The Globe. WEDNESDAY, MAY 8, 1878.

Globe, Volume IX, Issue 1290, 8 May 1878, Page 2

The Globe. WEDNESDAY, MAY 8, 1878.

In former articles wo have tried to show in what maimer it would be possible to secure an executable distribution of seats which would at the same time be selfadjusting. Any scheme of Representation, however, which continues the present mode of dividing the country into electoral districts, and returning members by the votes comprised within their limits only, is scarcely entitled to the name it claims. Properly understood, a Representative body should bo an actual reflex of the opinion of the whole of the electors. At present this is rarely the case, and when it is, it is an accidental result. One district may happen to return a member holding certain views, and another may elect one holding the opposite, and so the House may iu a rough and incomplete way have all shades of opinion held iu the country represented. But it is cpdto possible that the opposite may bo the case. Under our present mode of election, the House is composed of the representatives of the majorities of each district. As Mill points out, “ the pure idea of a Democracy, according to its definition, is the government of the whole people by the whole people equally represented. Democracy as commonly received and hitherto practiced, is the government of the whole people by a mere majority of the people, exclusively represented.” Representative institutions are the result of the complex machinery of modern civilisation. Every citizen cannot afford the time, even if it were otherwise possible, to meet with his fellows and deliberate upon the affairs of State. So ho elects a Representative. His choice should fall upon one who holds similar views to himself, and when the Representatives meet they should as nearly as possible speak the voice of the nation upon all great questions. The minority iu that Assembly must of course yield to the majority, just as the minority would have to give way, were an appeal made to the whole people directly. The arbitrary division of the country into electoral districts, however, produces an entirely different result. The members returned represent the opinions of the majority of each electoral district only. It is therefore quite possible to imagine a state of things which would result iu the Representative House being unanimous, or nearly so, and the country not. Were some great question before the country, and each constituency contained a small majority iu favor of it, the members returned would be unanimous, but they would be far from representing the voice of the colony. Suppose, for example, that at the next general election the great question before the people was that of Manhood Suffrage, and that each of the constituencies by a small majority decided against the measure, wo should have the House of Representatives unanimously against it, and the country nearly equally divided. There might bo, say, 50,000 electors whose opinions were represented, and (8,000 whose views found no expression in (ho Assembly whatever. Surely it could not bo said that such a House, as we have named, could lay any claim to bo representative of the opinion of the whole body of electors. But the case is even worse than wo have put it. Owing to the exigencies of party government, many members are returned who very imperfectly represent the views of their own supporters. In order to secure the return of a man of their own party, individual electors have to sink their own opinions as to the fitness of the candidate. Ho is put forward by the wirepullers, and although iu the opinion of many who vote for him ho is far from a suitable representative, ho is returned in order to keep another man out because he belongs to the other side. In England, and especially iu America, this state of things notoriously prevails. Even iu Now Zealand, it is plain that wo are iu danger of entering upon a similar

course. Now, therefore, is the time, when Reform is tho order of the day, to discover whether it is possible to avoid this very great danger. Is it possible to make tbo Lower House a truly Representative one F Is it within our power in fact to elect a House, the opinions of whoso members would ho in exact proportion to those of all tho electors ot tho colony ? It cannot bo said that tho present mode of election secures this end, although perhaps popularly supposed to do. Wo have so long boon accustomed to the present” mode of expressing public opinion, that it is difficult to convince the people at largo that it is radically wrong in principle. A bare majority of tho electors have no more right to impose their rule upon tho remainder of tho nation than one man has. Under such a system it is possible to practically disfranchise nearly half the electors of the country. Through their representatives they have no voice whatever in tho management of its affairs. For all tho effect they have upon tho legislation, they might just as well not have voted at all, for they are in no way represented. Now if such a state of things was a necessary result of Democracy, and if there was no way of curing tho ovil, tho only thing to do would bo to quietly submit. If on the other hand tho aim of our Institutions is to place the power absolutely in the hands of a majority, and to prevent tho minority from having any voice whatever in tho management of their affairs, then there is no need for change. But in this case wo are departing from the model of the British Constitution which wo profess to follow. Owing to a variety of causes, which do not operate hero, and which are less potent even in England than they were, all shades of political opinions have been, and still are, represented in tho British House of Commons. But if our present system continues hero much longer, such will not bo tho case in New Zealand. Tho country will he handed over to tlie tyrannical rule of tho majority; and history tells us what that means. We hope the colony will have the courage to look this matter in the face, and take the question up properly. If this is done, the injustice of our present system of Representation will become apparent to the most unthinking, and there will be some chance of securing the adoption of a rational system—a system based on justice and equity, and which would tend more than any other measure which could bo introduced, to purge our political institutions of their glaring defects.