every case the change for the worse ■was due either to tho initiative or to tho veto of Franca. This is a serious charge, but the official papers place it beyond controversy. Tho first great false move was unquestionably the Joint Note presented in January. Before that Note was issued it was at least possible that the National movement could be kept within the limits of the status quo . Lord Granville did not like the Note. He never believed that it would be of any use. He objected to sign it, but on consideration of the urgent representations of M. Gambotta, snd on reflecting that the litoral construction

of it* wording was comparatively innocent, he consented, and to that unfortunate step we owe no small part of our present difficulties. As we stated at the

time, the Note, prefaced as it was by the declarations of M. Gambetta's confidants that it was the preliminary to an armed intervention, fell upon Cairo like a shell. No one was more aghast at the illtimed manifesto than the agents of France and England, who—incredible though it may be—do not seem to have bean consulted by their Governments. It undid in a moment the work of years, and at the same time that it made an enemy of Arab!, it arrayed the Saltan, the Notables, and all the other Powers on his side. An unluckier move was never made. M. Qambotta intended to follow it up, as his journal declared a few days ago, by despatching a few thousand, or even a few hundred, Anglo-French troops to Alexandria. his own agent at Cairo reported three weeks later that no intervention could safely bo attempted with fewer than 40,000 men, and his Ambassador at Berlin informed him that the four Eastern Powers

were agreed in opposing any AngloFrench occupation of Egypt. As soon as Lord Granville discovered the disastrous effect to the Note to which ha set his hand, he proposed to M. Qambotta to allay the ex--'oitement by a Note of explanation. Notwithstanding all his declarations in favor of concerted action M. Gambetta telegraphed to Cairo a flat refusal before his interview with Lord Lyonsi Thus, out of anxiety to oblige onr ally and to give France no reason for complaint, England was committed to the false move which has borne such evil fruit.

Things were no bettor after M. Qambatta’s fall. The evil had then been done. Common prudence dictated that, after declaring they were agreed to intervene, England and Franco should lose no time in preparing for the intervention which their declaration had done so much to precipitate. Lord Granville then took the wise and statesmanlike course of

proposing that the other Powers should be consulted as to the best mode of intervention. M. da Freyoinet assented, and the joint invitation to an exchange of views was issued on the 11th of February. Nino days before Arabi and the Chamber, by way of reply to the Joint Note, upset the Cherif Ministry, and forced the Khedive to sanction the Organic Law, From that time the Control practically ceased to exist, and no return to the status quo was possible without intervention. All the Powers expressed their willingness to exchange views, and Prince Bismarck, with characteristic directness, declared that he was ready to take part in a conference, at any place and at any time, to consider the question. This was on the 27th February. Six days before M. de Freyoinet had deprecated “hurry.” To oblige France the German proposal was rejected. All negotiations with the Powers were suspended, and for two months nothing was done to secure that concerted arragement for action in Egypt which bad become imperatively indispensable after the despatch of the Joint Note. This was the second false step in our joint dealings with Egypt, and thna it was that, while France under M. Gambetta had plunged England into a dangerous Egyptian crisis, France under M. de Freyoinet interposed a dogged and persistent refusal to allow us to avail ourselves of the means of escape which Lord Granville saw clearly enough, bat unfortunately did not press for with the necessary determination—out of regard for France. We need not pass in review the policy of M. de Freyoinet. The official papers represent Lord Granville as making repeated efforts to rouse M. de Freyoinet to prepare for eventualities in Egypt, He proposed the despatch of financial adjuncts to the Consuls. It was rejected. He suggested that a Turkish general should be sent to deal with Arabi. France objected, and the proposal was abandoned, He proposed that the fleet should go to Alexandria to support the Turkish mission, •nd in concert with all the Powers. France objected again both to the Turkish mission and to the concert, and again Lord Granville gave way. He admitted as he did so that it was s mistake. How great a mistake it was subsequent events have shown only too clearly. So -far from M. Lcmoinne’s complaint being well founded, it would bo more correct to say that Egypt had been sacrificed to the French alliance. Writing on the 19. h of January wo warned the Government that it would be better to adopt even the werst of suggested alternative policies, and to pursue it resolutely, than “ either to drift heedlessly along, or to follow the capiioes of Franco, with no definite idea of what policy we are to pursue, or at what point it may be necessary to part company with our ally at a'l risks.” Unfortunately wo have kept company "with our ally at all risks.