FIRES AND INSURANCE OFFICES.

Globe, Volume XX, Issue 1565, 24 February 1879, Page 4

FIRES AND INSURANCE OFFICES.

[Sydney “ Evening News.”] Fires have been unpleasantly frequent of late in the country town?. Parkes, Denili quin, and Albury have suffered successively from severe visitation* of the devouring element, and in most cases no satisfactory explanation of the origin of the fire has been given Sydney has experienced several considerable confl .grations, which perhaps may have been partly due to the summer season, and the consequent greater liability of buildings to catch fire. . . . The companies take almost any risk which is not palpably absurd, and then, when a fire occurs, they set to work to investigate the risk they have take i, and if possible prove that the insurer bad not the value of property which he has paid them for insuring. Thus they endeavour to obtain extravagant premiums, and yet not to take the extra risk. They quietly take the money of the insurer, and all the while they have no intention of freely accepting the risk. There would be little to be said about this arrangement, except to marvel at the manner in which both parties to a bargain try to overreach one another, were it not that the insurance companies are making their money by offering a positive encouragement to negligence and crime. Any shopkeeper can insure his stock for half as much again as it is worth, and if he can only make such arrangements as will result in a fire, he may make a handsome profit. Thus, the companies are giving a direct bonus to anyone who will commit and conceal a crime, which might result in misery and loss of life to many others. All the arrangements of an insurance office tend in this direction, for everybody who deals with applications is anxious for “fresh business;” agents get their percentage, managers often do the same, and the directors are always pleased to see the growth of their trade. Thus we have a gigantic system stretching its ramifications into every street, which must have the effect of making people less careful to avoid fire.

Whilst giving rogues a fine scope for their energies, the system is exceedingly unpleasant for an honest man. Whenever there is a fire of which the case is not quite clear, the unfortunate owner of the property is treated almost as though he wore a rogue. He is examined and cross-questioned, and all those connected with him are interrogated before the public in a manner that nust bo most unEleasant, and if he makes any mistake, or if e becomes confused about his affairs, at once the presumption of dishonesty against him is strengthened. The arrangement is such that only the honest man and the stupid rogue are troubled, for the really clever intriguer would take care to have all his evidence in order, and would easily baffle his opponents. It may be doubted whether the present system is really a profitable one to the companies They certainly secure a larger amount of premiums than they would if over-insuring were checked ; but they must on the other hand, have frequently to pay large sums for losses brought about by this very course, and at all times they must have heavy legal expenses in watching coroners’ proceedings and in contesting their liability. These items must lake the sugar off the plums, and, in all probability the ordinary insurers who are well within the value of their property, have to pay an extra price, owing to the doubtful business which

is taken by most offices. Insurance is so general now, —it has become so much a part of our every-day life,—that it is most important that it should bo conducted on a sound basis. It is, of course, much easier to point out a defect than to suggest a remedy, and in a matter of this kind we have more hope from the action of the offices themselves and from the general administration of the law by the Judges than from any special legislation. It would, however, be well in some way or other to limit the right of the companies to contest a liability which they have deliberately undertaken. It is very well for them to bring to light any fraudulent removal of goods, but when they have issued a policy for a certain amount, and have taken the premises, it is hardly in accordance with the principles of equity for them afterwards to turn round and say, “You never had this value in your place, and therefore our contract is invalid.” By binding down the company more strictly to their agreements rogues would have less encouragement, the companies would be protected, and the public would be saved from a very real danger.