THE ATTITUDE OF ENGLAND.

Globe, Volume VIII, Issue 962, 26 July 1877, Page 3

THE ATTITUDE OF ENGLAND.

It is now known that the Turks have not held their ground on the Balkans, and, without knowing that such was the case, the writer thus points to the possible contingency and its consequences : Last week we learned by submarine telegraph that the British fleet had been ordered to Besika Bay, at the mouth of the Dardanelles ; and in a day or two afterwards we were informed that the reason why this change of position had been ordered was for convenience of reference to Mr Layard, the ambassador at Constantinople, and to England. This statement seems a very simple one, and is apparently devoid of significance ; but if it be read in connection with certain antecedent circumstances, and certain passing events, it will be found, I think, to be an item of high importance. It is, in my opinion, neither more nor less than England raising her arm as it were, to be ready to strike the first blow in defence of her interests. It will be remembered that more than one member of the British Cabinet lias openly stated that if the progress of the war threatened to interfere with British interests, the G-overnment would be ready to defend them. The safety of Constantinople against Russian aggression is well known to be one of the cardinal points of our foreign policy. With a knowledge, then, of these antecedent facts, let us examine the character of the news from the seat of war at the time that the British fleet was ordered to Besika Bay, and the importance of the movement will I think at once be evident. The telegrams state that on the 3rd of July the fleet left Greece under sealed orders, and on the 4th that it had gone to Besika Bay. On the 27th June the Grand Duke Nicholas forced the passage of the Danube at Sistova, and General Zimmerman, with the main body of the Russian army, crossed at Galatz, apparently unopposed, the Turks abandoning the Dobrudscha at the same time. On the 2nd of July it was stated that the Russian head-quarters on the Danube had been advanced to Sistova; and on the 3rd that the advanced guard had reached Biela, a position about twenty miles south-west of Sistova. Placing these facts together, it is not merely reasonable to suppose, but it is indeed almost certain, that the transference of a British fleet to Besika Bay was a consequence of the passage of the Danube by the Russians in force, and of the advance of some of their cavalry to the foot of the Balkans. Like every one who knows the Turkish character, the British Cabinet has evidently a distrust of, the Turkish defence of the Balkans. That defence may be one of the most obstinate in history, and may utterly defy the Russian advance; but, on the other hand, it may be of the most futile character, and the Russian advanced guard, or at least a portion of it, may be in Adrianople before the coming, or even the present month, has gone. This is by no means probable, but it is possible; and statesmen have to consider and weigh possibilities as well as probabilities. But it will be said, what would it matter though the Russian advanced guard did reach Adrianople ? That is still 150 miles at least from Constantinople; the capital occupies a very strong position; the lines of defence have been traced ; and a large number of the inhabitants —70,000, it is stated—were at work on them in May, and by the end of June they must have been finished so as to be impregnable, except after a very protracted siege. This is all quite true ; but, nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the decision of the British Cabinet to move the fleet to Besika Bay was not only a prudent step, but was actually a necessary one, if the interests of England in protecting Constantinople against a Russian occupation are taken into consideration. THE DEFENCE OF CONSTANTINOPLE. Situated at the end of a peninsula which contains two or three very strong positions, with the Black Sea on one side and the Sea of Marmora on the other, Constantinople could easily be rendsred impregnable to the attacks of the whole Russian army, if the defence were aided by fleets in both seas. With the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea, and the British fleet co-operating in the Sea of Marmora, a very moderate garrison woidd be suflicient for the defence ; supplies of all kinds would easily be obtained by the besieged, while the besiegers would have to procure them by a long and tedious route through a hostile country. With the British fleet, then, in the Sea of Marmora, the position of the Russians would be as hopeless as that of the French before Torres Vedras. The moral support alone that the presence of the British fleet would give to the besieged would be of inestimable value, and the Russian army would have to own itself baffled and defeated, when it had the suburbs of the coveted capital almost within range of its guns. But the Sea of Marmora is only approachable from the west by the passage of the Dardanelles, and this celebrated strait is entirely commanded by the Thracian Chersonese. Could the Russians then obtain possession of this important peninsula, they could utterly bar the passage into the Sea of Marmora against the British fleet. The Turkish forts that defend the strait are, or were recently, incapable of defence against a very ordinary attack from the land side, so that if the Russian vanguard reached Adrianople, a rapid march of four or five days —if unopposed—would enable them to reach the neck of land on which Gallipoli is situated. They would then probably be able easily to obtain possession of the forts that guard the strait, and thus prevent the British fleet from reaching the Sea of Marmora. It does not necessarily follow that even then they would be able easily to obtain possession of Constantinople, for the Turkish fleet would still bo available for its defence. But if the British sq\iadron were unable to pass the Dardanelles, there can be little doubt that the Russians would have a fair chance of obtaining possession of the capital, not so much by the ordinary process of war, as by working on the fears, the jealousy, or the cupidity of the large Christian population within its walls. This is the danger that the British Government foresees, ami which it has taken stops to guard against, by ordering its fleet to lie in Besika Bay. If the Turks are unable to defend the Balkans, and the invaders cross them in force, there can be little doubt, I think, that the licet, will move forward, and that we shall hear of the Peninsula of Gallipoli being occupied by British troops, and of the lines which guard the entrance to it near that city, being seized by them, and fortified so as to repel any Russian attack.