The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED "THE TIMES.” FRIDAL, DECEMBER 8, 1939. CONTROL OF THE SEA

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20115, 8 December 1939, Page 6

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED "THE TIMES.” FRIDAL, DECEMBER 8, 1939. CONTROL OF THE SEA

Without being unduly optimistic Mr. Churchill has again succeeded in putting the war at sea in its right perspective. His statement to the House of Commons this week supplied an invigorating tonic at a time when, in some quarters, British losses have tended to be magnified. It is not unnatural that there should be an exaggerated view of the results of the German campaign. As is so often the way, bad news receives much publicity but good news is taken for granted and the importance of no news at all is seldom realised. When a British ship is lost the fact is not merely reported but is repeated time after time in the wireless bulletins until the news receives an exaggerated importance in the public mind. There might be a dozen references in the course of a day or two to the sinking of one ship, but there is not even the mention of the far more important fact that every day some hundreds of ships, carrying cargoes for the Allies, are pursuing the even tenor of their ways. The lack of proportion in the public mind is indicated by Mr. Churchill’s statement that during November 250,000 tons of shipping entered or cleared from British harbours for every 1000 tons that was lost —a proportion of 250 to one. In all the circumstances, those are remarkably good odds and it is time that emphasis was placed on the large number of ships that safely run the blockade instead of on the isolated losses.

The position can be analysed in another way. At the outbreak of war Britain had 21,000,000 tons of shipping. After three months in which every human and inhuman method of attack has. been exploited to the utmost that huge total has been reduced by only 00,000 tons, or less than onethird of 1 per cent. Viewing the position in its worst light a little more than It per cent of the pre-war tonnage has been destroyed by enemy action. If it were possible for Germany to maintain the same rate of destruction for two years—and even in the first few months the losses have been diminishing—then at the end of ‘that period the British mercantile marine would be reduced by only 12J per cent if there were not a singld ton of replacement. As it is, Mr. Churchill’s figures show that in the first three months the replacement rate was more than 80 per cent of the losses. If both the losses and replacement rate of the first three months were maintained, then, after two years of war, the total British tonnage would have been reduced by just over 500,000 tons, or 2£ per cent, or, to put it another way, at the rate of li per cent per annum. These figures make it clear that the war will have to go on for very many years before British overseas trade is seriously affected by the attacks which the enemy has concentrated upon it.

In addition to the mercantile marine losses there are, of course, the naval losses—the price which the Allies must pay for their control of the seas. These losses to date total 50,000 tons, or about 4 per cent of the naval tonnage which Britain had at the outbreak of war. To offset these losses there are nearly 1,000,000 tons of new naval vessels under construction and it seems reasonable to assume that the replacement rate is greater than that of the losses. In this connection, also, it has to be remembered that the enemy had the advantage of surprise

and it is inconceivable that this will be such an important factor in the future. Mr. Churchill’s figures show, for instance, that the submarine, despite increasingly illegal methods, is rapidly losing its striking power and lhai U-boats are being destroyed faster than they can be built. The magnetic mine. Hitler's secret weapon, although it scored some initial success, has had comparatively few victims recently and Mr. Churchill has given an assurance that measures for dealing with it were far advanced even before it was first used. Despite submarines, mines, and raiders, Allied

sea-borne trade is going on much as usual. There are, as Mr. Churchill says, always more than 2000 ships at sea and the fact that all but an in-

finitesimal proportion reach and leave port in safety is proof of the Allied

command of the seas.

These is another side of the picture which receives insufficient public notice and that is the position of German shipping. It is not possible, of course, to point to heavy Germany maritime losses for the simple reason that German shipping has virtually ceased to exist. Such vessels as were at sea when war was declared have not been able to continue their normal trade but have been in contant flight. How many of them have actually been captured by the Allies or scuttled by their own crews has not been disclosed, but even in the last week or two five or six such ships which ventured to leave neutral ports have been lost to Germany. German losses, however, are infinitely less serious than the general Immobilisation of German shipping, for the all-important fact is that while Allied trade continues with negligible interruption Germany cannot rely on a single ship reaching port in safety. The war at sea is inevitably linked with the economic war, since one is largely dependent upon the other. In measuring the British-losses at sea, therefore, it is necessary to weigh against them the incalculable gain of being able to maintain Allied trade while, at the same time, completely severing that of the enemy. Studied dispassionately from any angle, the Allied position at sea leaves no room for real concern but much ground for solid satisfaction.