THE WAR IN EUROPEAN TURKEY.

Globe, Volume VIII, Issue 962, 26 July 1877, Page 3

THE WAR IN EUROPEAN TURKEY.

A series of papers, from which we have already quoted, have been appearing from time to time in the Melbourne "Argus," on the subject of the Russo-Turkish war. They were principally speculations on the news as it is received, and they show the writer to be both well acquainted with the situation, and with the history of similar wars. They have also, since he commenced, been, confirmed by the latest intelligence from the front. His last two papers are particularly interesting, as referring to the placos at which the war is now proceeding, and the probabilities of English interference. We quote the more instructive passages:— THE EUSSIAN ADVANCE. The war has at last begun in earnest in European Turkey. The passage of the Danube at Sistova on the 27th June by the Russian Commander-in-Chief, at the head of the Eighth Army Corps, must be accepted as a movement that decides the command of that important river. The Russians have now, and will have, until they penetrate a long way further south, such a decided superiority in the field, that a passage of the Danube by one corps, means for them the command of the southern as well as of the northern bank. A large portion of the Turkish army must necessarily be confined within the various important fortresses that line the southern bank of the river, so that the number available for service in the field cannot have the slightest hope of successfully contending with the invaders, whan they have once obtained a firm footing on the Turkish side. But the successful pussage of the Danube by the Russians is by no means a matter of high importance, and is of itself in no way indicative of the result of the war. It would undoubtedly have been so had the Turkish capital been north of the Balkans, because alter the passage of the river the road to it would then have been open to the Russians. But from, the banks of the Danube, Constantinople can only be reached by a long and weary march of at least 300 miles, through a country of a most formidable character for defence, and protected by a climate which in summer is without exception the most unhealthy in Europe. Indeed it may with truth be said, that until the Russians crossed the Danube, the war, so far as regards operations in Europe, had not properly begun. Knowing their weakness in the field as compared with Russia, the Turks wisely determined to keep on the south side of the Danube, and there wait for the advance of their enemy. They strongly fortified and garrisoned Widdin, Rustchuk, Silistria, and other important points for crossing, and in this way they have succeeded in checking the Russian advance for about five weeks. But they could never have seriously contemplated being able to hold the Russians at bay on the northern bank for any length of time, as the successful defence of a river line 500 miles long, against an enemy greatly superior in force, is utterly opposed to all the probabilities of war. The possession of Sistova by the Russian commander, must therefore soon be followed by the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the banks of the Danube to the strong positions on the northern slope of the Balkans. Probably, before doing so, they will attack the enemy where he is not concentrated in great force, and we may thus hear of a few engagements of more or less importance, as for example that at Beila, in which the Russian advanced guard is said to have been defeated ; but the Turks are not likely to risk fighting a great battle unless under most advantageous circumstances. Such a step would merely be playing into the hands of the invaders, and it is therefore not one likely to be taken by the Turkish commander. His plan, there can be little doubt, will be to withdraw its field forces as the Russians advance in force; to lay waste the country by carrying all his available supplies with him in his retreat, and by burning or otherwise destroying all that he must leave beliind. Ho will also rendei\useless as far as he possibly can the railway from Rustchuk to Varua, so that the Russians may be compelled to supply themselves as they advanced with food, forage, and ammunition, by means of endless convoys of carts and waggons. By thus retreating and concentrating his army on the strong positions of the Balkans, and by holding the fortresses of Shumla and Varua, the Turkish commander will be able to place the Russians in a position of great embarrassment, and, indeed, of terrible difficulty. It is here, and not on the Danube, that the true Turkish defence will begin. And so long as the Turks are able to hold their ground at this point, an advanco by the Russians on Constantinople is impracticable.