The Gisborne Times PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. MONDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1907. MAKING FOR THE WORLD’S PEACE.

Gisborne Times, Volume XXV, Issue 2070, 23 December 1907, Page 2

The Gisborne Times PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. MONDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1907. MAKING FOR THE WORLD’S PEACE.

Although the recent treaty between the old-timo rivals for power in Southern Asia, Britain, and Russia, ostensibly only concerns the special interests of thoso nations, it must inevitably have a far-reaching effect in tlio world’s affairs. In a reeent issue, “Harper’s AVcekly” discusses in an interesting manner the probable effect of the treaty upon our relations with tlio United States. In this connection the New York journal points out that the understanding between Russia and Britain renders our alliance with Jajian a. one-sided arrangement that cannot possibly be of benefit of us, now that all danger of a Russian invasion of Europe has been removed. The writer sums up the position as follows: —'

1 Tliere is no doubt that, since the early part of 1905, times have undergone a momentous change so far as Great Britain is concerned. By the treaty with Japan then existing, she had scarcely anything, while Japan had everything, to gain, for that instrument simply hound each of the parties to assist the other if the latter should become engaged in war •with two or more Powers. In 1895 Japan had been robbed of the Liaotung Peninsula, ceded to her in the .'Treaty of. Sliimonoseki, by the joint interposition of Russia, Germany, and France. But for the Anglo-Jap-anese agreement subsequently effected, to which wo have just referred, Japan would never have ventured to engage in the war with Russia which began in February, 1904, for the Russian fleet, beyond a doubt, could have relied on the co-operation of the German and French .navies. Her reluctance to engage in a contest at sea with those three Powers was well founded, for the result inevitably would have been her permanent exclusion from Manchuria and the loss of ascendancy in Korea; and the Japanese population, 'already pressing on the means of subsistence, would have been condemned irrevocably to stifle and starve in: their archipelago. The hour when the former treaty with England- was signed, h.v which was blocked a revival of the triple confederacy in 1595, may be looked upon as having been the crisis in the modern history of the Alikado's empire. To England, on the other hand, the former Anglo-Japan-ese, treaty meant comparatively nothing, for it was most improbable tliat British India would ever bo seriously threatened with invasion by more than ono European Power. Wliat has been recognised for decades as tlio one gravo source of x>eril to the Anglo-Indian Empire was Russia, which gradually had crept from her conquests in Central Asia to the borders of Afghanistan and the Indian province of Kashmir. That danger, evidently, would not be averted, but accented, should Russia, beaten by Japan in her efforts to secure an icefreo naval station at Port Arthur or in the Korean Peninsula, feel herself driven to .secure an outlet to the Indian Ocean. Under the circumstances, Lord iLansdowne, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, felt it a duty to his country to substitute for the former agreement the treaty of August 12, 1905, whereby each of the parties is pledged to assist the other, even should the latter be assailed by one Power only. From tlie moment that this second compact was made, Great Britain had nothing to dread from Russia, but the spirit of the new treaty would, it might have been foreseen, constrain her to disregard the opposition of British-Columbians, •Australians, and New Zealanders to Japanese immigration, so far as the taking of rigorous measures against such an inflow should be concerned. What was no less serious—the .seriousness became patent as time went on —-reflection upon the possible effect of the Anglo-Japanese treaty in a possible contingency, to wit, a war between Japan and the United States, threatened to undo afl that had been done since the incident to weld the British and American peoples together, not only in a so-called union of hearts, but by the more enduring tie of a community of interests. That was a price for the last treaty with Japan which Englishmen, bearing in mind their dependence on their transatlantic kinsmen for breadstuff's, have felt the more reluctant to pay the 'more they have thought about the matter. The Anglo-Russian treaty, recently signed and now ratified, revolutionises for England the situation with regard to Japan on the one hand and to the United States on the other. Great Britain and Russia having agreed reciprocally to each other’s spheres of influence in Central Asia (Afghanistan and Persia), the first-named Power has now absolutely no need of an alliance with Japan. Henceforth Great Britain must bear all the burden of the compact of August, 1905, and no quid pro quo can conceivably be furnished by the Tokio •Government, To Jap m, on the other hand, it is still a matter of vita, moment that Great Britain shall a fill o re to the treaty of August, 1905, during the lifetime thereof, for otherwise the former Power coukl not count upon resisting successfully a combined attack at the hands of Germany and the United Sti.tes, which, alone of the great maritime states, have not exchanged guarantees with the Afikado. Under the circumstance*;, Great Britain has become tlio

arbiter of peace or war in tlio Far East: by lifting a finger tlio British Foreign Office can constrain the lokio Government to avoid giving a pretext for hostilities in tlio Pacific. If Japan over felt impelled, by the outbreak of race hatred in San Francisco or by President Roosevelt’s intention to mass our battle-ships in the Pacific Ocean, to attack the Philippines or Hawaii, she dare not now obey the impulse. For she might bo represented as the aggressor, and tlio British Foreign Office might, and doubtless would, assert that a. strict construction of the treaty of August, 1905, Mould not justify Great Britain in Kicking Japan in a war of aggression.

How, then, may wo sum up ■succinctly the effect of the Aiigio-Eiis-sian Convention? . That treaty lias assured for the period of its continuance, and, probably, for file twentieth century, the peace of tlie Far East. AVe shall hear, henceforth, no more from Tokio about tlie coercion of California than wo may expect to bear about the coercion ol British Columbia, or Australia, or New Zealand. . . In Berlin alone may the auspicious outcome of the Auglo-Russian agreement lie regarded with some regret. The main cause of a gradual weakening of the cordial understanding between Great Britain and the United States will soon have passed away, while Germany’s cherished hope of being accepted as America’s best friend now seems on the point of vanishing. If our contemporary has accurately expressed American feeling on the subject, it is moro and more evident that tlio Anglo-Russian treaty constitutes one of the best achievements of British diplomacy in recent years. It is, of course, very useful to have a satisfactory understanding with tlio Japanese, hut it is even moro urgent that our international relationships with the United States shall continue as cordial as possible. Still more is it gratifying to note the American view that the general effect of the treaty is to perpetuate the peace of the world.