COURT OF APPEAL.

Globe, Volume IV, Issue 301, 31 May 1875, Page 3

COURT OF APPEAL.

(j From the New Zealand Times.') Friday, May 21.

PATERSON V THE MANDEVILLE AND RANGXORA ROAD BOARD,

Mr Justice Johnston delivered the judgment of himself and Mr Justice Gillies in this case, as follows: This is an appeal from a rule absolute by the Supreme Court, Canterbury District, for a prohibition against the Resident Magistrate of the Kaiappi district proceeding in a cause under the following circumstances; —Paterson, the plaintiff, believing he had a good ground of action for an amount and for a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the Resident Magistrate’s Court, sues the Mande▼ille and Rangiora Road Board (a corporation) in the Resident Magistrate’s Court. The summons to this corporation is served on the clerk of the corporation. The corporation appears (we must assume properly) and objects, firstly, that the service of the summons is not in accordance with the Resident Magistrate’s Acts; and, secondly, that the Resident Magistrate’s Court has no jurisdiction in causes “ by or against ” Road Board Corporations. The Magistrate sets those objections aside, and hears and determines the cause. A rule nisi for prohibition is granted and is made absolute on no other grounds, as appear by the case, than those stated above as raised before the magistrate. The cause of action is clearly within the jurisdiction of the Resident Magistrate’s Court, but the question arises as to whether the jurisdiction extends to corporations as well as to individuals. On the authority of the Interpretation Act, 1868, as well as the case of Taylor v Growl and Gas and Coke Company (24 L.J, Ex 233 and 11 Ex. 1); we are clearly of opinion that the jurisdiction of the Resident Magistrate’s Courts extends to corporations as well as to individuals in respect of causes of action mentioned in section 19 of the Resident Magistrates’ Act, 1867. But then comes the question as to whether the jurisdiction of the Resident Magistrate’s Court over the subject matter of the suit attaches itself to the individual (person or corporation) sued, until due service of summons. The service or mode of service of a summons is a matter of practice and procedure of the Court, and although no mode of service on a corporation is specifically prescribed by the Resident Magistrate’s Act or rules made thereunder, it appears that the Resident Magistrate was satisfied that sufficient service had been effected ; and it appears that the Corporation sued appeared, although only to object to the service and jurisdiction. As to the question of service, the Resident Magistrate had clearly jurisdiction to decide (Zohrab v Smith, 5 D. and L. 635, and Robinson r Lenaghan, 17 L.J. Ex. 174) ; and, however wrong his decision may have been in this respect, prohibition, which can only apply in cases of want of, or excess of, jurisdiction, is not the appropriate remedy, In Mis caue of Reg. ▼

Evans and Yale, justices, 19 L.J. M.O. 151, the defendant not having been served at all, no doubt certiorari issued to quash the order, but certiorari is only the means of bringing a question before the superior Court by way of appeal, and in the present case the defendant Corporation was served, it may be—though we do not decide that point —irregularly or insufficiently, but appeared and thereby submitted itself to the jurisdic tion of the Court to determine whether the service was sufficient. We are therefore of opinion that the question of sufficient service in the present case was, as a matter of practice and procedure, within the jurisdiction of the Resident Magistrate, and consequently that prohibition is not the proper remedy against an erroneous judgment of the Resident Magistrate. The judgment of the Court is that the rule absolute ought not to have been made. Appeal allowed, with costs.